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Abstract/Lay Summary 
How does the living body impact, and perhaps even help constitute, the thinking, reasoning, 
feeling agent? This is the guiding question that the following work seeks to answer. The subtitle 
of  this project is emotion, prediction and embodied cognition for good reason: these are the 
three closely related themes that tie together the various chapters of  the following thesis. The 
central claim is that a better understanding of  the nature of  emotion offers valuable insight for 
understanding the nature of  the so called ‘predictive mind’, including a powerful new way to 
think about the mind as embodied 
Recently a new perspective has arguably taken the pole position in both philosophy of  mind and 
the cognitive sciences when it comes to discussing the nature of  mind. This framework takes the 
brain to be a probabilistic prediction engine. Such engines, so the framework proposes, are 
dedicated to the task of  minimizing the disparity between how they expect the world to be and 
how the world actually is. Part of  the power of  the framework is the elegant suggestion that 
much of  what we take to be central to human intelligence - perception, action, emotion, learning 
and language - can be understood within the framework of  prediction and error reduction. In 
what follows I will refer to this general approach to understanding the mind and brain as 
'predictive processing'. 
While the predictive processing framework is in many ways revolutionary, there is a tendency for 
researchers interested in this topic to assume a very traditional ‘neurocentric’ stance concerning 
the mind. I argue that this neurocentric stance is completely optional, and that a focus on 
emotional processing provides good reasons to think that the predictive mind is also a deeply 
embodied mind. The result is a way of  understanding the predictive brain that allows the body 
and the surrounding environment to make a robust constitutive contribution to the predictive 
process. While it’s true that predictive models can get us a long way in making sense of  what 
drives the neural-economy, I will argue that a complete picture of  human intelligence requires us 
to also explore the many ways that a predictive brain is embodied in a living body and embedded 
in the social-cultural world in which it was born and lives.  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How does the living body impact, and perhaps even help constitute, the thinking, reasoning, 
feeling agent? This is the guiding question that the following work seeks to answer. The subtitle 
of  this project is emotion, prediction and embodied cognition for a good reason: these are the 
three closely related themes that tie together the various chapters of  the following thesis. The 
central claim is that a better understanding of  the nature of  emotion offers valuable insights for 
understanding the nature of  the ‘predictive mind’, including a powerful new way to think about 
the mind as embodied. 
Broadly, a cognitive process is embodied if  it is deeply dependent upon aspects of  the physical 
body outside of  the brain, that is, parts of  the body contribute to cognition in richly causal or 
even constitutive ways (Wilson & Foglia 2011). This project will extend this definition beyond 
the external physical body, to include a full living system that involves the hotter and bloodier 
dimension of  the inner body (including the viscera, vascular, immune, and endocrine systems). 
Living embodiment of  this kind is increasingly implicated in accounts of  emotion and cognition 
(see Colombetti 2015; Stapleton 2013; Thompson & Cosmelli 2011; Damasio 2010). 
General interest in researching emotion is at a high. Various fields of  inquiry including 
philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and robotics have all begun to inquire into the role 
emotions might play in the functioning of  the mind. This burst of  popularity is due in part to 
advancements in our understanding of  neural architecture. I will draw on recent neuroscience of  
emotion as a means of  supporting some of  the central claims in embodied (‘full living body’ 
style) cognitive science. Emotion is an ideal topic for those interested in embodying the mind. In 
an important sense emotions are rooted in both brain and bodily processes. One way to see 
emotion research and embodied cognitive science coming together is in recent network theories 
of  the brain that are changing the way we think about the traditional ontological assumptions we 
have about emotion and cognition as easily separable processes (Pessoa 2017). In Chapter 1 I 
build on this research as a means of  supporting some of  the core ideas in embodied cognitive 
science.  
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In Chapters 2 through 6 I apply this line of  thinking specifically to a new and exciting view of  
the nature of  mind and cognition, which takes the brain to be a probabilistic prediction engine 
(Friston 2010; Howhy 2013; Clark 2013). Such engines, so the framework proposes, are 
dedicated to the task of  minimizing the disparity between how they expect the world to be and 
how the world actually is. Part of  the power of  the framework is the elegant suggestion that 
much of  what we take to be central to human intelligence - perception, action, emotion, learning 
and language - can be modelled (and so at least partially understood) within the framework of  
prediction and error reduction (Clark 2013: 181). In what follows, I will refer to this general 
approach to understanding the mind and brain as 'predictive processing'.  
The predictive processing framework is in many ways revolutionary. However, there is a 
tendency for researchers interested in this topic to assume a very traditional ‘neurocentric’ stance 
concerning the mind. I argue that this neurocentric stance is completely optional, and that a 
focus on emotional processing provides good reasons to think that the predictive mind is also a 
deeply embodied (in the ‘situated living organization’ sense described above) mind. The result is 
a way of  understanding the predictive brain that allows the body and the surrounding 
environment to make a robust constitutive contribution to the predictive process. While it’s true 
that predictive models can get us a long way in making sense of  what drives the neural-economy, 
I will argue that a complete picture of  human intelligence requires us to also explore the many 
ways that a predictive brain is viscerally embodied in a living body and embedded in the social-
cultural world in which it was born and lives.  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Introduction 
In order to offer important context to the arguments that follow, I will briefly introduce some of  
the relevant core concepts. First, I will briefly introduce the notion of  embodied cognitive 
science. Second, I will outline how I see recent neuroscience of  emotion offering support for the 
embodied cognitive science paradigm. Third, I will introduce the predictive processing 
framework - the primary model of  cognition and mind I will be discussing throughout this 
thesis. Fourth, I will outline how different camps within the predictive processing framework are 
viewing its amenability to embodied cognitive science. Fifth and sixth, I will lay the groundwork 
for my specific line of  argumentation that emotion research offers a more substantial bridge 
between predictive processing and embodied cognitive science. I conclude this introduction with 
a brief  synopsis of  each of  the chapters. 
Embodied cognitive science 
Cognitive science and philosophy of  mind have long made happy bedfellows. Empirically 
interested philosophers have learned to harness the cognitive sciences to help develop and test 
theories about the nature of  the mind. In return, philosophers have developed broad theoretical 
frameworks for making sense of  the empirical data. Of  the many shared interests between 
philosophy and cognitive science perhaps the most exciting today is the notion that the mind 
may be embodied. That is, that cognitive function may depend, in part, on organismic resources 
found outside of  the central nervous system. 
Traditionally cognitive science defended a rather narrow view of  cognition. The central nervous 
system was assumed to be the sole locus of  mental activity. The body, when it was discussed at 
all, was imagined to be simply a vehicle for perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs to 
interface with the brain. As Shapiro writes, concerning traditional cognitive science, “[b]ecause 
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cognition begins and ends with inputs to and outputs from the nervous system, it has no need 
for interaction with the real world outside it” (Shapiro 2007: 339).  1
Embodied cognitive science (ECS), by contrast, takes the position that cognition cannot be 
understood without also taking into consideration wider embodied and environmental dynamics. 
ECS is composed of  a loose-knit collection of  ideas about how the body and environment may 
make this contribution to cognition (see Brooks 1991; Beer 2003; Clark 1997; Kelso 1995; Noë 
2004; Thelen & Smith 1994; Thelen et al. 2001; Thompson 2007; Thompson & Varela 2001; 
Maturana & Varela 1991).  
One way researchers have argued for embodied cognition is by looking at how the body’s 
structure and function has evolved in ways that help reduce the computational costs of  
cognizing. For example, an animal who has evolved two eyes set at a certain distance apart, and 
the ability to turn its head, has a computationally cheaper method for acquiring more accurate 
depth perception compared to, say, a single eyed fixed-headed version of  itself  (Churchland et al. 
1994). In other words, the two eyed creature’s body does some of  its depth-perception for free. 
Another popular approach to supporting ECS is a close analysis of  the relationship between 
perception and action. A growing literature suggests that our perceptual abilities are built upon 
our behavioural abilities (Churchland et al. 1994; Clark 1997; Hurley 1998; O’Regan & Noë 2001, 
2004). Hurley’s (1998; 2008) work on “sensorimotor dynamics” is useful to consider here. Hurley 
argues that perception and action each emerge from a collection of  subpersonal processes, many 
of  which are shared between the two. Due to this integration activity in the motor system is able 
to directly impact perceptual processing and vice versa (see Hurley 1998: 363–364; see also 
O’Regan & Noë 2001). Hurley characterizes the relationship between perception and action as 
“constitutively interdependent”: i.e., they interact with one another in such rich and reciprocal 
ways that an easy separation into distinct categories becomes impossible. What we perceive and 
how we behave are controlled by a single complex system: action constitutes perception, and 
perception is a form of  action. This rich sensorimotor entanglement exposes a deep continuity 
between cognition and the body.  
 A common image arising from early cognitive science was the ‘mind as computer’. The central nervous system was 1
likened to the central processing unit (CPU), with the brain and transducer systems translating sensory stimulation 
into chunky, manipulatable symbols that could be operated upon by the CPU. Some of  those symbols could in turn 
be translated into behaviours. Cognition here is a highly insular (‘neurocentric’) affair, taking place entirely within the 
CPU-brain.
!2
In both examples cognitive processing is described as being offloaded onto elements of  the non-
neural body. The mind from this vantage is not some immaterial Cartesian substance, nor is the 
brain considered the mind’s minimally sufficient physical basis. Rather, cognition is reimagined as 
emerging from a much wider network of  interactions that take place between the brain and body.  
While considerations about gross morphology and sensorimotor dynamics go some way to 
refuting the neurocentric assumptions of  early cognitive science, some researchers remain 
dissatisfied with these approaches.  These contributions may only offer a ‘moderate 2
embodiment’: the body is described as helping to reduce cognitive costs, but in a way that 
maintains a strong separation between the brain as locus of  cognition and body as support. A 
central aim of  this thesis is the exploration of  a new and potentially more complete approach to 
embodying the mind. I will argue that emotion research (specifically, neuroscience) can offer a 
more substantial view of  the mind as embodied. While the study of  emotion should be an 
obvious topic for ECS, as emotions are often described as composites of  both brain and bodily 
elements, until very recently ECS has remained almost entirely silent about emotion. Emotion 
theorists in return have by and large failed to incorporate the lessons taught by ECS. I will argue 
that the body’s most important contribution to cognition is not to be found in the external or 
superficial aspects of  the body, but rather in the wetter, hotter and bloodier dimension of  the 
inner body which includes the viscera, vascular, immune, and endocrine systems (see Craig 2002; 
Damasio 2010; Stapleton 2013; Colombetti 2014; Thompson & Cosmelli 2011). I will introduce 
my argument for embodying the mind through emotion in the following section. 
Emotion-cognition entanglements 
Philosophers and scientists have long been interested in understanding the relationship between 
emotion and cognition. Historically, emotion and cognition were viewed as separable, and often 
even opposing, processes (Aristotle 1991; Plato 1992). While researchers at the end of  the 19th 
century, such as Darwin and James, had begun to recognize the important role that emotions 
play in the mind, their 20th century counterparts tended to view emotion and cognition as 
antithetical concepts. However, there has been a tremendous surge of  interest in emotion within 
the cognitive sciences over the last two decades. Among the more provocative challenges to 
traditional doctrine is the growing body of  evidence that the long assumed ontological 
boundaries separating emotion from cognition may be misguided (see Damasio 1994; LeDoux 
1996; Damasio 1999; Rolls 2005; Phelps 2006).  
 For good examples see Stapleton (2013) and Colombetti (2014).2
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Recent network models of  the brain provide compelling evidence that these folk divisions do 
not map onto functionally segregated brain areas (Pessoa 2013, 2017; Lindquist & Barrett 2012; 
Parvizi 2009). Emerging from this work is a strong argument for seeing emotion and cognition 
not only as merely interacting, but as functionally interdependent and dynamically co-evolving 
(see in detail in Chapters 1, 2 and 3). In many ways, this is unsurprising. A tight interdependency 
between cognition and emotion is what allowed our animal ancestors to succeed in situated 
action control. For emotion and motivation to support fast adaptive behaviour these processes 
must be able to influence the rest the system in a timely manner. In our world, situations change 
in important ways from moment to moment: our level of  energy, what opportunities the 
situation offers, and how we are faring in the task all matter to our survival. The necessity for 
animals to be extremely sensitivity to this internal bodily information should make us suspicious 
of  a strong segregation between emotion, motivation and cognition (Cisek & Pastor-Bernier 
2014; Lepora & Pezzulo 2015; Verschure et al. 2014).  
Network models offer an account of  the neural architecture that makes this smooth and ongoing 
influence possible. Where traditional models of  the brain tended to assume that connections 
between discrete brain areas to be relatively simple and linear, network models describe the brain 
as composed of  tightly organized neural-clusters, whereby every brain area is densely and 
reciprocally connected to every other area, and pathways leading from anywhere to anywhere are 
relatively short (Sporns 2006; Sporns et al. 2004; Sporns & Zwi 2004). For example, research 
now shows that every cortical area is either directly connected, or by way of  only one or two 
intermediate steps, to every other cortical area (Hilgetag et al. 2000; Sporns et al. 2000). This rich 
interaction between brain regions has shifted the emphasis away from trying to understand brain 
function one area or region at a time. Instead, researchers are now investigating how coalitions or 
networks of  different regions work together to support cognition and behavior.  
I argue that this interconnection, interaction and mutual influence among components (or neural 
regions) motivates a view of  cognitive and emotional processes as functionally inseparable within 
the brain (see in detail in Chapters 1, 2 and 3; see also work done in Colombetti 2014; Pessoa 
2013; Lewis 2005). The tight coordination between cortex and subcortex (which is in turn tightly 
coordinated with information from within the organism’s body) ensures that emotional and 
motivational value are continually folded into cognition and behavior (Pessoa 2009, 2015, 2017). 
For example, due to the rich reciprocal connections between the visual cortex and the 
subcortical pulvinar and amygdala (both widely linked to affective significance), vision is 
inevitably processed within an affective context. The result is that that can be no such thing as 
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pure vision (Churchland et al. 1994) - all vision will inevitably be affective vision (Pessoa 2015: 257). 
From this perspective, perception, action and cognition are more than merely biased by emotion 
and motivation: they are thoroughly, and inextricably, emotional and motivational in nature. I will 
argue that emotion and cognition should be thought of  as “constitutively interdependent” in 
much the same way that Hurley proposes about action and perception (for other similar 
arguments see Colombetti 2014). In the process of  generating intelligent behaviour, emotional 
and cognitive processes become so intermixed that a functional separation becomes impossible 
(Lewis 2005; Lewis & Todd 2007). This entangled architecture poses a significant challenge to 
the traditional ontological boundaries between thinking, perceiving, feeling and acting. 
Building on this view of  cognitive and emotional processes as non-decomposable in the brain, I 
make the argument that the larger brain-body-environment system is also non-decomposable. 
Following arguments developed by Pessoa (2014), I suggest that structure-function mappings of  
the networks themselves are highly dynamic (see in detail in Chapter 1). In other words, the 
function that a given network performs will vary over time in a highly flexible and context-
dependent manner. It is this latter finding which I take to support the non-decomposability of  
the brain-body-environment system. Network accounts propose that the function of  any 
particular neural network can only be understood if  the wider 'global variables’ that constrain its 
functioning are taken into consideration, for example, neurotransmitters, bodily arousal and 
slow-wave potentials (Pessoa 2014: 408). The fact that neurotransmitter and arousal systems are 
capable of  influencing the organization of  brain networks invites the question as to why this 
boundary between the brain and body should be considered as a sort of  ‘‘magical 
membrane’’ (Hurley, 2010)?. Why should we think that the factors capable of  influencing the 
function of  a network will reside only inside of  the brain? I will propose instead that we think of  
bodily states of  arousal and action-readiness (that manifest as changes in the body’s vascular, 
visceral and motor systems) as global control parameters that influence the formation of  large-
scale networks in the brain. To determine the precise functional contribution a network is 
making to behavior requires zooming out, and having in view the whole organism in its 
interaction with the environment. Emotional-cognitive processes don’t only take place inside of  
brains, but are processes that involve constant interaction between the brain and the whole living 
body of  the organism in an ecological setting.  
Predictive processing 
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An increasingly popular theory in philosophy and neuroscience is that the brain can be aptly 
thought of  an engine of  prediction (Bubic et al. 2010; Friston 2010; Howhy 2013; Clark 2013). 
This engine, so the story goes, makes sense of  the world by actively predicting what will happen 
next. As it turns out, much of  what we take to be central to human intelligence - perception, 
action, emotion, learning and language - can be understood as emerging from this prediction 
process (Clark 2013: 181). 
This so called ‘predictive processing’ (PP) story begins with a brain that has evolved to help 
make understanding and responding to the world possible. How does that brain learn about the 
complex world of  objects and events when all it seems to have available to it are the relatively 
abstract sensory signals? This challenge has been referred to as the 'problem of  
perception' (Hohwy 2013). To make the problem more pronounced, consider the fact that any 
single object can induce a variety of  sensory patterns: the same object can be encountered from 
different angles or in changing atmospheric conditions. Moreover, many different objects 
produce similar sensory signals: a picture of  an object and the object itself, or a partially 
obscured object and a fragmented one (e.g. a cat walking behind a picket fence). To make matters 
worse, we must also be able to explain how the brain is able to separate out the salient 
information from the unimportant sensory noise. The PP model ‘earns its salt’ by offering an 
elegant solution to this challenge.  
In extremely brief  terms, the predictive brain gets a grip on the world by continually learning 
about the vast network of  temporal-spatial regularities that reflect, and in some ways constitute, 
its environment . It uses this knowledge base to make increasingly refined predictions about 3
what objects and events are most likely responsible for the signals it receives from the 
environment. When these top-down predictions match the bottom-up signals well enough, a 
perceptual experience occurs. When it doesn’t, the discrepancy between the prediction and the 
actual signal (referred to as “prediction errors”) either moves forward through the system 
helping to refine future predictions (e.g. the hose alongside the house isn't a snake), or it 
provokes actions aimed at making the sensory stream better fit the predictions (e.g. placing my 
coffee cup back in its regular place on my desk). Finally, this entire prediction error minimizing 
 Our world is filled with learnable regularities - both natural and synthetic, ranging from the very fast (e.g. patterns 3
in a swiftly moving river) to very slow (e.g. the river eroding the land around it). Through tracking fast regularities we 
grasp the fine-grained details about a scene. Tracking slower regularities provide the kind of  abstracted and enduring 
information that can help contextualize more local predictions, and help with more long term predictions. Moreover 
there are obvious interrelatedness between these levels. For example, the small tidal movements and eddies of  the 
river are key factors in how the shoreline will be sculpted over many years, in return the contours of  the slowly 
shifting shoreline is what produces and contains the tidal movements. Tracking one would give clues about the 
other, and vice versa. See Hohwy (2013) for a more complete discussion about this point.
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routine is further tuned by a set of  second-order expectations that track the reliability of  the 
predictive systems own estimates given the state of  the organism and the current context. It uses 
this estimation of  reliability (referred to as ‘precision weighing’) to flexibly adjust the gain (like 
turning the volume up) on particular error units which increases the impact they have on the 
unfolding process. This allows the system to both highlight specific bodies of  information, and 
to modify the degree to which it relies on bottom-up or top-down information (see Friston 
2009, 2010). For example, while listening to your favourite song in the shower it would be useful 
to turn down the influence on the error units produced by the flowing water, and rely more on 
our clear memories of  the song (Clark 2016: 92). 
The novel addition this theory makes to traditional, feedforward-dominated perception research 
is that perception is not explained by incoming signals alone, but crucially also includes our top-
down predictions about the shape of  those signals and what they could mean. Perception here 
turns out to be something like a complex controlled hallucination: we see what we believe we 
see. Of  course what we believe is continually tuned by the actual sensory signals, which works (in 
normal functioning brains) to anchor predictions to reality. 
This approach openly opposes classical feedforward-dominated perceptual models. In the not 
too distant past the brain was commonly characterized as a passive organ. Dormant neurons 
were thought to patiently await incoming signals to jolt them into action. When signals did arrive, 
they were thought to roll in from the sensorium and flow upward through the neural hierarchy 
increasing in complexity along the way (Marr, 1982). In direct contrast, PP describes the brain as 
fundamentally proactive - the brain actively generates perceptions by continually attempting to 
recreate from the top-down the world of  sensory signals. 
A novel feature of  the PP model then is a tight link between knowledge, perception, and action. 
The brain here uses prior knowledge to make probabilistic predictions about the structure of  the 
environment, which cashes out as both perception and world-altering action. In the process of  
continually attempting to predict the next sensory input, and using any error to update those 
predictions, the brain learns about the actionable world. This partnership between knowledge, 
perception, and action allows the human brain to leverage a lifetime's worth of  learning in order 
to respond to the newsworthy aspects of  an otherwise chaotic stream of  data. 
Conservative, Radical and Enactive-Ecological PP 
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While PP theories are in many ways revolutionary, there is something about the paradigm that 
encourages antiquated assumptions to quietly slip in the back door. It is easy to see why. The 
brain here is depicted as a multi-level probabilistic prediction machine. Mentality is defined as the 
generation of  predictive models by way of  error minimization taking place entirely in 
hierarchically structured neurons. This has led some researchers to the conclusion that the mind 
should be seen as skull-bound and disembodied (Hohwy 2010, 2016).  
However, while we are getting a clearer picture of  the structural and functional nature of  these 
informational flows within the predictive brain, the story about these flows can be pitched in two 
quite different ways. I will adopt Clark’s distinctions of  these views as Conservative Predictive 
Processing (CPP) and Radical Predictive Processing (RPP) .  4
The more conservative approach of  CPP takes the predictive process to be primarily concerned 
with sensory inputs being accommodated by the correct selection of  a hypothesis that best 
explains the sensory information. These hypotheses are constructed with reference to past 
learning and resulting estimations about the reliability of  the hypotheses and signals. In this 
reading, prediction error is conceived of  as data yet to be accounted for by the evolving 
hypothesis. Sensory information from the world and body helps the brain generate an 
increasingly more accurate model, one that mirrors the causal structure and richness of  those 
external realities. From this perspective, our cognitive contact with such realities is found 
exclusively in this rich cortically-encoded inner-model, which is in turn used to select and guide 
behaviours. As such, CPP offers something of  a predictive version of  what Anderson (2014) has 
referred to as a “re-constructivist’ approach to perception: the predictive brain thus works to rely 
on its own recapitulation of  the world for navigation - and progressively throws out the ‘real’ 
world as a result. 
Jakob Hohwy’s research remains the standard when it comes to characterizing this more 
conservative view of  PP. According to Hohwy the predictive mind is inherently neurocentric, 
and should be thought of  as strongly secluded from the world. The predictive brain, according 
to Hohwy, works by continually generating best guesses (from the top-down) about what is in 
the world. Those guesses are deemed correct insofar as they are able to ‘explain away’ the 
incoming signals. The fact that the incoming signals are as they are becomes evidence that the 
 To be clear, my aim in contrasting these approaches is not to explicitly argue against the CPP vision here. Rather, 4
my goal in this project is to build on recent embodied PP models by highlighting the intimate relationship between 
emotion and cognition in the predictive brain. In this way, my research will help to develop RPP into a better version 
of  itself, and thus prepare it for future debate with those less-embodied theories.
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brain’s generative model is accurate. The brain's use of  these circular patterns of  evidence forms 
what Hohwy describes as an ‘evidentiary boundary’, which he uses as a point of  separation 
between the hypothesis generating mechanisms and the evidence that is being explained. The 
boundary proposed here is the edge of  the sensorium: on the inside the skull-bound brain, and 
on the outside the body and world. It is this move that forms the basis of  Hohwy's neurocentric 
vision of  the predictive brain. As he summarizes, "this tells us how neurocentric we should be: 
the mind begins where sensory input is delivered through exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and 
interoceptive receptors and it ends where proprioceptive predictions are delivered, mainly in the 
spinal cord" (ibid.: 18). 
This approach highlights the internalist, neurocentric and representationally rich qualities of  the 
framework.  While this rendition may not be technically ‘wrong’ (indeed, regardless of  how we 5
take the framework to be, the math underlying these processes remains the same) it can be 
importantly misleading. It can give the impression that the brain is simply in the business of  
‘searching’ for the best multi-level hypothesis for explaining the incoming sensory data. The 
trouble with this interpretation is evident - especially for advocates of  ECS. This neurocentric 
interpretation makes adaptive behaviours secondary to representational fidelity. A moment’s 
reflection, however, ought to convince us that it is action – not perception – that real-world 
systems really need to get right. Perceiving a structured scene is adaptively useless unless it 
enables you to behave in ways that lead to continued thriving (or avoid life threatening events; 
see Clark 2015 for further discussion of  this point). 
RPP opposes this neurocentric slant, highlighting instead that knowing what’s out there is deeply 
dependent on doing something about it. Uncovering the various entanglements that exists 
between perception and action is a potent way of, as Clark has put it, busting the predictive mind 
out of  the confines of  the skull (Clark 2017). 
Until recently researchers interested in predictive dynamics have overwhelmingly favoured 
discussions about perception (a notable exception is Wolpert & Kawato 1998). If  action was 
mentioned it was commonly characterized as important only insofar as it helped reduce sensory 
prediction errors. Recent research reveals a different picture of  the predictive brain - one that 
characterizes the whole predictive process as aiming to translate sensory information into 
successful, adaptive behaviours (for a good review see Friston et al. 2017). This shouldn't come 
as a surprise. The brain evolved first and foremost to facilitate life-preserving interactions with 
 There is an enormous literature from ECS that challenges these sorts of  views. A few notable sources are 5
Churchland et al. (1994), Clark (1997), Pfeifer & Bongard (2006). 
!9
the environment. Seeing a predator would be of  little value if  doing so didn't also lead to 
behaviours that improve one’s chances of  safety.  
According to Clark, the action-oriented RPP approach aligns well with a number of  the core 
ideas in ECS. To establish this relationship RPP highlights two aspects of  the framework 
commonly underappreciated by CPP: the central role that action plays in the predictive process, 
and a novel capacity for precision weighting to weave together faster heuristic-style actions with 
slower deliberative strategies in the pursuit of  cost effective behavioural solutions. For Clark this 
is the key to seeing the predictive brain as an essentially embodied brain: an organism that has an 
imperative to reduce error, and is able to do so through altering both their perception and action, 
will consistently make use of  whatever cheap opportunities it has available – including offloading 
processing on the physical body and cognitive scaffolds that the environment offers. It is this 
dedication to leveraging frugal error revolving strategies that helps emphasize how the PP 
framework and ECS might come together.  
The result is a view of  the predictive brain as an action-control system always on the lookout for 
ways to get ‘more for less’. The brain is not characterized as some stronghold of  accurate 
knowledge acquisition and rational action, but rather as an organ dedicated to producing just 
good enough behaviours (which commonly includes economical solutions that rely on the body 
and world). As Clark concludes, “Embodied, situated agents, all this suggests, are masters of  
‘soft assembly’, building, dissolving, and rebuilding temporary ensembles that exploit whatever is 
available, creating shifting problem-solving wholes that effortlessly span brain, body, and 
world” (2015: 250). We can think of  this “non-reconstructivist” approach to PP as offering what 
amounts to a mechanistic rendition of  earlier embodied sensorimotor theories of  perception 
(O’Regan & Noe 2001). 
Still, there is something unsatisfying about this picture from an embodied mind perspective. It 
remains a picture in which the brain is the controller of  the body. Decision-making can 
sometimes be offloaded onto the body in the form of  fast and cheap heuristics when bodily 
habits are given high precision-weighting. Furthermore, bodily processes of  homeostasis 
generate highly precise prediction errors that organize lower levels of  processing in ways just 
described. Otherwise, however, the body of  the organism appears almost as an afterthought. 
Such a view of  PP is consistent with a view of  cognition as only modestly embodied (Clark 2008).  
In the thesis to follow I will explore a way of  understanding the predictive brain that allows for 
the body and the surrounding environment to make a robust constitutive contribution to PP.  I 
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do this, in part, by looking more closely at the nature of  emotion (and its relationship to 
cognition) within the predictive organism as a whole. The resulting picture of  the predictive 
mind, so I will argue, is not only embodied, but also perhaps enactive and ecological. 
Within the recent literature on predictive processing, we can distinguish another (even more 
radically embodied) strand that interprets the brain in ecological and enactive terms (Allen & 
Friston 2018; Gallagher & Allen 2018; Kirchhoff  2018). Enactivists subscribe to a mind-life 
continuity thesis that takes cognitive processes and living processes to work according to the 
same fundamental organizing principles. Enactive theorists take adaptive regulation of  coupling 
with the environment to be the defining characteristic of  cognition, which they characterize as 
sense-making (Varela et al 1991; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo 2005). The organism gives meaning 
to its encounters with the environment in actively realizing and sustaining a self-produced 
identity. It produces, sustains and conserves its identity over time in its interactions with the 
environment, and in doing so enacts or “brings forth” a meaningful world. Cognitive and 
affective processes work together in this framework to steer the organism through the world in 
pursuit of  what is significant. Colombetti writes that “Cognition from an enactive perspective is, 
rather, the capacity to enact or bring forth a world of  sense, namely, an Umwelt that has a special 
significance for the organism enacting it…cognition as sense making entails that cognition is 
simultaneously also affective” (Colombetti 2014:18). Enactive theories of  cognition take meaning 
to be bestowed on the environment from the lived perspective of  individual agents in their 
interaction with an environment that includes other agents. This giving of  meaning to the 
environment by the agent is reflected in the central enactive notion of  sense-making. 
In the ecological-enactive rendition of  PP (EEPP) that I will support (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), 
affect and cognition are both understood as aspects of  the whole animal-environment system.  6
The living body is depicted as providing a point of  view on the environment relative to which 
 One of  the key issues separating EEPP from RPP and CPP is the role of  representations in PP. The generative 6
model has sometimes been taken to call for explanation in representational terms (see. e.g. Clark 2015; Gladziejewski 
2015; Williams 2017; Kiefer & Hohwy 2018, and for non-representational accounts of  PP see, Orlandi 
2016; Bruineberg, Kiverstein and Rietveld 2016; Hutto 2016; Kirchhoff  & Robertson 2018; Gallagher 2017). EEPP 
starts from the idea of  the organism as a whole as embodying a model of  its environment (Friston 2013). Instead of  
characterizing the generative model as encoding knowledge, EEPP proposes to characterize the relation of  the 
organism to its environment in terms of  attunement developed over a past history of  interactions. RPP argues by 
contrast that the hierarchical and temporally deep structure of  the generative model has to be understood in 
representational terms. The role of  the generative model in solving representation-hungry problems that call for 
reasoning about the absent, distal and counterfactual means that the generative model has to be understood in 
representational terms. I have where possible in my thesis tried to remain neutral on this vexed issue. Chapter's 4, 5 
and 6 (co-authored with proponents of  EEPP) tend however to favour formulations in EEPP terms. I don't 
however engage with the arguments from RPP for understanding the generative model in representational terms. 
My thanks to Julian Kiverstein for discussion of  this issue. 
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the environment is perceived as having affective significance. The whole embodied organism in 
its environment is taken to be the fundamental unit of  explanation - not only the processes 
within the organism's brain. Drawing on ideas from ecological psychology the environmental 
surroundings of  the organism are conceived of  as offering affordances or action possibilities to 
the organism. As I have noted, cognition is often distinguished from affect in the philosophical 
and psychological literature on emotion. Appraisal and evaluation are associated with cognition, 
while affect is identified with changes in the autonomic system in the body. Appraisal according 
to this ecological-enactive approach is instead understood as involving the whole living body of  
the organism (as it prepares to act on relevant affordances). The organism has a basic concern to 
improve its grip on its environment. The EEPP approach characterizes this concern as the 
‘tendency towards an optimal grip’. ‘Grip’ here refers to the organism's bodily stance in relation 
to its current situation. I (and my co-authors) use this term because grip is something the 
organism must actively maintain in relationship with the changing environment. I talk of  grip as 
tending towards optimality (following Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014) because the organism is 
aiming at restoring relative equilibrium with its environment. In EEPP, prediction errors signal 
an increase in disequilibrium in the organism-environment system as a whole. Such disequilibria 
reflect a divergence in the sensory states (exteroceptive and interoceptive) the organism expects 
to occupy given the kind of  organism it, its current state, and the niche it inhabits. The organism 
then acts to reduce this disequilibrium or to make it the case that it comes to occupy the sensory 
states that it expects to be in (given the life it leads). In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I explore how 
precision and uncertainty should be understood based on this interpretation of  the relationship 
between affect and cognition. In particular, I make the argument that precision is mediated by 
affective states (states of  action readiness) taking place within the organism’s body as a whole as 
it relates to the world (more on this below). 
Interoception and the living body 
Researchers have already begun thinking about how the PP framework may be extended to 
discussions about feeling, emotions and moods (Ainley et al. 2016; Allen et al. 2016; Apps & 
Tsakiris 2014; Barrett & Simmons 2015; Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Clark 2015; Gu et al. 2013; 
Seth 2013, 2014; Seth et al. 2012).  7
 These approaches very much mirror PP models more generally, insofar as they range from staunchly disembodied 7
and cognitivist (Seth et al. 2012) to deeply dynamical and embodied (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Kirchhoff  
2016).
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Seth, for example, proposes that PP applies just as neatly to interoception as it does 
exteroception (2013). Interoception refers to our internal sense of  physiological changes in the 
body - somatic, visceral, vascular, and motor (Craig 2002, 2003). According to Seth’s 
Interoceptive Predictive Processing (IP) model, top-down predictions about the source of  
interoceptive signals counter-flow with bottom-up interoceptive prediction errors. Feelings arise 
from the ongoing integration of  these various predictive representations. Error signals are 
hypothesized to be minimized in an analogous way to sensorimotor predictions: either the error 
modifies the model to fit the inner world, or autonomic reflexes are initiated which influence the 
body to fit the prediction. In this model autonomic reflexes are called on to fulfill interoceptive 
predictions. 
While this work clearly includes the body into the discussion, Seth’s model amounts to a 
relatively straightforward comparator-style theory of  emotion. This means that while IP extends 
the PP framework to include signals form the body, it remains conceptually cognitivist - the body 
is only a source of  information, as opposed to being constitutive of  the process itself  (see Allen 
& Friston 2018 for a similar conclusion). I will argue that taking this cognitive-centric perspective 
is optional, and give reasons to abandon this account in favour of  a more dynamical and 
embodied view (Chapter 2). 
Another popular predictive framework focusing on interoception has been proposed by Barrett 
and Simmons (e.g. the Embodied Predictive Interoceptive Coding model (EPIC); 2015). While 
Barrett and Simmons focus on the same brain areas as Seth (e.g. the insular cortex), by taking a 
network perspective of  the brain they conclude that this process shouldn’t be thought of  as 
modular, but instead as dynamic. As they succinctly state, 
“It may be tempting to view the interoceptive system, as outlined in the EPIC model, as a 
modular system. However, the brain has a small-world architecture... augmented by ‘rich-
club’ hubs (that is, highly connected nodes), which ... serve as the brain’s ‘backbone’ for 
neural communication and synchrony. Several agranular visceromotor regions—including 
the anterior insula and cingulate cortices—are rich-club hubs, prompting the hypothesis 
that agranular visceromotor cortices send predictions to and receive prediction-error 
signals from cortices with greater laminar differentiation in an effort to create the kind of  
synchronized brain activity that is necessary for consciousness” (Barrett & Simmons 2015: 
425)  
Predictions about the internal body are described in this model as a sort of  “pacemaker” signal, 
one that helps synchronize the various streams of  information in order to bring forth a unified, 
embodied experience (Allen et al. 2016; Dehaene et al. 2014).  
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However, both the IP and EPIC models are only embodied in so far as bodily information is 
given a key role in influencing and contextualizing overall predictive dynamics. While cognition, 
perception and action are all continually adjusted by interoceptive information, that information 
plays its part entirely within the brain. In other words, the body itself  is only important in so far 
as it adjusts the internal mental representations of  the body. In both models, the body that 
matters is located squarely inside the head. Allen and Friston make the same point about these 
models, writing, “Whether such representations are connectionist [EPIC] or modular [IP] in 
nature is of  little concern; both views paint a homunculus into the picture” (2018: 2472). 
I will argue that a closer investigation of  the relationship between circuits typically referred to as 
emotional or cognitive (as outlined in Chapter 1) allows for a much more embodied view of  
emotion (Chapter 2). Interoception, I will argue, should be seen as more than just another 
stream of  information that the predictive brain makes use of. Rather, affective changes in the 
organism’s body play a constitutive role in the predictive process itself. Central to my claim is 
recognizing an intimate, although commonly overlooked, relationship between precision 
weighing and affectivity (Chapters 3, 4, 5 & 6). 
Re-positioning precision 
Radical Predictive Processing (RPP) makes an argument for embodiment that is reliant on 
precision weighting (as noted above). Specifically, it relies on precision weighting’s capacity to 
delicately adjust the various balances within the predictive systems to provide an economical 
combination of  simple reflexes and complex goal-driven action sets. This fluidity may make 
precision weighting look a little like a ‘magic modulator’. Without clearly understanding precisely 
how precision performs this task, some might worry that RPP may have inadvertently imported 
an un-explanatory free variable into our explanatory schema. I argue that the threat of  magic 
modulation can be averted by appreciating the role of  subcortical processing in the estimation, 
orchestration and distribution of  precision weighting (Chapter 3). Network approaches to 
understanding the entangled nature of  emotion and cognition (within the brain, and between the 
brain and body) offer a fuller description of  how precision weighting performs this important 
function. However, including these elements into the story requires that we understand precision 
a little differently; crucially, it implies that the predictive mind is much more embodied than 
previously assumed. 
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Kanai and colleagues (2015) have proposed that precision weighting is orchestrated, in part, by 
subcortical regions such as the pulvinar complex (the largest nucleus of  the thalamus). However, 
Kanai and colleagues limit their investigation to the ventral pulvinar (and its relationship with the 
visual cortex) which results in their account overlooking many of  the important embodied 
elements that would otherwise be expected given the important role the pulvinar plays in 
emotion and motivation. I will expand their work by providing a view of  the pulvinar that is 
consistent with dynamical network characterizations of  the brain (specifically, Pessoa 2014; see 
Chapter 3). This model characterizes the pulvinar as a central hub where various streams of  
information (including massive inputs from within the body) are integrated. Through this 
integration, perceptual processing and decision-making are directed towards signals that have 
affective significance for the organism. My contribution thus opens up new ways for thinking 
about how interoception helps to tune the predictive system towards what matters to the 
organism.  
I go on to develop this line of  thinking about the relationship between precision weighting and 
affective significance by proposing an account of  precision weighting set by error dynamics 
(Chapters 4, 5 & 6). ‘Error dynamics’ refers to the temporal comparison of  error reduction rates 
(see Joffily & Coricelli 2013; Van de Cruys 2017). For a predictive organism to thrive it needs to 
be sensitive to error and error reduction, as well as the rate at which errors are being managed. If  
we think about error minimization happening at a certain speed, then the predictive organism 
must also be sensitive to changes in velocity - accelerations and decelerations in error 
minimization.  This sensitivity indicates how well or poorly the organism is doing at reducing 
uncertainty. Error dynamics, as such, are second-order processes closely related to precision 
weighting. Where first-order prediction errors can be thought of  as acting as information in the 
system (and are used to guide behaviour and update predictions), second-order prediction errors 
act as information for the system (representing how well or poorly the system is proceeding over 
all).  
It has been proposed that error dynamics are made available for the system as emotional valence 
– feelings of  pleasure and displeasure (Joffily & Coricelli 2013; Van de Cruys 2017) . When 8
things are going well for the predictive agent (and its behaviours are resulting in a more certain 
future) it feels good. When it’s struggling to get a handle on the scene, or is unable to manage 
the complexity of  some task, it feels bad. To be clear, this feeling should not be seen as 
 This notion of  valence as emerging as a form of  ‘prediction error dynamics’ has already found a home in both 8
artificial intelligence and robotics circles (Schmidhuber 2010; Kaplan & Oudeyer 2007), and research on intrinsic 
rewards and adaptive behaviours in humans and non-humans (Kaplan & Oudeyer 2007).
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something over and above the tracking of  error dynamics, but rather the feelings are a reflection 
of  the quality of  the organism’s engagement with the environment (see also Polani 2009). As 
Van de Cruys writes, “Emotions [given this addition] appear as the continuous non-conceptual 
feedback on evolving —increasing or decreasing— uncertainties relative to our predictions. The 
upshot of  this view is that the various emotions, from "basic" ones to the non-typical ones such 
as humour, curiosity and aesthetic affects, can be shown to follow a single underlying 
logic” (2017). 
I will argue that error dynamics play a central role in setting precision weighting (Chapters 4-6). I 
use this discussion about error dynamics and affect to show why we shouldn't think of  precision 
as merely a brain event, but rather as intimately related to affective changes in the body that track 
and leverage opportunities to optimize the organism’s relationship with the environment. I draw 
a conceptual connection between error dynamics and a ‘tendency towards an optimal grip’. I 
argue that organisms make use of  these feeling (arising as part of  their embodied tracking of  
their overall condition in the world) to fine-tune precision estimations. This points to a crucial 
role for bodily feelings in ensuring the organism keeps expected uncertainty to a minimum in its 
interactions with the environment. Equivalently, this means the organism succeeds in improving 
its overall condition in relation to its environment. This is to say it exhibits in its behaviour a 
tendency towards optimal grip on the things that matter in its environment (in Chapter 6 I 
present an account of  addiction as a case in which the tendency towards an optimal grip breaks 
down). By presenting affective changes as part of  the precision machinery, I offer an elegant way 
to fold (embodied) value back into the predictive system. This addition opens the way for a 
much more fully embodied vision of  the predictive mind to emerge. 
The central aim of  this thesis is to offer a theoretical bridge between PP, affective neuroscience, 
and a rich ‘living-body’ style ECS. Brought closer together, these frameworks form a synergy: 
dynamic network views of  emotion can help fill out some of  the neurobiological underpinnings 
still needed by the PP framework, and in so doing open the way for a more deeply embodied 
vision of  the predictive mind to emerge. In return, PP can offer a rich suite of  analytical tools, 
and a sophisticated theoretical landscape, for making sense of  why thinking, perceiving, feeling 
and acting collaborate in the brain as they do. The end result is an understanding of  the 
predictive brain as one part of  a much wider entangled system that includes the visceral, active 
body and the social and physical environment.  
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Summary of  chapters 
The chapters of  this dissertation are written as independently readable papers and so can be read 
in any order. That said, they do form a coherent argument, which can be best understood 
through a brief  synopsis of  each chapter in order. 
 • Chapter 1 I develop a framework for thinking about a radical embodied cognitive 
neuroscience. The first part of  the chapter argues that emotion and cognition are 
inseparable processes at the level of  the brain. The second part of  the chapter argues 
that emotion should be understood as a dynamic process that depends upon the whole 
living body of  the organism. In the third part of  the chapter, I propose a tight fit 
between environmental affordances and the patterns of  action-readiness that manifest in 
the organism’s body in the form of  states of  arousal and valence. Given the 
inseparability of  emotion and cognition in the brain, and the deep dependence of  
emotional processes on the whole body of  the living organism in its engagement with 
the environment, I conclude that cognitive processes are likewise deeply dependent upon 
these wider organism-environmental dynamics. I take the description offered above of  
emotional and mental experience as the emergent result of  dynamic parallel loops 
stretching between cortical and subcortical regions, and between brain and body, to 
provide a perfect example of  an embodied cognitive system.  
 • Chapter 2 applies the central ideas from Chapter 1 to recent PP accounts of  
interoception. I explore how PP can inform, and be informed by, recent debates in the 
philosophy of  emotion. In particular, whether we ought to think of  emotions as taking 
place entirely within the head, or instead as embodied phenomena. The first part of  the 
chapter outlines Anil Seth’s recent PP account of  interoception, highlighting in particular 
its proposed association with traditional cognitivist theories of  emotion. In the second 
part of  the chapter I offer a critique of  these cognitivist theories based on more recent 
dynamic systems approaches to emotion – approaches which aim to dissolve the 
ontological boundary between emotion and cognition at both the psychological and 
neurobiological levels. In the third part of  the chapter I make the case that a PP account 
of  interoception would align much better with these embodied and dynamic systems 
models of  emotion. 
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 • Chapter 3 I explore what role emotions and subcortical contributions play in the PP 
framework. In the first part of  the chapter I continue to develop the picture of  online 
cognitive function emerging from the tight coordination of  cortical and subcortical 
systems (Chapter 1). The second part of  the chapter explores a role for subcortical 
circuits in setting “precision weighting”. I build on a proposal from Kanai and Friston 
(2015) suggesting that the pulvinar (a portion of  the subcortical thalamus) might play a 
role in setting precision weighting by placing their discussion within the context of  
dynamic network models of  the brain (as seen in Chapter 1). The third part of  the 
chapter argues that the close association between subcortical processing and precision 
engineering should lead us to think of  precision engineering as more closely related to 
affective significance. Thus the contextualization that precision is proposed to offer turns 
out to be an affective one. By emphasizing subcortical contributions to setting precision 
weighting, and recognizing the rich reciprocal interaction between subcortical circuits 
and the internal feeling body, I open the door for thinking about a more fully embodied 
predictive brain: one that includes not just gross morphology and sensorimotor integration, but 
also the rich contribution that the inner dimension of  affect (including changes in the 
endocrine system, immune system, vascular and viscera) makes to cognition. I continue 
to develop this line of  thinking about the rich relationship between precision and affect 
throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6, in which I present a series of  test-cases for my 
framework. 
 • Chapter 4 develops a novel account of  why an agent that aims to minimize uncertainty 
would be motivated to seek out novelty. One might think that such an agent would 
inherently aim to avoid novel and surprising interactions with the world, perhaps even 
seeking out a dark (predictable) room and staying there. And yet various animals clearly 
find playfulness and curiosity to be highly rewarding. In this chapter I argue that the 
answer to this puzzle lies in understanding how bodily feelings help attune predictive 
organisms towards opportunities for continually improving their grip on what they care 
about. The first part of  the chapter outlines the so called “dark room” challenge levelled 
against PP. I describe how action-oriented PP has so far attempted to overcome this 
challenge, and highlight a few reasons for being dissatisfied with the answers given so far. 
The most important criticism involves the widespread reliance on precision weighting 
while not yet clearly specifying the nature of  how precision-weighting is set (as seen in 
Chapter 3). In the second part of  the chapter I attempt to fill in this gap by suggesting 
that precision weighting is set in part based on embodied error dynamics. Error dynamics 
refers to the tracking of  the rate at which error is reduced over time. Sensitivity to error 
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dynamics ensures that the predictive agent is continually steered towards opportunities 
for reducing uncertainty at a particular rate. Furthermore, I argue that this information 
about rate of  change is given corporeally as states of  affordance-related action readiness 
patterns that are simultaneously affective and behavioural. In the third part of  the 
chapter I show how an agent that is sensitive to error dynamics will naturally be a curious 
agent, motivated to explore its environment. In Chapter 6 I will go on to describe how a 
breakdown in this sensitivity to error dynamics is what accounts of  the increasingly 
restrictive behaviours seen in substance addiction.  
 • Chapter 5 extends this view of  embodied error dynamics (constructed in Chapter 4) to 
explore how the PP framework might contribute to live debates in the philosophy of  
desire. The first part of  the chapter reviews recent naturalistic (specifically, 
neuroscientific) approaches to thinking about desire as deeply related to reward learning. 
The second part of  the chapter explores how desire and reward learning have been 
reinterpreted in PP terms. In the PP framework reward learning systems are thought to 
be involved in attentional processing, working to set precision weighting on prediction 
errors at multiple levels in the brain based on what the organism finds valuable or 
rewarding. In the third part of  the chapter I argue for thinking about precision weighting 
as based on embodied error dynamics. Given my earlier arguments, I take this to mean 
that precision is based on affective tensions which arise as part of  the agent’s dynamic 
coupling with the environment. I therefore add an important enactive-ecological twist to 
the PP account of  desire. The role of  reward and value in modulating attention should 
be understood as taking place in the organism’s body and not only in its brain, as the 
organism prepares to act on what matters to it in the environment. This approach further 
allows me to offer an account of  the phenomenology of  desire in PP terms, something 
which is currently missing in the literature. This vision of  error dynamics as being closely 
associated with midbrain reward processing offers an bridge between this enactive-
ecological PP framework and addiction research which I go on to explore in Chapter 6. 
 • Chapter 6 draws on PP to explore whether or not addiction should be thought of  as 
simply a disease of  the brain. It is widely acknowledged that addiction is accompanied by 
structural and functional changes in the brains of  addicts that directly correlate with 
pathological symptoms such as intense craving, compulsive drug-seeking behaviour and a 
breakdown in cognitive control. Based on this evidence the model of  addiction as a brain 
disease is now widely accepted. However not everyone has embraced this model. Marc 
Lewis (forthcoming) has developed an alternative interpretation of  the neurobiological 
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evidence. He argues that addiction is a form of  maladaptive learning. In this chapter I 
agree with Lewis that addiction is not a brain disease. I argue instead that the 
pathological nature of  addiction is not to be found in the brains of  addicts but in the 
larger organism-environment system of  which the brain is (of  course) an important part. 
I construct this argument in large part on the basis of  predictive processing models of  
addiction, however I once again suggest an important ecological-enactive twist on the 
current models. The first part of  the chapter outlines the effects of  addictive behaviours 
on the midbrain’s reward circuitry. In the second part of  the chapter I reinterpreted these 
effects in PP terms. In particular, outlining the view that reward learning is used to 
weight the precision of  the prediction errors that lead to behaviours. I show how the 
“hijacking” of  reward learning can be redescribed in PP as (roughly speaking) the 
substance determining how precision is weighted. Consistent with Chapters 4 and 5, I 
argue that it is in fact a sensitivity to embodied error dynamics that is thereby being 
hijacked in addiction. In the third part of  the chapter I use these insights to develop an 
ecological-enactive predictive processing account of  addiction. I argue that precision 
weighting relative to error dynamics is best understood within the larger context of  an 
organism aiming to improve its ‘grip’ on the things that matter in its environment. I go 
on to develop a line of  thinking about the destructive behaviours of  addicts as the result 
of  disorganization within the wider agent-environment system. From this perspective 
addiction is best characterized not as a change in any particular neural circuitry, but as a 
more general loss of  attunement between the organism and its environment. I argue that 
PP, with the addition of  embodied error dynamics, can offer a rich explanation of  how 
neural computational processes in addiction contribute to the breakdown in this wider 
organism-environment system. This suggests a broader palette of  possible interventions 
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Chapter 1 
The embodied brain: towards a radical embodied 
cognitive neuroscience 
Abstract 
In this programmatic paper we explain why a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience is needed. 
We argue for such a claim based on problems that have arisen in cognitive neuroscience for the 
project of  localizing function to specific brain structures. The problems come from research 
concerned with functional and structural connectivity that strongly suggests that the function a 
brain region serves is dynamic, and changes over time. We argue that in order to determine the 
function of  a specific brain area, neuroscientists need to zoom out and look at the larger 
organism-environment system. We therefore argue that instead of  looking to cognitive 
psychology for an analysis of  psychological functions, cognitive neuroscience should look to an 
ecological dynamical psychology. A second aim of  our paper is to develop an account of  
embodied cognition based on the inseparability of  cognitive and emotional processing in the 
brain. We argue that emotions are best understood in terms of  action readiness (Frijda, 1986, 
2007) in the context of  the organism’s ongoing skillful engagement with the environment 
(Rietveld, 2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, forthcoming). 
States of  action readiness involve the whole living body of  the organism, and are elicited by 
possibilities for action in the environment that matter to the organism. Since emotion and 
cognition are inseparable processes in the brain it follows that what is true of  emotion is also 
true of  cognition. Cognitive processes are likewise processes taking place in the whole living 
body of  an organism as it engages with relevant possibilities for action.  
1.1 Introduction 
Radical embodied cognitive science is a relatively new branch of  cognitive science that looks to 
ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory to understand the contribution of  bodily 
capacities to cognitive processes (Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011). It is ‘‘radical’’ in claiming that 
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cognitive scientists need new conceptual tools if  they are to understand the ways in which 
cognition depends on the body in its interaction with the environment. The classical conception 
of  the human mind as working according to the same principles as a digital computer 
encourages us to think of  the body and the environment as providing at best inputs to, and 
receiving outputs from cognitive processes (Rupert, 2009). Embodied approaches to cognitive 
science by contrast stress the many and varied ways in which an animal’s environmental niche 
offers resources for the animal to act on. The individual has bodily skills and abilities that are 
refined and perfected through practice for dealing adequately with the possibilities for action the 
environment offers. The explanatory tools cognitive science deploys must do justice to the 
essential contributions of  bodily skills and environmental affordances to cognitive behavior. 
They must account for the ways in which the individual is able to expertly coordinate their 
behavior with a dynamically changing environment. Ecological psychology and dynamical 
systems theory provide the tools to meet this challenge. Moreover the conceptual tools these 
sciences offer are arguably better suited to explaining the complex, dynamical interactions 
between an animal and its environment than the standard computational tools of  cognitive 
science. This gives us a pragmatic reason to add these explanatory frameworks to the explanatory 
toolkit of  cognitive science.  
Our aim in this paper will be to argue that cognitive neuroscience should look to ecological 
dynamical psychology for an understanding of  the psychological functions the brain performs. 
The classical approach to cognitive science encourages the following view of  the division of  
labor between psychology and neuroscience. Cognitive psychology provides analyses of  the 
cognitive operations an individual must perform in order to carry out a cognitive task. Cognitive 
neuroscience then seeks to determine how these cognitive operations are carried out by brain 
regions and networks of  brain regions. Consider vision as an example. The tasks the visual 
system performs are commonly decomposed and broken down into early visual processing in 
which an image is formed, and features of  the surfaces in the surrounding environment are 
represented. At an intermediate stage in visual processing features of  surfaces are used to 
construct object representations. Late processes then use object-based information to put 
objects into categories (Palmer and Kimchi, 1986). Cognitive neuroscientists design their 
experiments based on this type of  functional decomposition of  visual processing in the brain. 
The aim of  their experiments is to use the knowledge we have accumulated from previous 
experiments to determine how these different stages in visual processing are carried out by the 
brain. There is no room in this view of  the division of  labor between psychology and 
neuroscience for the body and the environment to play anything other than a peripheral role in 
cognitive processes.  
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A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience will take its analyses of  psychological function not 
from cognitive psychology, but instead from ecological psychology and dynamical systems 
theory. The advantage of  doing so will be an analysis of  psychological function that does justice 
to the contribution of  the bodily capacities and the ecological setting to a given cognitive 
behavior.  
The first part of  our paper will point to findings that strongly suggest it is time for cognitive 
neuroscientists to look elsewhere for their analyses of  psychological function than to classical 
cognitive psychology. We begin by reviewing recent research concerned with large-scale patterns 
of  connectivity in the brain. We take this research to present a major challenge to any analysis of  
the brain into functionally specialized regions that carry out either emotional or cognitive 
psychological functions. Such a view of  the brain as being made up of  functionally specialized 
regions follows naturally from the view of  the division of  labor between psychology and 
neuroscience we sketched above. Cognitive psychology has the job of  providing analyses of  the 
functions that are computed in emotional and cognitive processing. Cognitive neuroscience looks 
to determine how these functions are performed by different regions and networks in the brain 
(see e.g., Posner et al., 1988). The work we will review on functional and structural connectivity 
in the brains of  humans and other animals supports a different perspective on brain processes in 
which classical emotional and cognitive brain regions are in constant dynamic interaction. We 
will show how this work on functional connectivity makes trouble for attempts at localizing 
either emotional or cognitive functions to specific brain structures.  
We argue next that psychological function is better understood at the level of  the whole brain-
body-environment system. The argument we offer for this second thesis is somewhat circuitous, 
but necessarily so because it enables us to engage with, and distinguish our proposal from other 
related theories in the literature on emotion and cognition. We begin by comparing our 
perspective with that of  psychological constructionist (or dimensional) theories of  emotion 
which interpret the integration of  cognitive and emotional processes in terms of  interactions 
between domain general neural networks (see e.g., Barrett and Satpute, 2013). We suggest 
(following arguments developed in Pessoa, 2014) that structure-function mappings are not fixed 
and static properties of  networks. Instead structure-function relationships are dynamic, with the 
functions a given network performs varying over time in a highly flexible and context-dependent 
manner. We then argue that the functional contribution of  a network is determined by the whole 
organism in its interaction with an environment that is rich with possibilities for actions. To 
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determine the precise functional contribution of  a network to an animal’s behavior we must look 
at how this network functions in the context of  a wider organism-environment system.  
The radical rejection of  the classical computationalist explanatory framework by advocates of  an 
embodied approach to cognitive science has been taken to call into question the place of  the 
concept of  representation in psychological explanation. Hutto and Myin have argued for 
instance that the dynamic engagement of  an animal with the environment doesn’t require the 
extraction, processing and manipulation of  states with semantic or representational content 
(Hutto and Myin, 2013). We do not engage directly with this issue, but instead focus our 
arguments on defending the claim that embodied cognition is best studied at the level of  the 
whole brain-body-environment system. We leave the implications of  our arguments for the role 
of  representation in psychological explanation as a matter to be discussed on another occasion.  
The positive view we develop in this paper will be built up in two stages. First, we argue that 
cognition and emotion are inseparable processes in the brain. Second, we argue emotion is a 
dynamic process involving the whole body of  the organism. The first two steps in our argument 
establish the inseparability of  emotion and cognition in the brain and the deep dependence of  
emotional processes on the whole body of  the living organism in its practical skilled engagement 
with the environment. We take these two steps to imply a third step: the conclusion that 
cognitive processes depend on the whole living body of  a person or animal in its practical and 
skilled engagement with an environment of  affordances. Since emotion deeply depends on the 
living body, so also does cognition.  
1.2 Localizing emotion and cognition in the brain  
When we ordinarily think of  emotion we often think of  short-lived, transient episodes that wash 
over, and sometimes overwhelm us, gradually fading away after a relatively short period of  time. 
Folk psychology makes distinctions between episodes of  anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness 
and so on. When we think of  our own emotions and those of  others we do so using these folk 
psychological categories. How do these folk psychological emotion categories map onto 
processes in the brain?  
Affective neuroscientists have posited a set of  biologically basic emotions such as rage, fear, lust, 
care, and grief  that can be localized to specific and dedicated networks in the human brain 
(Panksepp, 1998, 2012). Typically these basic emotions are associated with the brain stem, the 
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diencephalon (thalamus and hypothalamus), and limbic structures which are taken to be 
evolutionarily old, primitive parts of  the brain, highly structured at birth and relatively isolated 
from learning. These parts of  the brain are directly connected, and tightly coupled to autonomic, 
endocrine and immune systems in the body that work together to keep an organism’s body in a 
state of  homeostatic and metabolic equilibrium. They are also taken to be ‘‘automatic’’ in their 
processing (as contrasted with cognitively controlled processes), and are thought to be critically 
involved in impulsive behavioral responses such as fear and rage.  
Cognitive processes (such as learning and memory, reasoning and planning) are often associated 
with the phylogenetically newer and more highly evolved cerebral cortex. The neocortex in 
primates has been described as the ‘‘crowning achievement of  evolution and the biological 
substrate of  the human mental prowess.’’ (Rakic, 2009, quoted by Barton, 2012, p. 2098). The 
primate neocortex for instance shows a fivefold difference in volume when compared to that 
found in insectivores (Barton and Harvey, 2000). This growth is thought by many to be 
accompanied by an evolution of  higher-cognitive functions. Systems in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) for instance make use of  information that has been processed by other parts of  the brain 
to ensure that we, in contrast to our animal ancestors, keep our emotional impulses in check. As 
the Victorian neurologist John Hughlings-Jackson put it: ‘‘the higher nervous arrangements 
evolved out of  the lower keep down those lower, just as a government evolved out of  a nation 
controls as well as directs that nation.’’ (Jackson, 1884, p. 662, quoted by Parvizi, 2009, p. 354) 
The frontal lobes exert control over, and suppress our more animal desires, thereby ensuring that 
we act in ways that are contextually appropriate. These functional processes allow higher 
mammals to compare possible plans and strategies offline, and make a cost-benefit calculation as 
to which possible course of  action is likely to be the most beneficial in the long run.  
This understanding of  cognition and emotion leads to a view of  the mammalian brain as divided 
into cognitive ‘‘higher’’ regions (neocortex) and emotional ‘‘lower’’ subcortical regions. This 
division is perhaps best exemplified in Paul MacLean’s discredited triune model of  the 
mammalian brain (MacLean, 1952, 1990; for criticisms see Swanson, 1983; LeDoux, 2012). The 
lower, animal parts of  the brain are understood (in line with the Hughlings-Jackson ‘‘Victorian’’ 
narrative) as standing in a linear, and hierarchical relationship to the higher neocortical regions. 
Why assume however that the only parts of  the human brain to undergo change over the course 
of  evolution were those located in the cortex? An alternative co-evolutionary hypothesis is that 
both cortex and sub-cortex underwent changes in a coordinated fashion. Those brain structures 
with major anatomical and functional links most likely evolved together (Barton and Harvey, 
2000). Barton (2012) discusses for instance how the cerebellum (an area known to be involved in 
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the learning of  motor skills) is larger in primates compared with other mammals. He adduces 
evidence for the threefold co- evolution of  the diencephalon, cerebellum and the neocortex. 
There is also evidence that subregions of  the amygdala are substantially more developed in 
monkeys as compared with rats (Chareyon et al., 2011). Pessoa has suggested, in line with the co-
evolutionary hypothesis we just sketched, that this increase in size in the amygdala is likely to be 
linked to the degree of  connectivity with other brain structures (Pessoa, 2014, pp. 413–414).  
The old hierarchical model of  the higher primate brain and the lower reptilian brain assumes a 
unidirectional flow of  information from lower to higher brain systems. While the higher-brain 
systems depend on lower-brain systems for their functioning the reverse is not true. Parvizi 
(2009) offers an important critique of  this ‘‘corticocentric myopia’’. In his words ‘‘higher 
functions of  the brain are made possible by a reciprocal interconnection between cortical and 
subcortical structures rather than being localized only in the upper tip of  the vertical 
neuroaxis’’ (p. 354). Parvizi describes the connectivity between the cortex and the rest of  the 
brain in terms of  ‘‘reciprocal interconnection’’. This means that there are complex relations of  
negative and positive feedback that characterize the communication between sub-cortex and 
cortex. Parvizi suggests that higher brain functions (such as executive control functions) happen 
in ‘‘the loops operating between the cortical areas and ‘‘lower’’ subcortical structures such as the 
basal ganglia; the basal forebrain; the thalamus; the cerebellum; and the brainstem dopaminergic 
and noradrenergic systems.’’ (p. 358, supporting references omitted).  
Consider as an example the hypothalamus, a region located just below the thalamus and above 
the brain stem. The hypothalamus is commonly associated with the coordination of  homeostatic 
mechanisms such as hormonal and behavioral circadian rhythms and neuroendocrine processes. 
However, it is also bidirectionally connected to the cerebral cortex by at least four pathways that 
run via the basal forebrain and amygdala; the brainstem and the thalamus (Risold et al., 1997). 
Barbas and Rempel-Clower (1997) showed that in primates the hypothalamus projects to all 
regions (orbital, medial and lateral) of  the PFC. The hypothalamus functions as a so- called 
‘‘connectivity hub’’ that is optimally placed because of  its extensive connections to have a near 
global effect on brain function (Pessoa, 2013, pp. 230–231). Importantly, areas of  the PFC 
(orbital and medial PFC), insular cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala also link back to the 
hypothalamus. The connections between the hypothalamus and PFC are bidirectional and 
reciprocal, allowing for rapid coordination and synchronization of  activity between ‘‘higher’’ and 
‘‘lower’’ brain systems. This coordination allows for cognitive and affective processes to be 
mobilized together allowing the animal to behave flexibly, and in ways that are adapted to the 
particularities of  a context of  activity.  
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This picture of  higher cognitive systems and lower emotional systems as being ‘‘vertically’’ 
integrated and tightly coordinated strongly argues against a corticocentric myopia. It suggests 
instead a view of  cognitive and emotional processes as strongly interdependent (Lewis, 2005; 
Stapleton, 2013; Pessoa, 2013; Colombetti, 2014, ch.4). By ‘‘interdependent’’ we mean to refer to 
the degree to which cortical and sub-cortical systems influence each other. This degree of  
influence is measured by the information-processing operations the components that make up 
these systems each perform. The evidence (some of  which we have reviewed above) points to a 
tight coupling or mutual influence between these systems. The operations carried out by 
components located in the cortex are constantly effecting, and being effected by, the operations 
that are taking place in components found in the sub-cortical systems. Functional connectivity 
isn’t just about channeling information between functionally specialized brain regions. Instead it 
‘‘generates complex system-wide dynamics that enable local regions to participate across a broad 
range of  cognitive and behavioral tasks’’ (Byrge et al., 2014, p. 395).  
Marc Lewis provides a clear example of  the dynamical interaction between emotion and 
cognition in the brain (Lewis, 2005). He discusses the cognitive and neural processes that are 
engaged when a person experiences ‘‘road rage’’. We quote him at length because his example 
makes it clear why it is important to understand this interaction between emotional and cognitive 
processes as taking place at the level of  the whole embodied person in the environment, a point 
we return to below.  
‘‘Mr. Smart slams on the brakes when noticing the proximity of  the car in front. Anger 
arises initially from frustration, as Mr. Smart wants to keep driving fast, but also from a 
sense of  violated entitlement: he is in the left lane and should not have to slow down. Fear 
may also be triggered by the close call, eliciting further anger because of  an intermediate 
evaluation of  unmanly helplessness. These emotions arise rapidly, but they are paralleled 
by a co-emerging sense of  the other driver as intentionally obstructive (and therefore 
blameworthy). Mr. Smart’s highly focused visual attention, a derivative of  anger, takes in 
the red color of  the car ahead, as well as the expensive-looking design, and his anger is 
amplified by his sense of  the unfairness of  this show- off  blocking his path (based on an 
implicit memory of  some long- forgotten or fantasized rival). A stabilizing angry-anxious 
state, coupled with ruminative plans for vengeance (perhaps a blast of  the horn), anchors 
attention to the head of  the man in front. This lasts for a minute or two while Mr. Smart 
fashions and modifies plans to pass on the right. However, when the man peers over his 
shoulder, Mr. Smart evaluates this act as a taunt, generating shame and anger in an 
elaborated appraisal of  humiliation, and calling for extreme action to save his self-image 
from further subjugation’’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 175).  
For Lewis a change in emotional state is triggered whenever orderly behavior ‘‘is interrupted by a 
perturbation, resulting in a rapid loss of  orderliness and an increase in sensitivity to the 
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environment’’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 174). In Smart’s case the suddenly obstructed lane jolts his body 
from a state of  low arousal (feeling of  calmness and flow) to being highly aroused (feelings of  
fear and anger). Lewis writes: ‘‘living systems are like taut springs, ready to respond to small 
perturbations that are biologically meaningful’’ (Lewis, 2005, p. 176; see also Kauffman, 1993). 
Any cognitive or emotional event can be a trigger, so long as it sufficiently perturbs the system 
into a state of  disorder. Once order has been disrupted, sub-cortical and cortical neural systems 
enter into a series of  recursive feed- back loops, activity in the one system amplifying activity in 
the other (Lewis, 2005, p. 176). Consider for example the positive feed-back loop established 
between the psychological processes of  bodily arousal on the one hand (realized in sub-cortical, 
limbic systems), and attention and recall (involving regions in the neocortex) on the other. 
Smart’s feelings of  violation at being halted in the fast lane triggers feelings of  anger. The 
arousal generated by the anger motivates and focuses Smart’s attentional resources onto the 
dangerous and transgressive elements in the environment: the driver of  the red sports car. This 
increased attentional focus highlights the expensiveness of  the automobile, which in turn triggers 
feelings of  unfairness, which increase Smart’s feelings of  anger. Simultaneously Smart’s angry 
arousal anchors his recall processes to similar past situations, and memories of  past 
transgressors, which amplifies Smart’s feeling of  anger. Smart’s bodily arousal motivates and 
directs his attentional and recall processes. These cognitive processes in turn intensify and 
prolong his state of  anger arousal.  
When the somatic and cognitive processes become appropriately coupled (anger in the form of  
bodily arousal directing attention and recall, attention and recall sustaining/amplifying bodily 
arousal) the brain systems supporting these psychological processes begin to settle into stable 
patterns of  activity (Lewis, 2005, p. 177). Just as a group of  birds quickly settles into an enduring 
flocking pattern, so also do Smart’s emotional and cognitive processes temporarily stabilize and 
settle into a coherent and large scale anger-anxiety state. The ‘‘lower’’ neural processes that track 
bodily arousal, and the ‘‘higher’’ neural processes associated with attention and memory sustain 
each other, and generate an enduring emotional-cognitive state.  
Lewis’s example is framed in psychological terms, but the reciprocal and mutual influence he 
describes strongly speaks against any separation of  emotion and cognition in the brain. 
Subcortical and cortical networks non-linearly interact in his example in such a way as to sustain 
temporary, large-scale patterns of  organization over time. One might object that the activity in 
these networks take shape on the basis of  interaction, or communication between functionally 
specialized brain regions. We think this is exactly the picture of  the organization in the brain that 
is called into question once one rejects corticocentric myopia. In the Smart example, we see how 
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negative and positive feedback loops shift the brain from a state of  relative disorder to a 
temporary, more or less short- lived pattern of  global coherence. This shift from disorder to 
global coherence involves the formation of  large scale networks in the brain. The relations of  
feedback that are critical for the formation of  such networks mean that each element is directly 
or indirectly affecting every other element that makes up the network. This fundamentally 
challenges a picture in which each element performs a psychological operation (either emotional 
or cognitive) apart from its interactions with other elements. We suggest instead conceptualizing 
psychological function at the level of  the processes taking place in the large-scale network as a 
whole. Large-scale networks implement psychological processes that are simultaneously both 
emotional and cognition in nature. They are in Lewis’s words ‘‘amalgams’’ of  emotion and 
cognition.  
1.3 Are emotional and cognitive processes “psychological 
constructs”? 
We have now given the argument for the first claim we wish to make in this paper that the brains 
of  animals resist functional decomposition into separable emotional and cognitive components. 
In this section we begin making the case for the second step in our argument, which is a defense 
of  the claim that the amalgam of  emotional and cognitive processes we find in the brain deeply 
depend upon the whole living body of  an organism. We begin by discussing psychological 
constructionism because research in this tradition would seem, at least at first glance, to lend 
further support for the view we have been developing. Psychological constructionism grew out 
of  the dimensional theory of  emotion. The dimensional theory claims that emotional episodes 
such as fear, anger, and sadness are combinations of  more fundamental dimensions such as 
arousal (the strength and intensity of  an emotion) and valence (the degree of  pleasantness or 
unpleasantness) working in combination with cognitive processes of  appraisal The dimensional 
theory can be traced back to Wundt and has received more recent defense in the work of  James 
Russell and Lisa Feldman-Barrett (Wundt, 1897; Russell, 1980, 2003; Barrett, 2006). More 
recently, psychological constructionists have begun to argue that emotions do not map onto 
distinct regions and networks in the brain but are instead the result of  dynamic interactions 
between large-scale networks that compute domain- general functions (Barrett and Satpute, 
2013). This looks to be very much in keeping with what was argued in the previous section.  
The constructionist theory is often contrasted with categorical or discrete theories of  emotion 
(briefly discussed at the beginning of  section Introduction). Discrete theories of  emotion posit 
basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust and surprise) that are species-
universal, hardwired, and have unique physiological and neural signatures or profiles (see e.g., 
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Panksepp, 1998; Ekman, 1999; Izard, 2007, 2011). Discrete theories of  emotion have 
unfortunately often subscribed to the problematic division of  the brain into emotional and 
cognitive systems criticized in the previous section (see e.g., Panksepp, 1998). Constructionists 
add something important to our earlier argument by calling into question the claim that 
emotions can be mapped onto specific functionally-specialized regions and networks in the 
brain. They argue instead that the brain is organized into domain-general, distributed functional 
networks, and emotions are the result of  interactions between these networks.  
A growing literature supports a view of  function-structure mappings in the brain as many-to-
many, thereby bolstering the case for a constructionist theory of  emotion. There can be no one-
to-one mapping of  psychological function to anatomical regions or structures because brain 
regions and structures exhibit extensive pluripotency and degeneracy. Pluripotency refers to the 
well-established finding that one and the same region (e.g., Broca’s area) can be involved in the 
performance of  multiple functions e.g., language processing, movement preparation, imitation 
and imagery related tasks (see Anderson, 2010, 2014 for discussion of  this and many other 
examples of  pluripotency). Degeneracy refers to the finding that different neural structures can 
perform one and the same function (Edelman and Gally, 2001; Friston and Price, 2003; Figdor, 
2010). Taken together these findings suggest a many-to-many mapping of  structure to function at 
the level of  brain regions.  
This seems to present a challenge to the discrete theory of  emotion. Pluripotency and 
degeneracy strongly suggest that each basic emotion is unlikely to have its own physiological and 
neural profile. Consider what we now know about the amygdala in this regard, an area that is 
often referred to as supporting a discrete theory of  fear because it has repeatedly been shown to 
be involved in threat responses in rats and humans (see e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Öhman and Mineka, 
2001; for critical discussion see Sander et al., 2003). The amygdala has however also been shown 
to be active when people are presented with novel, but emotionally neutral stimuli (Moriguchi et 
al., 2011; Balderston et al., 2011; Blackford et al., 2011). Herry and colleagues for example found 
increased activity in the amygdala when subjects were presented with unpredictable sequences of  
tones as compared with predictable sequences (Herry et al., 2007). The amygdala is involved in a 
wide variety of  different functions, including ‘‘cognitive’’ functions such as value representation 
and decision-making (Sergerie et al., 2008; Pessoa, 2013, ch.2).  
Recent meta-analyses have shown that other brain regions associated with emotion such as the 
anterior insula, pregenual and subgenual anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex also show 
increases in activity for a variety of  different emotion states. Lindquist and colleagues compared 
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the sets of  brain regions that were consistently activated in studies of  anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness and sadness. They found six distributed networks that consistently showed up in the 
studies they analyzed from 1990–2007. The networks and the regions of  which they were 
composed were not associated with particular emotion categories, but were instead found to be 
active in all studies of  emotion experience they analyzed. They found no brain regions that were 
functionally specialized—every region that was activated for one emotion category was also 
activated for at least one other emotion category (see Figure 5 in Lindquist et al., 2012 for a 
useful visual summary of  the findings of  their meta-analyses). The same brain regions can carry 
out a variety of  distinct psychological operations and belong to different overlapping networks 
over time (also see Anderson, 2010, 2014; Colombo, 2013). What a brain region does at any 
given time will depend on the network with which it is affiliated.  
Lindquist and colleagues argue their meta-analysis supports a constructionist or dimensional 
theory of  emotions, and challenges discrete theories (which they label ‘‘natural kind’’ theories). 
Emotion in general has as one of  its components bodily arousal which can (but need not) be 
combined with pleasurable or unpleasant feelings. We will henceforth refer to the latter 
dimension of  emotion as ‘‘valence’’. Constructionists give this combination of  arousal and 
valence the label ‘‘core affect’’. Core affect plays a role in homeostasis tracking endocrinal, 
visceral and muscular changes internal to the body that inform the organism that there is 
something in the environment of  potential relevance or value. Barrett and Satpute (2013) take 
core affect to be neurally realized by a large-scale intrinsic network that has come to be called the 
‘‘salience’’ or ‘‘ventral attention’’ network (Menon and Uddin, 2010). An intrinsic network is a 
network of  widely distributed brain regions whose activations are tightly correlated across time 
when subjects are at rest, and their attention is not engaged by any external task or stimulus 
(Seeley et al., 2007; Bressler and Menon, 2010; Raichle, 2010; Yeo et al., 2011). Barrett and 
Satpute suggest that the salience network is made up of  dorsal and ventral subnetworks. The 
dorsal subnetwork uses homeostatic and metabolic information from the body to guide attention 
and motor behavior. The ventral subnetwork realizes affective feelings that are experienced by a 
subject as pleasurable or unpleasant with different degrees of  arousal. The salience network 
carries out ‘‘domain-general’’ functions, which is to say that this network of  brain regions is 
active in a wide range of  tasks (i.e., it is not domain or function-specific). What these tasks all 
share in common is they all require the orienting of  attention to homeostatic or metabolically 
relevant information.  
Core affect doesn’t provide the basis for making folk psychological distinctions between 
emotions. It is a feature common to all of  the emotions we ordinarily distinguish between in folk 
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psychology. Core affect takes on the character of  different emotions only through the interaction 
of  the salience network with other domain general networks in which such functions as 
categorization, language processing and executive control takes place. We focus on the role of  
categorization here since it will prove important for the argument we make for an embodied 
view of  psychological function in the next section of  the paper. It also provides an opportunity 
for us to briefly compare our theory with related work on the embodiment of  emotion.  
Constructionists argue that it is on the basis of  the categorization of  core affect that states of  
bodily arousal are made meaningful and related to a determinate object. Using the meta- analytic 
studies mentioned above as evidence they have recently argued that categorization takes place in 
the episodic memory, or default mode network (DMN) of  brain regions that reconstructs past 
experiences for use in current processing (Bar, 2007; Wilson- Mendenhall et al., 2011; Lindquist 
and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012). Areas of  the default-mode network (medial PFC, 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, medial temporal lobe) were found to be consistently active 
during a range of  emotional states (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). Constructionists 
have proposed the hypothesis that the DMN may function to model probabilistically the causes 
of  current core affective changes (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 125). The result of  such models of  
the causes of  core affect is the categorization of  core affect as an instance of  anger, fear, sadness 
or whatever (see also Barrett and Bar, 2009).  
As already noted, this hypothesis certainly makes a good fit with the findings we reviewed in the 
previous section of  extensive connectivity between emotional and cognitive brain regions. 
Emotion is the outcome of  interaction between multiple psychological components, each 
associated with assemblies of  neurons within distributed networks. Lindquist and colleagues 
write that ‘‘these networks combine and constrain one another like ingredients in a recipe, 
influencing and shaping one another in real time according to the principles of  constraint 
satisfaction’’ (p.126). However, we shall argue that even this picture of  function-to-structure 
mapping may need to be revised in the light of  the arguments we made above in section one.  
Constructionists subscribe to a mechanistic view of  psychological functions whereby emotion is 
decomposable into basic psychological operations which can then be mapped onto 
distinguishable networks or ‘‘flexible assemblies of  neurons’’ that ‘‘fire together in a probabilistic 
way’’ (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012). We suggest however that functional connectivity may make 
trouble for such a functional decomposition, just as it did for attempts at localizing emotional or 
cognitive functions to specific components. We saw in the Smart example how large-scale 
networks form in the brain through positive and negative feedback. This means that either 
directly through local anatomical connections, or indirectly through long- range connections, 
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every brain region has the potential to influence every other brain region within a given network. 
The function and operations a particular region carries out will be determined by (but also 
determine) its interactions with the other elements to which it is connected in a network.  
In this section, we’ve seen how the same region can play a role in carrying out very different 
functions over time. In order to determine what function a given region is performing we need 
to look at the network with which it is affiliated, but this is something that varies over time. 
Pessoa has suggested that ‘‘In the extreme, two networks may involve the exact same regions 
interacting with each other in distinct ways across time’’ (Pessoa, 2014, p. 408). The function of  a 
region is thus not a fixed and static property, but is dynamic and context- dependent, varying 
with the network in which the region is functioning. A version of  the problems we have raised 
with localizing function to structure may therefore also arise at the organizational level of  
networks. The finding that there is no one-to-one mapping of  structure to function might also 
generalize to the domain-general networks appealed to by psychological constructionists to 
explain emotion in the brain. The function of  a given intrinsic network may also be dynamic, 
with very different networks making the same functional contribution to behavior at different 
times (Pessoa, 2014; Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015). The same network of  brain regions may 
contribute differently to behavior because of  the way in which the elements of  which it is 
composed are interacting.  
The structure-function relation for networks, and not only for brain regions is thus also in 
dynamic flux. Pessoa has suggested that in order to determine the precise functional 
contribution of  a given network we may need to look at ‘‘global variables’’ such as 
neurotransmitters, bodily arousal, and slow-wave potentials (2014, p. 408). The function a given 
network performs is dependent upon the wider context in which the network is active. How 
should we think about this context-dependence? We shall argue the context we need to take into 
account may include the rest of  the body in its interactions with the environment, as is argued in 
radical embodied cognitive science. The mechanistic style of  explanation that constructionists 
employ assumes however that networks have fixed domain-general functions. We saw this for 
instance in the constructionist proposal to divide the salience network into ventral and dorsal 
subnetworks with ventral regions directing the selection of  visceromotor responses, and the 
dorsal parts being assigned the function of  spatial orientation and motor selection. The research 
we have reviewed on functional connectivity challenges any such view of  structure-functions 
mappings as fixed and permanent.  
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Is this simply a complication in the mechanistic theory of  emotion that constructionists propose, 
or does it constitute a more serious challenge? In the next section we suggest it may be 
interpreted as supporting an embodied interpretation of  the results reviewed above. Once we 
start to admit the role of  global variables such as activity in neurotransmitter systems and 
valenced states of  bodily arousal in influencing the functioning of  a given network, why think of  
the boundary between the brain and the rest of  the body as a sort of  ‘‘magical 
membrane’’ (Hurley, 2010)? Why think that the factors that influence the function of  a network 
reside only inside of  the brain? In the next section we argue that bodily states of  arousal and 
valence (which manifest as changes in the body’s vascular, visceral and motor systems) shift the 
brain from state of  relative disorder to temporary patterns of  large scale coherence. The 
environment elicits patterns of  action readiness that manifest in the body in the form of  states 
of  arousal and valence. We take these two points to establish the main claim of  our paper that to 
understand the psychological function of  a large scale network requires neuroscientists to pay 
attention to the whole organism-environment system.  
1.4 The deep dependence of  emotion and cognition on the living 
body  
The constructionist, dimensional theory of  emotion we discussed in the previous section 
conceives of  emotional experience as the product of  the interaction between different 
components. We’ve discussed the core affect and situated conceptualization networks above. 
Bodily arousal and valence (core affect) both occur as part of  the life-regulation, homeostatic 
and metabolic processes of  an organism, a being that strives to resist disorder and disintegration 
in its interactions with the environment (Spinoza, 1677/1894, Ethics III, 6 and 7; Thompson, 
2007, part 2; Colombetti, 2014). We follow Giovanna Colombetti in arguing that these states of  
the living body provide an organism with a means of  evaluating and appraising aspects of  its 
surrounding environment in terms of  their relevance or significance for the organism 
(Colombetti, 2014). ‘‘Relevance’’ is determined by the organism in relation to what the 
phenomenological philosopher Merleau-Ponty described as the ‘‘organism’s proper manner of  
realizing equilibrium’’ with the environment (Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, p. 154, also see 
Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). When Merleau-Ponty writes of  the organism ‘‘realizing’’ 
equilibrium with the environment, we take him to be referring to situations in which the 
organism is coping ‘‘smoothly’’ with the environment (to borrow a phrase from Dreyfus, 1991). 
Crucially, the organism never fully accomplishes equilibrium with the environment so long as it is 
alive. There is always room for further improvement. As long as the organism has needs and 
desires it will always be in a state of  a state of  relative disequilibrium with the environment, a 
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metastable state (Kelso, 2012; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). Living systems act so as to reduce 
this disequilibrium thereby improving their situation, and taking them closer towards a state of  
equilibrium with the environment.  
One of  the core components of  bodily affect is what the psychologist Nico Frijda called ‘‘action 
readiness’’ (Frijda, 1986, 2007). Affect makes the organism ready to act in ways that improve its 
grip on the situation in which it finds itself  (Rietveld, 2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; 
Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, forthcoming). The states of  bodily arousal that are either 
negatively or positively valenced we take to be patterns of  bodily action readiness. 
Constructionists also take core affect to be the ‘‘body’s way of  representing whether objects in 
the environment are valuable or not in a given context’’ (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 124). The core 
affect network is described as orienting the ‘‘brain’s processing capacity towards the most 
homeostatically- relevant and metabolically-relevant information—it performs a body-based 
source of  attention within the human brain’’ (Barrett and Satpute, 2013, p. 366). This is all very 
much in keeping with the view we have just outlined, but with a number of  crucial differences. 
We argue that this orientation to what is relevant in the environment should be conceived of  as 
action readiness, where the latter needs to be understood in the context of  a whole animal-
environment system.  
The living organism always finds itself  in an environment offering many possibilities for actions. 
From these possibilities some are singled out as important to the organism because they are 
possibilities that elicit an action-readiness in the organism. The organism is drawn to act on 
those affordances that bring the organism closer to equilibrium with the environment, and move 
the organism further away from a state of  disequilibrium. We are suggesting that interoceptive 
areas of  the brain track changes in patterns of  action readiness in the body of  the organism as a 
whole. These bodily changes reflect the organism’s state of  relative equilibrium with the 
environment. When the body of  the organism is aroused by some opportunity or challenge in 
the environment, the effect on the large-scale patterns of  activity in the brain is that of  
destabilizing and disrupting the self-sustaining pattern of  organization that has temporarily taken 
form. In the terminology of  dynamical systems theory, the brain is caused to shift out of  one 
attractor state. The brain then settles into new large scale patterns of  activity (a new attractor 
state) that makes the organism ready to act in ways that reduce its disequilibrium with the 
environment.  
In our view, bodily arousal in the form of  action readiness already includes some appraisal or 
evaluation of  the environment. The body of  the organism is aroused in particular way by 
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opportunities or challenges the environment offers that matter to the organism. Due to the 
organism’s skills and abilities that have been trained up in the past, the organism is already 
prepared to do what needs to be done to improve its situation in the world. Constructionists by 
contrast conceive of  core affect not as states of  action readiness, but more along the lines of  raw 
sensations that are only given meaning through the cognitive process of  situated 
conceptualization. Lindquist and colleagues describe categorization as functioning like a ‘‘chisel, 
leading people to attend to certain features in a sensory array and to ignore certain others.’’ 
Categorization is said to take place in a network of  brain regions (the DMN) that are engaged 
when remembering personal experiences (episodic memory) and when imagining future events 
(prospection) (Bar, 2007; Buckner et al., 2008). Categorization is hypothesized to take the form 
of  representation of  prior experiences (Barsalou, 2003). These prior experiences are used to 
infer what the most likely cause of  the current affective changes in one’s body might be, and it is 
this inference that allows for the integration of  internal changes in bodily experience, and 
external sensory perception into a ‘‘meaningful psychological moment’’ (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 
124).  
Constructionists might seem to be making common cause with recent embodied theorists of  
emotion such as Paula Niedenthal who take perceiving and thinking about emotion to involve 
the perceptual, somatovisceral and motoric reenactment or embodiment of  the emotion in 
oneself. Like constructionists, Niedenthal also takes the concepts involved in thinking about 
emotion to be modal concepts involving a re-experiencing of  past experiences. Consider for 
instance smiling. There is a clear difference between a felt smile and a false smile, a difference it 
turns out that can be traced to ways in which the muscles around the eye (the orbicularis oculi) 
contract (Ekman and Friesen, 1982). This so-called Duchenne marker is found in felt, but not in 
false smiles, and is apparently precisely localizable in the brain (Ekman et al., 1990, though one 
might question this in the light of  the arguments given above). Niedenthal and colleagues have 
argued that the processes involved in recognizing a false from a felt smile in other people might 
likewise involve one unconsciously simulating offline the very same muscle movements one 
makes when genuinely or non-genuinely smiling (Niedenthal et al., 2010). Emotion is thus 
embodied because experiencing emotion, thinking about emotion, and recognizing emotion in 
others all require one to literally embody the emotion oneself  in one’s posture, expression, 
movements and gestures.  
This is an intriguing idea, and the evidence for it is strong. However, there are a number of  
important differences between Niedenthal’s embodied theory of  emotion, constructionism, and 
our embodied theory. For Niedenthal, folk psychological distinctions between emotions can be 
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precisely mapped onto physiological states which can in turn be correlated with populations of  
neurons found in sensory, motor and affective regions of  the brain (Niedenthal, 2007). She is 
careful to add that the re-experiencing of  physiological states involved in perceiving and thinking 
about emotion (be it one’s own or other peoples) need not be real physiological states of  the 
body. Simulations of  these physiological changes will do. The changes taking place in the living 
body of  the organism turn out to be merely peripheral, and all the real action required for 
generating an embodied emotion takes place in the brain. We argue by contrast that states of  the 
whole living body in the form of  action-readiness drive the meta-stable, large-scale pattern of  
activations that take shape in the brain. Emotion is embodied because it is realized in states of  
action readiness that mobilize the organism, orienting the body to relevant possibilities and 
challenges.  
Constructionists would, we suspect, also disagree with Niedenthal’s embodied theory. She seems 
to be committed to a discrete theory of  emotion according to which distinct physiological and 
neural states are associated with different basic emotions. Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006) have 
both argued against a mapping of  emotions one-to-one onto behavioral expressions of  the kind 
appealed to in Niedenthal’s research. They argue for instance that behavioral expressions of  
emotion are enormously context-sensitive and exhibit massive situational variance. For example, 
in some situations I may express my sadness by crying, while in many other situations I may find 
this sort of  open expression of  feeling to be inappropriate. We agree with Colombetti (2014), ch.
2 however that a dynamical account of  emotions of  the type we have been proposing, can 
account for this context-sensitivity without completely rejecting a discrete theory of  emotion. 
Colombetti argues (and we agree) that emotional episodes may be mapped onto ‘‘relatively stable 
patterns of  brain and bodily (including behavioral and expressive) processes.’’ (Colombetti, 2014, 
p. 48).  
The role of  past experience in orienting an organism to what is relevant looks very different 
when viewed from the perspective of  the whole living animal in interaction with its 
environment. Constructionists describe the psychological process of  situated conceptualization 
as involving the reenactment of  past experiences, which leads to an understanding of  the cause 
of  one’s current bodily state of  core affect, and creates ‘‘a meaningful mental moment in the 
present’’ (Barrett and Satpute, 2013, p. 367). Emotion is responsible for giving an organism a 
meaningful experience of  the environment just as we argue, but it does so only with the 
mediation of  processes of  situated conceptualization. We’ve suggested by contrast that affect in 
the form of  action readiness orients the organism to the possibilities for action that matter most 
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to the organism at the time. The organism finds itself  ready to deal adequately with the 
affordances of  the environment, but it does so in large part because of  its past experience.  
Particularly important are the skills and abilities built up over long period of  repeatedly 
encountering and dealing with the same or similar situations. In sports and music for instance 
‘‘training, repetition and drill is the concrete foundations on which the structure of  play gets 
erected (Noë, 2009, p. 118). However it is not only in these socio-cultural domains that practice 
matters; an animal’s adequate dealings with the affordances of  the environment is always a 
matter of  skill. An animal can respond to an affordance well or badly, and it can get better over 
time at doing so (Rietveld, 2008). This past history of  recurrent interactions with the 
environment is necessary we suggest for correctly anticipating the outcomes of  one’s current 
interactions with the environment. Past experience thus explains how the animal is currently 
ready to respond adequately to relevant possibilities for action. It is on the basis of  this action 
readiness (which we have just argued enfolds the organism’s past experiences) that the organism 
gives meaning to the environment, and certain possibilities for action stand out as immediately 
relevant to the organism now. We therefore agree with constructionists that past experience plays 
an important role in creating a meaningful moment of  emotional experience. We disagree 
however about the form this meaningful moment of  experience takes. We argue it takes the 
form of  the whole organism being ready to deal adequately with the relevant affordances of  its 
environment.  
This in turn suggests a different interpretation of  the constructionist finding that the grouping 
of  areas that makes up the DMN are consistently active for a range of  different emotional 
experiences. We speculate that the spontaneous activity found in this population of  neurons 
gives the organism the ability to accurately and precisely anticipate the outcome of  its interactions 
with the environment. (For more details on how we would understand these anticipatory 
processes we direct you to Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014)).  
1.5 Conclusion  
Our goals in this paper have been twofold. First we wished to show that cognitive neuroscience 
may need a different account of  cognitive function to that which cognitive psychology supplies. 
Second we wanted to show that ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory under the 
heading of  radical embodied cognitive science may be able to provide such an account of  
cognitive function. However if  we do look to embodied cognitive science to play this role, this 
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means giving up on a brain-centred view of  cognitive function. We will no longer be able to 
claim that the brain is the organ of  the mind. Instead we will need to think about mind and the 
cognitive processes that make up the mind at the level of  the whole brain-body-environment 
system. Let us briefly recap our argument.  
We began by reviewing some of  the problems cognitive neuroscientists have run into in mapping 
emotional and cognitive functions onto discrete and separate structures in the brain. Instead of  
discrete brain regions and networks performing specialized emotional or cognitive computational 
operations, we have discussed evidence that points to extensive mutual influence between 
classical emotional and cognitive areas of  the brain. We then argued that this makes trouble for 
any attempt to localize function in specific brain areas. We turned our attention next to 
dimensional or constructivist theories of  emotion that share our view that the different emotions 
as they are understood in common-sense psychology are unlikely to map onto distinct neural 
circuits. Constructionists argue instead for an account of  the different emotions as constructed 
out of  the activity and interaction among domain-general neural networks. However we argued 
that constructionists may face a similar problem to the discrete emotion theorists they oppose. 
They may find that the domain-general networks to which they appeal likewise do not have fixed 
and permanent functions, but may shift their functions in ways that depend on context.  
The moral we think of  this considerations about brain regions and networks not having fixed 
and permanent functions is that we need to think of  cognitive function in the brain as context- 
sensitive. We then turned our attention to offering an account of  this context-sensitivity. We 
argued for a view of  affect as states of  action readiness involving the whole body of  the 
organism. States of  action readiness manifest in the body as forms of  arousal that are either 
positively or negatively valued. These bodily states prepare the organism to respond to relevant 
opportunities and challenges in the environment. These states of  action readiness are tracked by 
interoceptive processes in the brain. The salience network very likely plays a central role in this 
process (Menon and Uddin, 2010). We then argued that patterns of  large scale activity take shape 
in the brain in ways that are driven by the states of  action readiness in the body as a whole. 
These states of  action readiness are elicited by relevant affordances in the environment, and 
make the organism ready to respond to relevant affordances.  
So far our arguments have focused entirely on emotion and how best to understand emotion in 
the brain. We take our argument however to point to the more general conclusion that cognitive 
function is best investigated at the level of  the whole brain-body-environment system. We take 
such a conclusion to follow from what we’ve already argued about emotion and cognition 
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interactions in the brain. We’ve seen above that there any separation of  emotional and cognitive 
processes in the brain doesn’t hold up in reality. The brain areas that neuroimaging studies 
identify as being active when people perform tasks that engage emotional and cognitive 
processes turn out to be in constant and continuous interaction. We’ve also argued that 
emotional processes take place in the living body of  the organism in its interactions with an 
environment rich with affordances. Given that there is no separating emotion and cognition it 
follows that cognitive functions likewise deeply depend on the whole living body of  the 
organism in its engagement with an environment rich with affordances.  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Chapter 2 
Interoceptive inference: emotion-cognition interactions in 
the predictive brain 
Abstract 
In recent years, predictive processing and hierarchical inference have proven to be invaluable 
tools in describing the complex interaction that takes place between top-down cognitive 
processing and bottom-up sensory information (Friston et al. 2017; Friston 2010; Corbetta et al. 
2008). While predictive processing frameworks have primarily been applied to exteroceptive 
signals and the ways that we model the outside world, there is growing interest in how the same 
functional models may be used to describe the processing of  interoceptive signals. 
Seth (2013) has recently proposed a predictive processing theory of  emotional awareness. 
According to the model, cascading top-down predictions about the source of  interoceptive 
signals counterflow with bottom-up interoceptive prediction errors. The integration of  the 
various predictive representations results in the felt aspect of  an emotion. The model is intended 
to extend traditional cognitive appraisal theories of  emotion by filling out the 
neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the interaction between the affect (e.g. neural and 
physiological arousal) and appraisal (e.g. memories, evaluations, predictions) elements commonly 
considered to make up an emotional experience (Scherer 1984, 2001, 2009; Brosch & Sander 
2013; Schachter & Singer 1962). 
In this paper, we will argue that an interoceptive predictive processing account of  emotion needs 
to be dynamic and non-linear in ways that refute the cognitivist assumptions of  existing appraisal 
theories of  emotion. The argument will be in part based on recent neuroscientific descriptions 
of  the relationship between emotion and cognition. As we will see, predictive processing 
accounts of  emotion fit well within dynamic network models of  the brain that aim to dissolve 
the boundaries between emotion and cognition (Pessoa 2014; Lewis 2005). This resemblance 
sets interoceptive predictive processing firmly against many of  the characteristics of  appraisal 
theories of  emotion. The aim of  this paper will be to highlight some of  the ways that predictive 
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processing can contribute to live debates in emotion theory, as well as suggest how affective 
neuroscience might in turn facilitate a better understand of  our predictive processing theories of  
mind.  
2.1 Interoceptive predictive processing 
In recent years, the Predictive Processing (PP) framework has proven a powerful resource when 
it comes to describing the complex interactions that take place between high-level cognitive and 
low-level sensory information (Friston 2002, 2010; Corbetta et al. 2008; Howhy 2013; Clark 
2013). Very briefly, according to the PP model the brain uses what it has learned about the 
underlying regularities in the world to make increasingly accurate top-down predictions about the 
nature of  the bottom-up sensory signals it receives moment to moment. Perception in this 
model is not about sensory signals alone, therefore, but also the brain’s best guesses about what 
those signals mean for the embodied agent. Discrepancies between these predictions and the 
sensory signals produce ‘errors’. These errors help improve the predictive processes in a couple 
of  ways: first, errors can go forward in the system helping to refine the predictions so as to form 
a better fit with the scene; or second, they can produce the behaviours needed to bring the 
external scene in line with the predictions. Ultimately, this whole prediction error minimizing 
regime is ‘tuned’ by second-order predictions about how reliable the different streams of  
information are given the predictive agent’s current state and the current context. This 
estimation of  reliability, referred to as ‘precision weighting’, allows the predictive system to 
flexibly adjust the relative impact (or gain) that certain prediction errors have on the overall 
process (Friston 2010). 
While PP has primarily been used to investigate exteroception, there is a growing interest in how 
the this same framework may also apply to interoception (Ainley et al. 2016; Allen et al. 2016; 
Apps & Tsakiris 2014; Barrett & Simmons 2015; Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Clark 2015; Gu et 
al. 2013; Seth 2013, 2014; Seth et al. 2012). Seth (2013) has provided PP researchers an excellent 
foray into the realm of  feelings with his proposed interoceptive predictive processing account 
(IP). According to Seth, the same predictive story can also be told about interoception. Here, 
interoception - the internal sense one has of  physiological changes in the body, including 
visceral, vascular, motor and somatic information - is the collaborative result of  top-down 
predictions about the source of  the interoceptive signals converging with bottom-up 
interoceptive signals from the body. Error signals in this model are minimized in an analogous 
way to the sensorimotor predictions above: either an error modifies the model to fit the affective 
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state of  the organism , or autonomic changes are provoked so that the body comes to fit the 9
predictions. The integration of  these various predictive representations at multiple levels results 
in a felt experience. 
Seth proposes that IP may help extend appraisal theories of  emotion (ATE) by filling out some 
of  the neurocomputational mechanisms underlying the interaction between the affective (e.g. 
neural and physiological arousal, action tendencies) and appraisal (e.g. memories, evaluations, 
predictions) elements commonly considered by ATE to make up an emotional experience 
(Brosch & Sander 2013; Scherer 2001, 2009; Schachter & Singer 1962). While it is true that both 
IP and ATE aim at explaining how emotions emerge from more domain-general processes, they 
do so in importantly different ways. In particular, we will show, IP should be seen as dynamic 
and embodied in ways that refute the overly simplistic and cognitivist assumptions of  ATE. Our 
argument will be based on a dynamic network models that aim specifically at dissolving the 
boundaries between emotion and cognition (Pessoa 2014). As we will see, IP fits well with such 
network models. This resemblance, we believe, makes IP irreconcilable with many of  the 
characteristics of  both traditional and more contemporary ATE accounts. 
The remainder of  the paper will proceed as follows: first, we will review ATE as a model, 
highlighting in particular the tendency to assume an overly simple relationship between affect 
and appraisal. Second, we will look at both recent network models of  the brain (Pessoa 2014) 
and dynamic systems approaches to thinking about emotion (Lewis 2005) that describe the 
relationship between emotion and cognition as dynamic and non-linear; and third, we will argue 
that IP fits better with these dynamic models than with both traditional and contemporary ATE. 
2.2 Appraisal theories of  emotion 
Traditionally, cognition and emotion were described as separable at both the neurobiological 
level (e.g. cortical vs. subcortical) and the psychological level (e.g. perception vs. arousal). Given 
that separation, the primary task for emotion researchers was to reconcile these disparate 
elements, helping to explain how they came together in the generation of  an emotional 
experience. A major contributor to this project are cognitivist, or appraisal type, theories of  
emotion (ATE). 
 We will follow Barrett and Bliss-Moreau (2009) in their more general use of  the term ‘affect’. They write, “In the 9
science of  emotion, ‘‘affect’’ is a general term that has come to mean anything emotional. A cautious term, it allows 
reference to something’s effect or someone’s internal state without specifying exactly what kind of  an effect or state 
it is. It allows researchers to talk about emotion in a theory-neutral way” (ibid., 168).
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ATE (e.g. Arnold 1960; Scherer 1999) are motivated by the fact that our cognitive evaluation (or 
appraisal) of  a scene forms a central part of  any emotional experience. Perception of  an event 
on its own doesn’t seem to be sufficient for producing an emotional response. Rather, emotions 
arise when an organism evaluates the significance of  an event for its well-being (Brosch 2013). If  
the event is relevant to the organism, cognition induces the physiological changes that produce 
an emotional experience. For example, a rude gesture only gives rise to anger insofar as it is 
interpreted as offensive. One advantage of  ATE, then, is that it is a handy explanation for the 
intentionality and rationality of  emotions. In virtue of  their cognitive component, emotions are 
about ‘things in the world’ and can be judged as rational or irrational, appropriate or 
inappropriate. The cognitive or evaluative aspect of  an emotion allows ATE to do justice to the 
intentionality of  emotions, while retaining the importance of  bodily events.                 
‘Appraisal’ in these theories generally refers to processes that evaluate the significance of  a 
stimulus for an organism’s well-being (Brosch 2013: 370; Scherer 2009: 1309). ATE aims 
specifically at explaining how emotions emerge from the interaction between affective reactions 
and cognitive appraisals. Consider a famous example from Schachter and Singer's (1962) 
experiment. Participants in the experiment received an injection which they believed was for 
vision but was in fact adrenaline. They were then asked to wait in a room with a confederate who 
acted in a silly or an irritating manner. When later interviewed, the participants (but not the 
control subjects) identified their adrenaline induced arousal as either joy or irritation depending 
on the context that included the confederate. Schachter and Singer concluded that emotions are 
the result of  largely undifferentiated patterns of  neural and visceral arousal and the individual’s 
best guess at what that reaction could mean. The famous catch line: an affective reaction is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for a particular emotional experience to occur. While the findings 
and methods have been open to criticism (for a review see Prinz 2003), the central conclusion 
that emotions take more than raw bodily activations is widely accepted today (see also Critchley 
2005). They must also in some way include an interpretation of  what is happening in the 
environment and its relationship to the organism. Notice that in Schachter and Singer's two-
factor model the obvious separation between bodily affectivity (described as "a general pattern 
of  excitation of  the sympathetic nervous system"; 1962: 379) and the cognitive appraisals that 
make sense of  those activations. This fits a general pattern in ATE models of  characterizing 
cognitive appraisal and emotional affect as discrete entities. 
How are these entities related? In traditional ATE theories, appraisal and affect are related to one 
another in simple and causally linear ways. Newer ATE models, however, take into account 
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possible dynamic and recursive relationships between cognitive and emotional processing. For 
instance, Scherer (2004, 2009) presents an appraisal model of  emotion called ‘The Components 
Process’ model (CPM). This model focuses on explaining the dynamic unfolding of  an emotion 
over time caused by an individual’s evaluation of  an event as significant to her goals or needs. 
According to appraisal theories, an individual is constantly evaluating whether objects or events 
around her are relevant to her goals, needs and values. Appraisal mechanisms check for criteria 
such as novelty, valence (whether the event is pleasant or unpleasant), relevance (the significance 
of  the event for the agent or her social group), the implications of  the event, coping potential 
(how well the individual can adjust to the consequences of  the event) and normative significance 
(the compatibility of  the event with one’s goals and values) (Scherer 2009: 1309). 
The CPM emphasizes that appraisal along these criteria occurs at multiple levels of  processing. 
Appraisal of  novelty, for instance, can occur quickly and automatically via subpersonal processes 
at the neural level. It can also occur as the result of  a deliberate comparison at the level of  
conscious thought. Appraisal processes also require the coordinated activity of  many neural 
structures, and the CPM includes bidirectional effects between appraisal processes and cognitive 
and physiological functions. For instance, a minimal amount of  attention is needed for the 
appraisal process to begin but, if  an event is perceived as relevant, more attentional resources 
will be recruited for the stimulus (Scherer 2009: 1314). 
Taking an event to be relevant sets in motion the motivational systems needed to respond to that 
event. The results of  the appraisal and motivational changes induce changes in the autonomic 
system and somatic system (such as increased heart rate and a changed facial expression). These 
changes are then given a unified representation by a multimodal integration area, and this 
representation is continuously updated according to changes in events and appraisals. The 
unified representation can then become conscious and available to be labelled as an emotion. 
The CPM sees the role of  emotions as preparing the organism to respond to significant events 
and, in some cases, preparing the organism to take one of  any number of  possible courses of  
action in response to an event (Scherer 2009: 1308). Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
emotions are not a sufficient cause of  action. Behaviours are seen as complex, with emotions 
being among the factors that prepare an organism for action. 
Essentially, the CPM claims that emotion processing arises from interacting componential 
subsystems, including appraisal processes, physiological processes, motor expressions and action 
tendencies. The subsystems are interdependent such that changes in one subsystem result in 
changes in the others. Additionally, the appraisal process and subsequent physiological, somatic 
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and motor unfolding is recursive, with multiple feedforward and feedback mechanisms between 
subsystems. 
Scherer’s CPM specifically aims to do justice to the neurophysiological evidence on emotion 
processing, citing the following as “central design features” of  emotion: “(i) the dynamic, 
recursive nature of  emotional processing; [and] (ii) the central, and causal, role of  multi-level 
cognitive processing of  both antecedent events and response options” (Scherer 2009: 1307).  10
Nonetheless, it is by no means the only current appraisal theory to do so. Brosch and Sander 
(2013) present an “appraising brain” model of  emotion that rejects the ‘feedforward’ view of  
information processing in the brain. Their model involves recursive processing cycles through 
which the brain develops an increasingly finer-grained evaluation of  a stimulus. Because 
cognitive and physiological information is integrated into stimulus processing at multiple 
latencies, the model does not draw a hard and fast distinction between cognitive and 
physiological components of  evaluation. In their account: 
  
“A linear view of  information processing, where information is first analyzed in the 
sensory cortex then moves “upward” to regions underlying more complex processing to 
finally arrive in the prefrontal cortex, has been replaced with models emphasizing that 
information flow in the brain occurs in multiple sweeps of  activation, with numerous 
feedforward and feedback loops that refine neural processing patterns and the underlying 
computations with each iteration […] This allows for the dynamic, increasingly more 
complex evaluation of  a stimulus, highly compatible with the predictions of  appraisal 
theory” (ibid.,166). 
  
Although new ATE accounts take pains to accommodate neuroscientific evidence on recursive 
and dynamic processing they still fall prey to certain cognitivist assumptions, dividing emotional 
and cognitive processing into decomposable subsystems and privileging the latter.  
In the following sections, we will argue that the ATE model is based on an inaccurate 
interpretation of  the neural interactions underpinning emotional experience. As we will see, 
recent dynamic network models of  the brain highlight neural connectivity that dissolves any clear 
separation between cognitive and emotional processing. In the next section, we draw on 
Giovanna Colombetti’s work, which critiques ATE on the basis of  this interconnectivity between 
emotion and cognition at the level of  the brain.  
 Although Scherer’s model incorporates dynamic and recursive neural processing, appraisal criteria are processed 10
sequentially and in a strict temporal order. This is a distinctive feature of  Scherer’s ATE model, so we will not focus 
our argument on it.
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2.3 The cognition-emotion divide in ATE 
Scherer claims to offer a dynamic and recursive account of  emotion because it incorporates 
continuously changing cognitive and motivational processes. However, Colombetti (2007) argues 
that this is insufficient to make his account genuinely dynamic. She claims that the CPM is still 
modular because it "posits cognition (appraisal) as a separate component inside the emotion 
system, which merely interacts with other components” (2007: 97). Bodily events are not part of  
the self-organizing network of  processes that give rise to cognition. The body influences 
cognition, mostly indirectly, but it does not form a part of  the cognitive process itself. Cognition 
still occurs only in the head.  
According to Colombetti, Scherer’s model reproduces the flaws of  cognitivist models insofar as 
psychological functions are assigned to discrete subcomponents of  the system as opposed to 
being emergent features of  the system. For instance, the affective and cognitive components of  
Scherer’s model do not emerge from the interactions of  several subcomponents (which are 
themselves neither cognitive or emotional). Rather, they are controlled by dedicated systems. 
Moreover, appraisal belongs exclusively to the cognitive system. Arousal and bodily events 
modulate cognitive processing, but do not play a part in appraising themselves. 
ATE imagine cognitive appraisals as doing all of  the heavy lifting when it comes to determining 
the character of  the felt emotion: they appraise the context, categorize the stimulus as either 
pleasant or unpleasant, initiate physiological changes and action tendencies, and reappraise the 
object and situation over time so that the agent can adjust their response. Affect is often 
conceptualized as the body’s reaction to cognitive appraisals. As Colombetti so elegantly puts it, 
“The body in the two-factor theory is by itself  ‘naked’, so to speak, and it needs to be cognitively 
“dressed” to give rise to emotion” (Colombetti 2013: 88). Colombetti, using Susan Hurley’s 
terminology (1998), calls this approach “vertically modular”: though arousal and cognition 
interact, they are controlled by distinct and easily separable subsystems. This means that, though 
it claims to focus on the dynamic nature of  emotional processing, the CPM is not genuinely 
dynamic in the way espoused by proponents of  dynamical systems theory in cognitive science 
(e.g. Lewis 2005). According to a dynamic systems model, appraisal, arousal and other 
psychological functions emerge from the interaction of  several microcomponents. Importantly, 
these microcomponents do not themselves have any specific function independently of  the 
large-scale patterns in which they participate. 
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In the following section we will briefly review Pessoa’s collection of  findings on cognitive-
emotional processing in the brain and examine why Colombetti and Lewis take such findings to 
pose a problem for models such as CPM. 
2.4 Dissolving the boundaries between appraisal and affect 
A once-popular neuroscientific paradigm imagined the human brain as evolving in layers with 
phylogenetically newer and more advanced circuitry overlaying and directing older more 
primitive-instinctual circuits (Herrick 1933; Papez 1937). From that perspective, cognition and 
emotion were naturally assumed to be separable at the neural level - being neatly mapped onto 
the higher-cortical and lower-subcortical areas of  the brain respectively. However, as our 
neuroscientific techniques improve we are increasingly aware that such a dichotomous view of  
neural processing is too simple to capture the complex, reciprocal and self-organizing nature of  
human brain function. This is especially true when discussing the the division between cognition 
and emotion.  
Drawing on a wealth of  neuroscientific research Pessoa argues for the dissolution of  the 
boundary between emotional and cognitive processes at the level of  the brain (2013). Pessoa 
shows that brain regions typically characterized as emotional or cognitive perform functions that 
are characterized as both emotional and cognitive in nature. For example, the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), which is often characterized as contributing to cognitive functions due to its central role 
in the maintaining and manipulating information in the brain, also plays an important role in 
emotional processing such as regulating approach and avoidance behaviour (Pessoa 2008: 150). 
Or consider that the amygdala - a paradigmatic emotional area traditionally believed to play a role 
in fear processing - is widely understood today to be key in directing attention and supporting 
associative learning (Hollard & Gallagher 1999). Pessoa concludes that “parceling the brain into 
cognitive and affective regions is inherently problematic, and ultimately untenable” (2008: 148). 
Pessoa’s argument rests on a dynamic network perspective of  neural structure and processing 
(van den Heuvel & Sporns 2011, 2013a, 2013b). In contrast to more traditional models (that 
assumed connections between brain regions to be relatively simple), neural networking models 
describe the brain as being composed of  ‘functional clusters’: regions within which every area is 
reciprocally connected to every other area (Pessoa 2014: 10). In turn, these clusters communicate 
and collaborate with one another via far reaching “connector hubs”: centrally positioned brain 
regions that enjoy massive connectivity with the rest of  the brain (Pessoa 2008: 154). A prime 
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example of  such a hub is the amygdala, a subcortical area at the topographical centre of  the 
brain that is densely and reciprocally connected with all but 8 cortical regions (Young et al. 1994).  
Intelligent behavior, according to this model, emerges from the transient, large-scale, functional 
networks where circuits are continually being connected and disconnected in various patterns 
over time. In this model, behaviours are not implemented by individual circuits or areas, but 
emerge instead from the interactions of  multiple areas (Pessoa 2008; Anderson 2014). One 
important conclusion that emerges from this perspective is that the functional profile of  any 
given area will inevitably change relative to the transient large scale pattern the area is affiliated 
with at the moment (Pessoa 2008: 154; Mesulam 1990).  
While there may be neural clusters at the far peripheries of  the brain, due to their lack of  
connections with neighbouring areas, that may be characterized as either cognitive or affective; 
even these circuits contribute to overall function through their participation in much larger 
patterns of  brain activity. The large-scale patterns that emerge are inevitably composed of  what 
might be characterized as both emotional and cognitive circuits, significantly eroding our ability 
to cleanly divide processing into simply emotional or cognitive categories. Complex behaviours 
are seen as emerging from these large-scale emotional-cognitive patterns, which continually shift 
according to the context and the goals of  the animal. Pessoa concludes, “there are simply no 
truly separate systems for emotion and cognition because complex cognitive-emotional behavior 
emerges from the dynamic interactions between brain networks” (Pessoa 2008: 148).   11
Colombetti argues that dynamic network models such as these pose a problem for appraisal 
theories: if  there is no division between cognitive and emotional processing at the level of  the 
brain, then psychological accounts that characterize cognition as a distinct module are 
unjustified. To help illustrate this point, Colombetti references Marc Lewis’ dynamic systems 
theory of  emotion (Lewis 2005, 2015; Lewis & Liu 2011; Lewis & Todd 2005, 2007). Lewis 
draws on neuroscientific evidence to show that the broad psychological categories of  ‘emotion’ 
and ‘appraisal’ cannot be cleanly mapped onto the brain. He argues that an inability to 
differentiate cognitive from emotional functions at the neural level implies that it is untenable to 
attempt to do so at the psychological level (since these distinctions lack a neural basis). 
Maintaining the division between cognitive and emotional processing thus creates a jarring 
difference between the way functions are individuated at the neural vs. the psychological 
levels.The distributed nature of  neural processing means that the psychological functions - 
 There is a growing literature in cognitive neuroscience that questions whether any neural resources are simple 11
components in the way previously imagined (see Anderson's work on neural reuse; 2010).
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typically taken as cognitive and emotional - interact in such rapid and mutually dependant ways 
that we cannot separate them from another. This is further illustrated in the following section 
where we examine Lewis’ dynamical theory of  emotions. 
2.5 Lewis’ dynamical systems theory of  emotion 
Marc Lewis outlines an approach to emotion research that emphasizes the inseparability of  
affective and cognitive elements. He uses dynamical systems modelling to help bridge emotion 
theory with the dynamic network models of  the brain. In what follows, we will summarize the 
dynamic systems approach and Lewis’s application of  the theory to emotion. 
Dynamic systems theory (DST) explores the mathematical means to model changing systems in 
temporally sensitive ways. As real world systems rarely exist in a vacuum, dynamic modelling 
often includes how closely related systems influence one another (Van Gelder 1995: 358). When 
neighbouring systems are so close that state changes in one system necessarily result in state 
changes in the other, those systems are described as 'dynamically coupled'. According to DST, 
coupled systems are not independent systems, but rather are better thought of  as comprising a 
single changing system (Van Gelder 1995: 357; see also Kelso 1995). An important 
characterization of  any such dynamic system is a tendency to 'self-organize' (Lewis, 2005). This 
means that no subsystem acts as the ‘controller’ of  other systems, but rather, “coherent wholes 
emerge and consolidate from interacting constituents” (Lewis 2005: 173).  
  
The language of  self-organizing dynamic systems is an ideal tool for discussing mental 
phenomena. As Lewis writes, “dynamic systems operate through reciprocal, recursive, and 
multiple causal processes, offering a language of  causality consistent with the flow of  activity 
among neural components” (Lewis 2005: 169). Lewis picks out various psychological 
components commonly described as appraisal processes (e.g. perception, evaluation, attention, 
memory, and higher-order executive functions), and as affect processes (e.g. action tendencies, 
attentional orientation, and affective feelings). According to Lewis, when we shift from one 
emotional state to the next, elements of  appraisal and affect collaborate in highly interdependent 
ways.  
Consider the complex interactions that occur between affective and appraisal components as 
part of  sexual attraction. Erotic cues impact various brain systems (perhaps via the amygdala) in 
fast and pre-attentive ways (Diano et al. 2017). This initial activation triggers innate sexual 
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reflexes (patterns of  arousal and action readiness) and learned sexual scripts (memory and 
planning). These arousals and expectations further entrain attentional processing on the erotic 
cues, which in turn produces a feedback loop between the autonomic arousal and the narrowing 
of  attentional and decision making processes - which ultimately, if  unimpeded, leads to approach 
behaviours. Once the change in emotional state is initiated, these affective and appraisal elements 
quickly become coupled. As Lewis writes, “according to this model, appraisal activities and 
emotional response activities cause one another, each activating, propelling, and guiding the 
other, reciprocally and recursively... hence what evolves is not just an appraisal but an emotion-
appraisal amalgam or 'emotional interpretation'” (Lewis 2005: 176). Much like the dynamic 
network views outlined above, in which neural circuits (commonly associated with cognition or 
emotion) function by collaborating in larger-scale patterns of  activation, appraisal and affective 
processes become similarly entangled.  
Colombetti highlights how both Pessoa and Lewis argue against the vertical modularity of  
emotion and cognition. Emotion and cognition, according to dynamic network models, refute 
easy localization to specific neural regions and, as expressed above, the subpersonal processes 
constituting emotion and cognition relate in dynamic and non-linear ways. Colombetti concludes, 
“[i]f  this is the appropriate way to conceptualize the cognition-emotion relationship, then to 
characterize appraisal as a separate cognitive process not overlapping with (other) emotional 
components (as the CPM, for one, does) is misleading, because it does not do justice to the real 
complexities of  the neural level” (Colombetti 2013: 100). In contrast to ATE, a cognitive 
evaluation is not the only cause of  an affective reaction, nor is it the role of  cognition simply to 
appraise the body's reactions. Instead, these elements co-evolve, working to elicit and sustain 
each other over time.  
In the following section, we will apply these insights to the interoceptive predictive processing 
theory. We will argue, based on neuroscientific evidence on AIC function (and a comparison 
with other PP theories of  emotion), that IP is better suited to a dynamic model of  emotion than 
an appraisal model of  emotion. 
2.6 Interoceptive predictions are complex, self-organizing and 
embodied 
Seth proposes that IP can extend ATE by detailing some of  the neurocomputations that link 
affective changes and cognitive appraisals. Seth is right to make this connection insofar as both 
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models are clearly interested in explaining how emotions emerge from the interaction between 
more basic appraisal and affective processes. However, as we will see in the following sections 
(which build further on the neuroscientific evidence discussed earlier), what the subcomponents 
of  emotion are and how they are thought to relate is significantly different according to the two 
theories. IP emerges as a much better fit with more dynamical models of  emotion. 
IP characterizes an emotional experience as emerging from the tight coordination of  bottom-up 
bodily information and top-down cognitive and perceptual processes. In fact, a hallmark of  PP 
models is this interdependent relationship between bottom-up and top-down information 
(Dayan et al. 1995; Friston 2002, 2012; Corbetta et al. 2008). According to IP, errors signals are 
explained away by either a modification of  the generative model (so as to make a better fit with 
the interoceptive signal) or by motivating autonomic changes (eg. heart rate, respiratory rate, 
smooth muscle behaviour) to better fit the model (Seth 2013: 566). Seth’s account highlights the 
fact that error minimization takes place within two neurophysiological loops simultaneously: a 
first loop stretches between the high-level prediction and changes in the internal milieu 
(interoceptive), and a second loop from prediction to overt actions and expressions 
(exteroceptive). These loops between brain and body are described as deeply interdependent: the 
ebb and flow of  each cycle initiating, maintaining and restraining the next cycle. Subjective 
feelings emerge in Seth’s model from the co-evolution of  these streams of  information. The 
self-organizing and interdependent nature of  these predictions refutes the description popular in 
ATE of  a clear separation of  affective and appraisal processes. To make this point more clearly, 
it will help to look at processing in the anterior insula cortex (AIC), the central instantiator of  IP 
in the brain. 
2.6.a Interceptive predictions and the insular cortex 
The strongest evidence for IP comes from research on the AIC (see also Allen, 2014). According 
to Seth, (2013) the AIC is a central component of  the neural instantiation of  predictive 
processing of  emotion. In this section, we will review the neuroscientific evidence on the 
function and connectivity of  the AIC. In doing so, we will illustrate that its role in generating 
emotion fits with the dynamical systems models described in the previous sections. The AIC is 
what Pessoa calls a connector hub - it is richly connected with myriad other brain regions, it is 
functionally diverse, and it does not play a specifically cognitive or affective role in emotional 
processing. 
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AIC function was previously thought to be limited to feelings of  disgust (e.g. Jabbi et al. 2008; 
Wicker et al. 2003). This hypothesis emerged from the observation that diseases that affect the 
AIC (such as Huntington's and Parkinson's) are often accompanied by lowered disgust reactions 
(Mitchell et al. 2005) and difficulty perceiving disgust in others (e.g. Kipps et al. 2007; 
Sprenglemeyer et al. 1996; Suzuki et al. 2006). As we saw above, such locationist views are 
increasingly giving way to dynamic models of  brain function, in which neural circuits play 
various roles depending on the larger structural and functional networks they participate in. For 
example, while there is some evidence that specific neural patterns may instantiate particular 
emotions (Panksepp 2004; LeDoux 1996), many of  the same functional systems of  neurons are 
found to participate in a wide variety of  emotional and cognitive processes (Lindquist et al. 
2012). The AIC is an ideal case of  a brain area that wears many ‘functional hats’. 
The AIC is believed to be one of  the most functionally diverse areas in the brain, activated for a 
wide range of  both emotional and cognitive tasks (Anderson et al. 2013). The AIC has been 
found to be involved in in almost all emotional processing (Kober et al. 2008; see also 
Ackermann and Riecker 2010; Craig 2010; Garavan 2010). Moreover, the AIC has also been 
found to play a key role in many cognitive processes, including predicting what will happen next 
in the body given the current context (Singer et al. 2009; Damasio 1999). For example, in a study 
on anxiety, Paulus and Stein (2006) characterized neurons in AIC as computing an interoceptive 
prediction error when anticipated, and experienced bodily responses to aversive stimuli were 
mismatched. When a similar mismatch was induced using false cardiac feedback by Grey and 
colleagues (2007) increased dorsal AIC activation was correlated with an increase in emotional 
intensity/salience to the stimuli. This research characterizes the AIC as an area uniquely capable 
of  integrating interoceptive and exteroceptive signals with past experiences and future 
expectations. IP has been proposed as an elegant neurocomputational explanation of  how these 
processes might come together: through a continual reducing of  error between top-down 
predictions and bottom-up interoceptive signals (Gu et al. 2013; Seth 2013; Allen et al. 2016). 
According to Bud Craig’s influential account of  the insula (an area heavily referenced in the IP 
literature; Clark 2015; Barrett & Simmons 2015; Seth & Friston 2016) interoceptive information 
is processed in a posterior-to-anterior progression in an increasingly complex fashion with 
various streams of  internal, external and contextual information being integrated along the way 
(Craig 2002, 2009). Feeling states represented in the insula in fact emerge from the collaboration 
of  these various streams. It is important to note that this process does not follow a simple feed-
forward progression from sensory signal to representation (like Damasio 2000; Craig 2009; 
Singer et al. 2009). Seth demonstrates an awareness of  this fact when he writes, that such an 
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assumption is "challenged by evidence of  substantial cross-talk between levels of  viscerosensory 
representation, including top-down cortical and behavioural influences to brainstem and spinal 
centres (Seth 2013: 567; see also Critchley & Harrison 2013). IP relies on a characterization of  
the AIC as capable of  simultaneously integrating various streams of  information from within the 
body with contextual signals from higher-order cortical areas (such as orbitofrontal cortex, 
cingulate cortex, etc.) and continually modifying internal states of  the body via massive 
descending systems (see Gu et al. 2013a). Gu et al. make a similar point in their own account of  
interoception in predictive processing that also focuses on the AIC. They write: 
  
“The AIC both responds to and controls the internal milieu or literally "gut 
feelings". The AIC is perfectly placed anatomically to do this; it is equipped with the 
anatomical and functional foundation to perform the very important task of  
inducing transitions in physiological states... neurons in AIC innervate the viscera 
directly and indirectly for example through projections to the hypothalamic area via 
the amygdala. In short, the AIC is able to cause changes in the physiological states 
of  the body, in addition to perceiving changes from the body” (2013b: 3382). 
  
As Seth notes, these two directions of  interaction (brain-to-body and body-to-brain) unfold 
“continuously and simultaneously underlining a deep continuity between perception and 
action" (Seth 2013: 566). According to IP, the brain’s best guess at the cause of  some perceptual 
signal reactivates similar somatic patterns associated with such stimuli in the past (see also 
Damasio 1994). This reactivation prepares the body to respond to the prediction appropriately 
and helps the system predict what will happen next. The reactivation includes both autonomic 
changes and explicit actions (including gestures, facial expressions and postural changes). These 
bodily changes provide the basis for the next wave of  interoceptive information to be integrated 
and matched against the evolving prediction (which includes exteroceptive information, 
memories and predictions), and it is this that will eventually give rise to an emotional experience. 
Prediction and incoming signals co-evolve in fast back-and-forth succession, attempting to 
minimize discrepancies between model and signal. The emergent, integrated representation is 
then re-represented and made accessible to conscious awareness (Harrison et al. 2010; Craig 
2002, 2009). Here, the AIC instantiates exactly the sort of  emotion-cognition entanglement 
discussed by Pessoa and Lewis in their arguments for dynamical models of  neural and 
psychological functioning. 
ATE models characterize emotion as emerging from the interaction of  multiple subcomponents; 
as we saw above, the components themselves remain distinct, as “modules” subserved by 
dedicated circuits. However, this characterization of  the AIC - weaving together emotional and 
cognitive information via multiple waves of  interaction between brain and body - aligns IP much 
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more closely with dynamic models of  emotion that aim to dissolve the dichotomy between affect 
and appraisal. 
2.6.b A predictive account of  seeing with feeling 
Although we are still coming to understand how information flows within the brain, we can 
perhaps look towards other predictive processing accounts that investigate interoception to help 
underscore the idea that IP is a better fit with the more dynamical and self-organizing views of  
emotion described above. A parallel argument has recently been made for the influence of  
interoception on visual perception. Barrett and Bar (2009) argue that our best account of  the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) indicates that bodily affect contributes, in a constitutive way, to visual 
predictions. This reflects our position that the neural connectivity of  the AIC indicates that 
bodily affect has a role to play in emotional appraisal. Below we review the argument made by 
Barrett and Bar regarding the OFC and point to its relevance for interoceptive predictive coding.  
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is divided into lateral and medial parts. Medial OFC takes rough 
visual information from subcortical areas and makes an extremely fast guess at what such 
information could mean. This ‘best guess’ flows through the hypothalamus, midbrain, brainstem 
and spinal column into the perceiver’s body, recreating the internal affective state previously 
associated with that stimulus. This affective reactivation loops into pre-motor areas that 
transform the affective signal into an action plan (e.g. approach or avoid; Damasio 1994; Gallese 
2005). Simultaneously, the lateral OFC works to integrate the initial affective response (including 
autonomic and endocrine changes) with increasingly rich visual information. As the object 
becomes clearer, the OFC ‘updates’ its prediction, which in turn invokes subsequent affective 
reactivations and reactions (which further fills out the percept). This recursive process continues 
until a detailed representation of  the object is finally constructed (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1328; see 
also Bar et al. 2006). The body in this model plays a key role in the unfolding of  the prediction 
that constitutes our experience. Bodily affect is not merely a signal to be interpreted by cognitive 
systems, but itself  plays an active role in evaluation. As Barrett and Bar write, "the internal world 
of  the body may be one element in the ‘context frame’ that facilitates object 
recognition" (Barrett & Bar 2009: 1330). The emergent visual experience, then, is the result of  
both neural and physiological signals evolving together over time. 
          
Barrett and Bar’s take on the relationship between affect and visual processing thus offers a 
predictive processing version of  Colombetti’s argument for the non-decomposability of  
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emotional and cognitive processes: affective changes and cognitive appraisals relate to one 
another in nonlinear, co-evolving ways, arising from subprocesses that are not themselves 
cognitive or emotional. The result is that affect is seen as an equal partner in the generation of  
our experience. Barrett and Bar conclude that they have “laid the foundation for the hypothesis 
that people do not wait to evaluate an object for its personal significance until after they know 
what the object is. Rather, an affective reaction is one component of  the prediction that helps a 
person see the object in the first place” (Barrett & Bar, 2009: 1331) 
There are important parallels between Barrett and Bar's account of  the OFC and Seth's account 
of  the AIC. The OFC and AIC are, in fact, considered to process information in very much the 
same way, but for external and internal experience respectively (Lewis & Todd 2005: 20). Craig 
has gone so far as to call the insular cortex the ‘sensory cortex of  the limbic system’, because of  
the way information is hierarchically processed in multiple waves (2002). What Barrett and Bar’s 
framework reveals, however, is that affective elements arising from physiological states should 
not be seen as something that occurs in reaction to objects that have already been perceived - 
rather they are integral to the process that allows perception to occur in the first place. Similarly, 
we have argued, that visceral states of  the body are coupled with appraisals in the formation of  
internal experience. 
Barrett and Bar have presented us with a network depiction of  the predictive brain, one in which 
higher-level predictions and lower-level affective changes are seen as interacting in highly 
dynamic and nonlinear ways (refuting a view of  vertical modularity, as Colombetti described 
above). Seth’s opening bid for a predictive processing account of  interoception in fact relies on 
just this type of  rich integration of  information (particularly in the AIC). However, we believe 
that by highlighting those particular brain structures and functions as part of  characterizing IP 
we must also accept a more dynamic and embodied view of  interoception.  
2.7 Conclusion 
One of  the most exciting features of  the predictive processing framework is its wide applicability 
to a multitude of  cognitive functions. Seth’s interoceptive predictive processing model offers an 
excellent starting place for thinking about how the predictive processing mechanism may apply 
to feelings and emotions. 
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In this paper we argue against Seth’s suggestion that a predictive processing version of  
interoception should be thought of  as an extension to appraisal theories of  emotion. While IP 
certainly captures some of  the main features of  ATE, characterizing IP as an appraisal model 
assumes an overly cognitivist reading of  interoceptive processing. We argue that a predictive 
processing account of  interoception is in fact dynamic in ways that run counter to the cognitivist 
assumptions native to both traditional and contemporary appraisal theories of  emotion. 
The neurobiology underlying reciprocal top-down and bottom-up processing suggests a 
substantially more dynamic and embodied PP story than the one due to Seth. We argued for this 
view by reviewing recent neuroscientific descriptions of  the relationship between emotion and 
cognition, revealing them as essentially non-decomposable at both the neurobiological (Pessoa) 
and psychological (Lewis) levels. Given the reciprocal interaction between emotional and 
cognitive processes highlighted by these frameworks, and the fact that IP relies on the very same 
densely interconnected neural regions highlighted by Pessoa’s and Lewis’s accounts, we conclude 
that an interoceptive predictive processing comports best with non-linear dynamic systems 
approaches to emotion rather than with standard appraisal models. 
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Chapter 3 
Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the 
embodied mind 
Abstract 
Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the human cortex as a multi-
level prediction engine. This ‘predictive processing’ framework shows great promise as a means 
of  both understanding and integrating the core information processing strategies underlying 
perception, reasoning, and action. But how, if  at all, do emotions and sub-cortical contributions 
fit into this emerging picture? The fit, we shall argue, is both profound and potentially 
transformative. In the picture we develop, online cognitive function cannot be assigned to either 
the cortical or the sub-cortical component, but instead emerges from their tight co-ordination. 
This tight co-ordination involves processes of  continuous reciprocal causation that weave 
together bodily information and ‘top-down’ predictions, generating a unified sense of  what’s out 
there and why it matters. The upshot is a more truly ‘embodied’ vision of  the predictive brain in 
action.  
3.1 The strange architecture of  predictive processing  
In 2012 the AI pioneer Patrick Winston wrote about the “puzzling architecture” of  the brain—
an architecture in which “Everything is all mixed up, with information flowing bottom to top 
and top to bottom and sideways too.” He added, “ It is a strange architecture about which we are 
nearly clueless” (Winston 2012).  
It is a strange architecture indeed. But that state of  cluelessness is increasingly past. A wide 
variety of  work—now spanning neuroscience, psychology, robotics and artificial intelligence is 
converging on the idea that one key role of  that downward- flowing influence is to enable 
higher-levels to attempt (level-by-level, and as part of  a multi-area cascade) to try to predict 
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lower-level activity and response.  That predictive cascade leads all the way to the sensory 12
peripheries, so that the guiding task becomes the ongoing prediction of  our own evolving flows 
of  sensory stimulation. The idea that the brain is (at least in part, and at least sometimes) acting 
as some form of  prediction engine has a long history, stretching from early work on perception 
(Helmholtz 1860; MacKay 1956; Neisser 1967; Gregory 1980) all the way to recent work in deep 
learning (Hinton 2007, 2010).  
A promising subset of  such work is the emerging family of  approaches known as ‘predictive 
processing’.  Predictive processing plausibly represents the last and most radical step in the long 13
retreat (see Churchland et al. 1994) from a passive, feed- forward, input-dominated view of  the 
flow of  neural processing. According to this emerging class of  models biological brains are 
constantly active, trying to predict the streams of  sensory stimulation before they arrive. Systems 
like that are most strongly impacted by sensed deviations from their predicted states. It is these 
deviations from predicted states (prediction errors) that now bear much of  the information-
processing burden, informing us of  what is newsworthy within the dense sensory barrage. When 
you see that steaming coffee-cup on the desk in front of  you, your perceptual experience reflects 
the multi-level neural guess that best reduces visual prediction errors. To visually perceive the 
scene, if  this story is on track, your brain attempts to predict the scene, allowing the ensuing error 
(mismatch) signals to refine its guessing until a kind of  equilibrium is achieved.  
To appreciate the benefits, first consider learning. Suppose you want to predict the next word in 
a sentence. You would be helped by knowledge of  grammar. But one way to learn a surprising 
amount of  grammar, as work on large-corpus machine learning clearly demonstrates, is to try 
repeatedly to predict the next word in a sentence, adjusting your future responses in the light of  
past patterns. You can thus use the prediction task to bootstrap your way to the world-
knowledge that you can later use to perform apt prediction. Importantly, learning using multi-level 
prediction machinery delivers a multi-scale grip on the worldly sources of  structure in the sensory 
signal. In such architectures, higher levels learn to specialize in predicting events and states of  
affairs that are—in an intuitive sense—built up from the kinds of  features and properties (such 
 There is a large and growing literature here. Good places to start include Friston (2005, 2010), Clark (2013), 12
Hohwy (2013) and Clark (2016). 
 For this usage, see Clark (2013). 13
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as lines, shapes, and edges) targeted by lower levels. But all that lower-level response is now 
modulated, moment-by-moment, by top-down predictions.   14
To make the best and most flexible use of  the flow of  prediction error PP architectures 
simultaneously estimate the so-called “precision” of  the prediction error signal itself. Precision is 
the inverse variance of  a prediction error signal—in other words, it sets error bars around an 
error signal according to its currently estimated importance or reliability. High-precision errors 
enjoy greater post-synaptic gain and (hence) increased influence. Conversely, even a large 
prediction error signal, if  it is assigned extremely low precision, may be rendered systemically 
impotent, unable to drive learning or further processing. This enables different circumstances to 
render differ- ent prediction error signals important, and may mandate different balances 
between processing in different brain regions and between top-down prediction and incoming 
sensory evidence.  
Action itself  is accomplished using the same resources. The core idea here (Friston et al. 2010) is 
that there are two ways for brains to match their predictions to the world. Either find the 
prediction that best accounts for the current sensory signal (perception) or alter the sensory 
signal to fit the predictions (action). Importantly, the flow of  action can itself  be brought about, 
PP suggests, by a select sub-set of  predictions — prediction of  the (trajectory of) proprioceptive 
consequences that would ensue were the desired action to be performed. This turns out to be a 
computationally efficient way of  implementing motor commands (Friston 2011).  
A central claim of  this ‘active-inference’ view is that top-down predictions and bodily actions co-
evolve in circular and self-organizing ways. Friston and colleagues write, “Crucially, this inference 
or assimilation is active, in the sense that the internal states affect the causes of  sensory input 
vicariously, through action. The resulting circular causality between perception and action fits 
comfortably with many formulations in embodied cognition and artificial intelligence; for 
example, the perception–action cycle (Fuster 2004), active vision (Wurtz et al. 2011), the use of  
predictive information (Ay et al. 2008; Bialek et al. 2001; Tishby and Polani 2011), and 
homeokinetic formulations (Soodak and Iberall 1978). Furthermore, it connects these 
perspectives to more general treatments of  circular causality and autopoiesis in cybernetics and 
synergetics (Haken 1983; Maturana and Varela 1980)” (2014, p. 443).  
 This helps make sense of  recent work showing that top-down effects (expectation and context) impact processing 14
even in early visual processing areas such as V1—see Petro et al. (2014) and Petro and Muckli (2016). Recent work 
in cognitive neuroscience has begun to suggest some of  the detailed ways in which biological brains might 
implement such multi-level prediction machines—see Bastos et al. (2012). 
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The resulting picture is one in which perception and action are complementary manifestations 
of  a single adaptive regime, whose core operating principle is the reduction of  precision-
weighted prediction error.  
Adaptive predictions cannot, however, take shape in an organismic vacuum. What my brain 
predicts, moment-by-moment, needs to be delicately geared to what I need, and to what I need 
to be doing. And what I need, and what I need to be doing, are both matters that depend heavily 
upon both my current physiological states and the shape and progress of  current world-engaging 
activity. It is here that sub-cortical structures, and especially the thalamus (and within it, the 
pulvinar) seem posed to play a special and crucial role. Understanding that role requires us to 
move beyond what Pessoa (2014, p. 11) describes as the ‘corticocentric’ image in which 
evolutionary older subcortical structures are dominated and controlled by the more recent 
cortical overlay. Instead, we will be led to endorse an ‘embedded’ view (op. cit., p.14) according 
to which cortical and sub-cortical states and activities change in a co-ordinated fashion 
characterized by ongoing patterns of  mutual influence.  
3.2 Continuous reciprocal causation in cortico-subcortical loops  
The term cortical myopia was first coined by Parvizi (2009) in reference to a lingering tendency in 
contemporary neuroscience to under-appreciate or to ignore the rich contributions sub-cortical 
brain regions make to higher cognitive function and intelligent behavior. The bias comes to us in 
part as a hangover from 19th century experimental brain research (see LeDoux 1987). At the 
time human brain evolution was imagined to be a largely linear affair, with phylogenetically 
newer and more advanced cortical areas overlaying and controlling older more primitive 
subcortical areas (Herrick 1933; Papez 1937). With higher cognitive functions such as language 
seen evolving alongside the massive expansion of  the neocortex (Barton and Harvey 2000) 
researchers naturally assumed higher cognition to be localized in the uppermost cortical tip of  
the neural axis. Together with Charles Darwin’s astute observations that basic emotions (eg. fear 
and rage) are shared across species, this led researchers to look for emotional/instinctual circuits 
in the older and highly conserved sub-cortex. Their conclusion was that human rationality 
emerged as the new and improved neo-cortex exerted increasing control over the outdated 
emotional-instinctual circuitry. As John Hughlings-Jackson wrote, “the higher nervous 
arrangements evolved out of  the lower keep down those lower, just as a government evolved out 
of  a nation con- trols as well as directs that nation” (Jackson 1884, p. 662, quoted by Parvizi 
2009, p. 354). This picture of  the brain has produced a long-standing tradition in cognitive 
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neuroscience of  investigating cortical and sub-cortical structures as dichotomous sets of  regions 
with “higher” circuits controlling/inhibiting the “lower” circuits (perhaps most dramatically in 
MacLean’s (1990) ‘triune’ brain model).  
The major issue with such corticocentric views is not that the brain might be usefully described 
in hierarchical terms (see Lewis and Todd 2005), nor is it the claim that processing ‘higher’ up 
the neural axis is essential for cognitive functions such as decision making and language (which 
they most certainly are). What needs to be doubted is the assumption of  a clear division of  labor 
between a higher ‘cognitive brain’ and subordinate ‘emotional brain’ and the assumption that 
higher areas influences lower ones, but not the other way around. As neuroscientific techniques 
improve, it is becoming increasingly clear that such a dichotomous view of  neural processing is 
too simplistic to capture the complex, reciprocal and self-organizing nature of  human brain 
function.  
Contrary to the Victorian view, the cortex is not a total newcomer to human brain evolution, but 
has in fact long been part of  the basic mammalian neural floor-plan (Pessoa 2013). Moreover 
both cortex and sub-cortex have continued to change throughout human evolution. For example 
sub-regions of  the human amygdala are believed to be 60% larger than apes’ relative to brain 
mass (Sherwood et al. 2012). Compare this with only a 24% increase in neocortical mass (Rilling 
and Insel 1999), and surprisingly no significant increase in frontal lobe mass (Semendeferi et al. 
2002). And finally there is growing evidence that cortical and sub-cortical areas evolved in a 
highly coordinated fashion, thereby producing rich looping interdependencies between lower 
emotional and higher cognitive circuits. A recent proposal by Chareyron et al. (2011) proposes 
that brain areas which are structurally or functionally interconnected evolve in tandem 
promoting increases in the convergence and integration of  information between the areas. A 
good example of  such coordinated cortical-sub-cortical growth comes from Barton (2012), who 
suggests that the increased size of  the primate cerebellum should be viewed in the context of  a 
three-way co-evolution between the diencephalon, cerebellum and the neocortex (see also 
Barton and Harvey 2000). Pessoa (2014) makes a similar observation about the massive size 
increase in the primate amygdala and its remarkable connections (both afferent and efferent) to a 
wide variety of  cortical and subcortical regions.  
The result of  this coordinated evolution has been the creation of  a rich embedding of  neural 
circuitry in which newer circuits are continually woven into older ones producing novel 
functional landscapes stretching across the entire brain. As Pessoa writes, this interweaving 
“creates a web of  functional and structural couplings in a way that blurs “old” and 
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“new”” (Pessoa 2015, p. 49). One way to see this is to note that complex sub-cortical dynamics 
now continuously influence, and are continuously influenced by, complex cortical dynamics. 
Such processes (of  ‘continuous reciprocal causation’—see Clark 1997) bind multiple 
‘components’ into unified dynamic wholes in which the state variables of  one system are the 
parameters of  the other, and vice versa.  Such complex couplings are characteristic of  evolved 15
systems in which neural processing, bodily action, and environmental forces are constantly and 
complexly combined. In the case at hand, we shall see that sub-cortical systems are themselves 
constantly informed by bodily changes and our own ongoing actions, thus coupling neural 
predictions and bodily unfoldings in deep and transformative ways.  
3.3 Sampling the coupling  
To put flesh on these teleo-functional speculations consider the huge number of  subcortical 
structures that target cortical regions either directly or via the thalamus, including areas such as 
the basal forebrain (Dunnett et al. 1991), hypothalamus (Pessoa 2014), basal ganglia (Clarke et al. 
2008), amygdala (Pessoa 2013), cerebellum (Leiner et al. 1986), and brainstem via dopaminergic 
and noradrenergic systems (Parvizi and Damasio 2000; Mather et al. 2015; Markovic et al. 2015). 
Many of  these ascending systems form important reciprocal loops with the cortex. For example 
the basal ganglia is connected to the cortex by at least five separate circuits, some of  which form 
closed loops with cortex via the thalamus. This allows information flowing from cortical areas to 
basal ganglia to return again to the same cortical area (Parvizi 2009). As Parvizi writes, the 
richness of  this looping relationship means that “in reality, there is no cortex versus basal ganglia 
divide. One does not exist without the other, and there is only an inter- linked network of  
corticostriatal loops” (op. cit. p.356). From this perspective, online cognitive function cannot be 
assigned to either the cortical or subcortical component, but instead emerges from their tight 
coordination.  
Work on the hypothalamus provides further examples of  the rich suite of  interactions weaving 
cortex and sub-cortex. In the past, researchers primarily focused on the hypothalamus’ 
descending systems (connecting to brainstem and spinal cord), lead- ing to its characterization as 
a homeostatic controller (Bard 1928; Cannon 1929). The hypothalamus also receives information 
from the body allowing it to finely tune affective responses to the environment (for a good 
discussion see Lewis and Todd 2005). Recently however our understanding of  hypothalamic 
 See Clark (2014, chapter 7). 15
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connectivity has expanded to include a rich set of  bidirectional pathways connecting to the 
whole cortical mantle (Risold et al. 1997). Contrary once again to the corticocentric vision, the 
hypothalamus appears to exert a large influence on cortical function both directly and indirectly 
via the thalamus, basal forebrain, amygdala and brainstem (all of  which are them- selves 
bidirectionally connected to the cortex and each other Pessoa 2014). This makes the 
hypothalamus the second largest contributor to cortical inputs after the thalamus (Swanson 
2000). The reciprocal connectivity to both cortical areas and the internal body would allow the 
hypothalamus to synchronize huge flows of  information within the brain and body (Pessoa 
2013, pp. 230–231). As Kiverstein and Miller have recently noted, “this coordination [facilitated 
by the hypothalamus] allows for cognitive and affective processes to be mobilized together 
allowing the animal to behave flexibly, and in ways that are adapted to the particularities of  a 
context of  activity” (Kiverstein and Miller 2015).  
Finally, consider the profound reciprocal relationship that exists between prefrontal cortex and 
brainstem nuclei. The brainstem (and striatal) circuits are believed to play a central role in 
generating rapid emotional responses (the so called ‘action tendencies’ in Frijda’s work; 1986) 
and so have been called the “seat of  emotions” (Panksepp 1998). Meanwhile the prefrontal 
cortex uses highly processed information from a variety of  cortical areas to directly inhibit 
brainstem reactions thereby allowing time for more sophisticated, and context appropriate, 
behaviors to emerge. But once again, this is not a one-way relationship. Instead, systems in the 
brainstem also modulate the frontal lobes by way of  neuromodulatory chemicals. 
Neuromodulatory systems producing dopamine, norepinephrine and acetylcholine within the 
brainstem, basal forebrain, hypothalamus have terminals in a huge portion of  both the sub-
cortex and prefrontal areas (Arnsten and Li 2005; Joels et al. 2006). Such neuromodulatory 
systems are believed to attune cortical processing to signals from the body and environment that 
are important for survival (Lewis and Todd 2005). As they have recently written:  
“if  not for the bottom-up flow, the brain would have no energy and no direction for its 
activities. If  not for the top-down flow, recently evolved mechanisms for perception, 
action and integration would have no control over bodily states and behavior. It is the 
reciprocity of  these upward and downward flows that links sophisticated cognitive 
processes with basic motivational mechanisms” (op. cit. p. 20).  
During complex behaviors, elements of  emotion and cognition are thus so intermixed that a 
significant decomposition becomes impossible at the level of  the brain (Pessoa 2013). If  a 
meaningful decomposition of  emotion and cognition is indeed impossible, then processes 
Chapter 3: Happily Entangled !66
considered to be emotional will be poised to play a much richer role than previously proposed 
(eg. influencing vision). Just such an account has recently been proposed, within the predictive 
processing framework, by Barrett and Bar (2009)—see also Barrett and Simmons (2015) and 
Chanes and Barrett (2016).  
With massive ascending and descending circuits the PFC becomes an important center of  
vertical integration of  information (Pessoa 2015). PFC along with related areas such as the 
orbitofrontal, cingulate and insula cortex are all richly interconnected with one another and with 
amygdala and hypothalamus both of  which have huge influence over internal (affective) 
processes. This collection of  areas has also recently been highlighted as part of  the so called ‘rich 
club’: a community of  highly interconnected neural hubs that serve as the backbone for brain 
wide (cortical and subcortical) synchronizations (van den Heuvel and Sporns 2011, 2013a, b; see 
also Chanes and Barrett 2016 for a good discussion on the relationship between rich clubs and 
predictive processing). This tight vertical integration of  neural processing suggests that cognitive 
and emotional processes are strongly interdependent (Lewis 2005; Stapleton 2013; Pessoa 2013; 
Colombetti 2013). In contrast to the corticocentric vision, cognition and behaviour are better 
seen as emerging from numerous systems stretching the entire neural axis and dynamically 
interacting via feed-forward and feed-backward loops (see Lewis 2005 for a richly detailed 
account of  this ebb and flow).  
3.4 A new look at the thalamus 
  
This picture of  dense cortical-sub-cortical coupling is further enriched by new under- standings 
of  the thalamus itself. While traditionally described as a byway through which information was 
shuttled into the cortex, today the thalamus is now being re- described as an important neural 
nexus point capable of  orchestrating huge flows of  cortical communication. As Pessoa writes, 
“corticothalamocortical information transfer may represent an important addition to, or even 
replacement of, the current dogma that corticocortical transfer of  primary information 
exclusively involves direct corticocortical pathways” (Theyel et al. 2010).  
In just this vein, Sherman and Guillery (2013) argue that large amounts of  thalamic connectivity 
are not simple way-stations or ‘first order’ relays, conveying information to the cortex from some 
sub-cortical source such as the retina. Instead, most of  the thalamus is said to be composed of  
‘higher-order relays’: circuits that transmit information between cortical areas—specifically, from 
layer 5 of  one cortical area to some other cortical area. This intriguing feature of  the 
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connectivity matrix is directly suggested by impressive bodies of  physiological and anatomical 
evidence, reviewed and summarized by Sherman and Guillery. It suggests that the primary role 
of  much thalamic connectivity may be to mediate intra-cortical communication. If  so, the 
question naturally arises, what are the differences in the kinds of  information being carried by 
these various pathways? Here, it is notable that “the extra-thalamic targets of  drivers  to the 16
thalamus seem to be involved in motor control” (Sherman 2007, p. 420). This opens up an 
intriguing possibility, which is that the information conveyed in cortico-thalamic- cortical circuits 
may be profoundly entangled with unfolding motoric commands and activity. This possibility has 
been defended and explored by Guillery (2003, 2005), and is further refined by Sherman and 
Guillery (2013). On this speculative account, transthalamic cortico-cortico pathways tend to 
transmit information about the motor consequences of  current processing in that area. This 
means that: “at every level of  sensory processing, perception is inextricably linked to ongoing 
instructions for action, prior to the action itself.” Sherman and Guillery (2011, p. 1073).  
Sherman and Guillery go on to suggest that the thalamus may thus play a role in establishing and 
maintaining transient action-specific dynamic couplings between cortical areas, and in alerting 
cortical areas to any unexpected motor instructions being computed by other areas (see Sherman 
and Guillery 2011, p. 1074). The resulting picture is one in which “sensorimotor processing is 
unified throughout all levels of  thalamo-cortical function” (op cit p. 1075). Processes of  
continuous reciprocal causation coupling cortical and thalamic sources here put higher-level 
prediction machinery in direct contact with unfolding bodily actions. But more importantly, they 
do so in ways that thus defy easy decomposition into ‘leader’ and ‘led’. Instead, bodily actions 
and complex top-down predictions co-evolve, delivering just the kinds of  ‘circular causality’ 
between perception and action imagined by proponents of  ‘active inference’ (see e.g. Friston et 
al. 2012).  
This emerging vision of  the densely woven cortico-sub-cortical economy is essential, we will 
now argue, if  we are to flesh out key aspects of  the predictive processing story described earlier. 
In particular, it will help us understand both the power, and the implementation, of  a key 
component of  that story—the variable precision-weighting of  prediction error.  
 A driver is traditionally distinguished from a modulator. Drivers, as the name suggests, are seen as primary 16
transmitters of  information whereas modulators alter the impact of  that information. Driver inputs to a thalamic 
relay are thus diagnostic of  the function of  that relay, whereas modulator inputs are not—see Sherman and Guillery 
(2011). Within PP, precision-weighting acts a kind of  universal modulator. 
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3.5 Precision and the threat of  magic modulation? 
PP accounts are distinguished, in part, by their pervasive reliance upon ‘precision estimations’ to 
perform a variety of  key tasks and functions. Precision estimates, as mentioned earlier, track the 
inverse variance of  the prediction error signal. In other words, they set error bars around 
different aspects of  that signal according to their estimated reliability, given the task and context. 
Precise prediction error signals result in increased post-synaptic gain, driving further processing 
more strongly than their less precise cousins.  
There are two main (but deeply related) roles played by precision within the PP architecture. 
First, and most generally, variable precision weighting alters the balance between top-down 
prediction and the incoming sensory signal, allowing us to rely on specific chunks of  sensory 
evidence to a greater or lesser degree depending upon task and context. For example, on a clear 
but windy day, for many tasks, visual information remains highly accurate and reliable and should 
be given more weight than (say) smell. By varying the impact of  specific aspects of  prediction 
error upon further processing, PP systems achieve a remarkable degree of  flexibility in their use 
of  long-term stored knowledge about the world. In the case of  the McGurk effect (see McGurk 
and MacDonald 1976) for example, we allow visual information from a mismatched, overdubbed 
video of  a speaking face to overwhelm some aspects of  the auditory signal, resulting in our 
mishearing ‘ba’ as ‘da’. This makes ecological sense since lip movements are normally an 
excellent cue to speech sounds, and we must often rely upon them in situations of  noise or 
uncertainty.  
Second, precision determines the nature of  control. For example, Pezzulo et al. (2015) leverage 
the precision estimation mechanism as a means of  ‘flipping’ between habitual and more 
reflective means of  control. Habitual control emerges when sensory prediction error is rapidly 
resolved at lower levels of  the processing hierarchy. More reflective means of  control emerge 
when prediction error is resolved at higher levels— levels that contextualize lower-level 
responses. In this way: “the ontology of  behavioural paradigms in associative learning can be 
seen as a successive contextualisation of  more elemental sensorimotor constructs, within 
generative models of  increasing hierarchical depth” Pezzulo et al. (2015, p. 18)  
Higher-level representations here entrain systemic response over longer time-scales, by 
predicting—and hence helping to bring about—more complex sequences of  responses and 
environmental (or bodily) states. Influential work on ‘multiple controllers’ for habitual (model-
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free) versus goal-directed (model-based) response is here accommodated within a single 
precision-modulated inferential schema in which: “it is the precision or reliability of  alternative 
controllers that arbitrates their relative contribution” (op cit p. 19)  
High precision predictions exert greater force, and when those predictions originate from much 
higher levels, they entrain prospective forms of  control—forms of  control that anticipate and 
help bring about extended sequences of  inputs so as to implement choices and policies 
concerning future actions. This is the domain that is sometimes referred to as ‘counterfactual 
prediction’—prediction that is truly oriented towards the future, and concerns states of  affairs 
that do not yet obtain. Control is thus:  
“not dichotomized into two discrete systems [habitual and model-based], but viewed as 
distributed along a graded continuum going from the highest levels of  abstract, 
prospective and conscious reasoning to more concrete, short-sighted unconscious levels 
of  reasoning down to the arc reflex”. (op cit p.24)  
This picture can be enriched in various ways, for example by noting that habitual control (here, 
the resolution of  high-precision prediction errors using only lower-levels of  the processing 
regime) may sometimes itself  extend over larger time-scales, as in the case of  highly skilled, over-
learnt sports performances. But for present purposes, what matters is simply the pervasive role 
of  precision estimation in supporting flexible, context-sensitive responses that seamlessly 
negotiate a smooth continuum between more-or-less ‘automatic’ and goal-directed modes. 
Behaviour, if  these accounts are on track, is contextualized by different hierarchical levels in 
ways that are arbitrated (op cit p.27) by precision dynamics. Precision here performs two distinct 
yet inter- related functions. It determines which areas and hierarchical levels currently exert most 
control. And it “reports opportunities to achieve a goal” (op cit p.28) by reflecting current 
confidence in those opportunities, and also by responding to signs of  progress or failure.  
In order to perform these functions adequately, variations in precision-estimation must be 
delicately responsive to an interacting medley of  exteroceptive, interoceptive, and proprioceptive 
sensory signals. For what goals we pursue, what actions we perform, which aspects of  behavior 
can safely be left to habitual control, and which demand higher-level contextualization, are all 
matters that require the simultaneous satisfaction of  multiple kinds of  constraint. Are we in 
physical danger? Are we hungry, or likely to become hungry if  we do not take precautionary 
action? Is there a sudden opportunity to fulfill a long-standing goal? Is our body currently able to 
reach some desired target? Do we have enough information to make a good call on whether or 
not to pursue a certain goal, or should we instead act so as to harvest additional information? 
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Delicate waves of  precision-engineered influence must reflect our brain’s best task-and-context 
reflecting guesses about all these matters, modulating the impact of  every aspect of  the 
prediction error signal so as to soft-assemble neuronal resources into temporary webs that keep 
us viable and that enable us to achieve our goals.  
Such spectacular fluidity might raise suspicions. It can sometimes seem as if  precision-variation 
is playing the role of  a ‘magic modulator’, putatively altering the balances of  internal power so as 
to allow the PP framework to accommodate every conceivable form of  adaptive behavior, from 
simple reflexes, to the most complex goal- driven unfoldings. Have we inadvertently imported an 
un-explanatory free variable into our explanatory schema? We believe that the threat of  magic 
modulation can be averted once we better appreciate the role of  sub-cortical processing in the 
estimation, orchestration and distribution of  precision.  
3.6 Sub-cortical contributions to precision estimation  
Implemented by multiple means in the brain (such as neurotransmitter-based modulation, and 
temporal synchronies between neuronal populations) flexible precision- weighting renders these 
architectures spectacularly fluid and context-responsive. Sub-cortical contributions affords 
further opportunities to incorporate constantly updated information about the state of  the body 
and its readiness for action, and about the uncertainties associated with the bodily information 
itself.  
For example, Kanai et al. (2015) suggest that thalamic nuclei weight precision in the visual 
cortex. More specifically, their account focuses on the pulvinar. The pulvinar complex is the 
largest mass in primate thalamus and connects to a wide variety of  cortical and subcortical areas 
via thalamocortical loops. It has extensive bidirectional connections with visual, temporal, 
parietal, cingulate, frontal and insular cortices, as well as the amygdala. As Pessoa writes, “at a 
gross level, it is as if  the entire convoluted cortex were ‘shrink-wrapped’ around the 
pulvinar” (2014, p.11). This massive connectivity provides the pulvinar with ample opportunity 
to modulate the flow of  information across much of  the brain.  
Kanai et al.’s proposal is that a key task of  the pulvinar is to alter the influence (gain) of  specific 
cortically-computed prediction errors so as to reflect their estimated precision. Such a sub-
cortical contribution would be a prime instance of  deep (cortico-sub-cortical) neural embedding. 
Core computations performed by the cortex would here be sensitively and constantly modulated 
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by information about the state of  the body and unfolding actions, as registered by the sub-
cortical nexus. These gain alterations would, in turn, impact the flow of  moment-by-moment 
cortico-cortico communication, routing and re-routing flows of  information and control as task 
and context unfold. The pulvinar, Kanai et al suggest, is both architecturally well-suited and 
anatomically well-situated to perform this role.  
This has quite radical implications. Because many subcortical circuits are tightly coordinated with 
internal bodily processes (vascular, visceral, endocrine, autonomic) information from the body 
turns out to play a much more important role than that assumed by the corticocentric vision of  
the brain. A particularly important function that requires this integration is the evaluation of  
(and motoric response to) sensory information. This is the bodily-sub-cortical-cortical weave 
that “addresses the question: given the present sensory information and the organism’s present 
internal state, how should it act?” (Pessoa 2008 p.150).  
Consider vision. What has been called the standard account of  vision assumes a division of  
labor between a ‘high-road’ ascending from the retina through the visual cortex in a (mostly) 
hierarchical manner, and a ‘low road’ that fast-tracks affectively salient visual information from 
retina through the superior colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala thereby helping to produce 
quick survival behaviors. The subcortical pathway is typically referred to in order to help explain 
the fast reaction time emotionally salient information produces in the brain and body (Pessoa 
2013). Many such dual-systems models exist, proposing two competing (or sometimes 
cooperating) routes: a faster, automatic, emotional, subcortical route, and a slower, controlled, 
cognitive, cortical route (e.g. Kahneman 2003; Stanovich and West 2000). These models remain 
both ‘cognitivist’ and corticocentric insofar as they assume emotional process- ing takes place 
entirely sub-cortically, and often in a way that is completely insulated from so ‘higher’ processes 
such as awareness and attention (believed to be processed cortically). They are also myopic in so 
far as they are blind to the wealth of  subcortical contributions to perception. To help map this 
more complex process Pessoa describes in detail six circuits (not meant to be exhaustive) that 
work to fold value into cognition and behaviour by biasing cortical processing towards patterns 
that are important for the organism’s survival. They include the amygdala, cortical valuation 
regions such as the OFC and insula, fronto-parietal attentional networks, basal forebrain and 
reticular nucleus, and the pulvinar.  
Of  particular importance for present purposes is the novel role Pessoa and col- leagues propose 
for the pulvinar nucleus. Citing a wealth of  experimental evidence and neuro-anatomical data, 
Pessoa suggests abandoning the standard view of  pulvinar as a simple subcortical by-way by 
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which affectively salient signals are fast tracked from retina to amygdala (Pessoa 2013). He offers 
in its place a detailed account of  how the pulvinar biases visual processing towards signals that 
have emotional or motivational significance in part by way of  its rich looping relationship with 
multiple cortical and sub-cortical areas.  
Importantly, the pulvinar is connected with the entire cortical mantle (Shipp 2003). Kanai and 
colleagues focus primarily on the inferior portion of  the pulvinar which is connected with striate 
and extrastriate cortex (targeting all 20–30 visual areas). However the lateral and medial pulvinar 
are richly connected to many other cortical and subcortical regions. The lateral pulvinar connects 
to temporal and parietal lobes (as well as portions of  extrastriate cortex), and the medial pulvinar 
connects to the parietal, frontal, orbital, cingulate and insular cortex and amygdala. Many of  
these areas in turn have rich bidirectional relationships with visual cortex as we saw above 
(including the OFC and amygdala). The medial pulvinar here modulates the flow of  multimodal 
information between a huge collection of  cortical and sub-cortical areas including OFC, AIC, 
ACC, and amygdala believed to be of  central importance in determining the affective value of  
signals and preparing the organism to respond appropriately (Pessoa and Adolphs 2010). In this 
way the medial pulvinar is proposed to amplify weak or fleeting signals that have biological value 
thereby producing greater behavioural responses (Pessoa 2014, p.72). This optimal positioning 
and rich interconnectivity allows the pulvinar to fold value into the action-perception system in 
ways that respect these affective valuations.  
This may be a good moment to respond briefly to an important pair of  issues raised by an 
anonymous referee. The first is: why do we take predictive processing (rather than some other 
theory) to be good candidate for a theoretical account of  sub- cortical-cortical connectivity? The 
second—closely related—is whether the complex dynamical story we favor, replete as it is with 
complex looping influence and couplings, is actually consistent with the fundamental tenets of  
predictive processing anyway. Both these issues resolve once it is appreciated that our 
fundamental claim is that sub-cortical processing plays a major role in delivering the evolving 
flow of  precision estimation essential to fluid and task-optimized cortical processing. Such 
precision estimations lie at the very heart of  the predictive processing machine, sculpting the 
moment-by-moment flow of  information in the brain. Their role, recall, is to enable contextual 
information to reconfigure the impact of  any area or level upon any other area or level according 
to the changing details of  task and of  inner and outer context. Our suggestion, in line with 
Kanai et al. (2015) is that these precision estimations are, to a surprising extent, sub-cortically 
mediated. This is what keeps them in touch (as they need to be) with both the ongoing flow of  
embodied action and the changing physiological state of  the organism. It was not our aim, 
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however, to present evidence that predictive processing is the best story about cortico-sub-
cortical connectivity. Rather, we assume (for the purposes of  the paper) that the predictive 
processing story is worth pursuing in general, and ask how sub-cortical influence might fit into 
the story. The fit, we argued, is excellent—such connectivity is in fact ideally placed to carry out 
the important task of  embodied-action-based precision modulation. The upshot is that we 
should expect to find subtle looping dynamics whereby precision-weighted pre- diction error 
both reflects and enables ongoing action—the kinds of  circular dynamics rightly foregrounded 
in traditional dynamical systems approaches. To fully appreciate the potential significance of  this 
complex interaction, we next locate affect where it belongs—as a reflection of  changing states 
of  organismic readiness for action.  
3.7 Affect and action-readiness 
Cisek (2007) was the flagship treatment of  the so-called ‘affordance competition’ hypothesis, 
according to which:  
“the brain processes sensory information to specify, in parallel, several potential actions 
that are currently available. These potential actions compete against each other for further 
processing, while information is collected to bias this competition until a single response is 
selected” Cisek (2007, p. 1585).  
The brain, so the story goes, is constantly computing, or starting to compute, a large set of  
possible actions. These possible actions (which are essentially states of  partial ‘action readiness’) 
are computed constantly and in parallel. They are also, as Cisek and Kalaska (2010, p. 279) put it, 
‘pragmatic’ insofar as “they are adapted to produce good control as opposed to producing 
accurate descriptions of  the sensory environment or a motor plan”. All this makes good 
ecological sense, allowing time-pressed animals to partially ‘pre-compute’ multiple possible 
actions, any one of  which can then be selected, completed, and deployed at short notice and 
with minimal further processing.  
In line with such a view, Hoshi and Tanji (2007) found activity in monkey premotor cortex 
correlated with the potential movements of  either hand in a bimanual reaching response task in 
which the monkey had to wait upon a cue signaling which hand to use. Similar results have been 
obtained for the preparation of  visual saccades (Powell and Goldberg 2000) and using behavioral 
and lesion studies of  reaching behavior in human subjects (Humphreys and Riddoch 2000; 
Castiello 1999). Decision-making seems to be folded right into these densely interanimated loops 
so that, to a certain degree at least, “decisions about actions emerge within the same populations 
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of  cells that define the physical properties of  those actions and guide their execution” (Cisek and 
Kalaska, 2011, p. 282).  
Emotion belongs at the very heart of  this embodied nexus. As processing proceeds, affect and 
content must be co-computed: intertwined (Barrett and Bar 2009) within the process of  settling 
upon a coherent, action-guiding interpretation of  the scene. Sub-cortical mechanisms that assign 
precisions to cortically computed quantities seem ideally suited to the implementation of  such 
affectively-informed affordance competition in the brain. The sub-cortical loops here keep 
‘higher-level’ prediction systems constantly in touch with our evolving actions, Consistent with 
such a picture, Frijda (1986, 2007) proposes that affect itself  reports on embodied action-
readiness programs that simultaneously indicate the relationship between the organism and the 
environment, and motivate the organism to improve that relationship. As Frijda writes, 
“emotion, by its very nature, is change in action readiness to maintain or change one’s 
relationship to an object or event” (Frijda 2004, p. 158). Frijda’s account thus slots neatly into 
place with the work of  Barrett and Bar (2009), Lewis and Todd (2005) and Pessoa (2015) 
discussed earlier. The common theme is that affect reports on action- readiness, revealing 
cognition, emotion, and action as inextricably entwined.  
Our speculative story—or better, story sketch—is now complete. The broad connectivity of  the 
medial and lateral pulvinar allows it to integrate various streams of  information including affect 
(insula), action (cingulate), value (OFC) and cognition/attention (frontoparietal). Such 
thalamocortical loops work to amplify weak or fleeting signals that have biological value thereby 
producing greater behavioral responses (Pessoa 2014, p.72). Sub-cortically orchestrated precision 
weighting thus emerges as a potent (and notably non-magical) tool for modulating bodily 
response, affect, and action. By fully weaving in sub-cortical contributions, we arrive at a vision 
of  a brain permeated by affect, constantly preparing the organism for action.  17
3.8 Conclusions: coupling the active body and the predictive brain  
If  cortico-sub-cortical weave plays the roles we are suggesting, the consequences for our 
understanding of  prediction, perception, and action are profound. On the one hand, attention to 
this delicate multi-dimensional weave should help allay a major worry about the PP approach—
the worry that too many puzzles and problems are being solved by the blanket appeal to context-
 This is a contemporary version of  the profoundly ‘motocentric’ vision of  the brain suggested in the classic work 17
by Churchland et al. (1994). 
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variable precision assignments. For that blanket appeal, it may now be hoped, may be cashed out 
in many different ways, that make the most of  these (relatively newly-discovered) properties of  
multiple interacting cortico-sub-cortical loops. In particular, we argued that reflection of  the role 
of  the medial pulvinar highlights the role thalamocortical loops play in directing various flows of  
information towards what is affectively salient.  
The resulting picture is profoundly ‘embodied’ insofar as mutual couplings (with the full 
dynamical signature of  continuous reciprocal causation) obtain between body, sub-cortex, and 
cortex, with sub-cortical (specifically thalamic) nuclei serving to bring bodily information 
constantly into the mix. These sub-cortical loops help influence precision estimations in ways 
that reflect bodily states and unfolding actions, allowing value (to the organism) and affect 
(relating to interocepted bodily states) to exert a continuous influence on high-level predictions, 
that themselves exert a continuous influence on bodily states and unfolding actions.  
What begins to emerge is a richer vision of  the predictive brain itself. Our neural prediction 
engines are fundamentally in the business of  preparing the organism for action, courtesy of  
constant sub-cortically mediated two-way communication with bodily unfoldings. In this way we 
construct an affect-laden experiential world that is as much about our own changing needs as it 
is about the state of  a mind-independent reality.  Mind like these are thoroughly permeated by 18
emotion and by readiness for action. Emotion, cognition, and preparation for action here form a 
single whole, self- organized around precision weighted, prediction-error minimizing interactions 
that span cortical and sub-cortical circuits. These interactions couple the active body to the 
predictive brain.  
 Such a perceptual realm is constructed in a fashion that is deeply ‘narcissistic’ in exactly the sense of  Akins (2006). 18
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Chapter 4 
The feeling of  grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the 
predictive brain 
Abstract 
According to the free energy principle biological agents resist a tendency to disorder in their 
interactions with a dynamically changing environment by keeping themselves in sensory and 
physiological states that are expected given their embodiment and the niche they inhabit (Friston 
2010). Why would a biological agent that aims at minimising uncertainty in its encounters with 
the world ever be motivated to seek out novelty? Novelty for such an agent would arrive in the 
form of  sensory and physiological states that are unexpected. Such an agent ought therefore to 
avoid novel and surprising interactions with the world one might think. Yet humans and many 
other animals find play and other forms of  novelty-seeking and exploration hugely rewarding. 
How can this be understood in frameworks for studying the mind that emphasise prediction 
error minimisation? This problem has been taken up in recent research concerned with epistemic 
action—actions an agent engages in to reduce uncertainty. However that work leaves two 
questions unanswered, which it is the aim of  our paper to address. First, no account has been 
given yet of  why it should feel good to the agent to engage the world play- fully and with 
curiosity. Second an appeal is made to precision-estimation to explain epistemic action, yet it 
remains unclear how precision-weighting works in action more generally, or active inference. We 
argue that an answer to both questions may lie in the bodily states of  an agent that track the rate 
at which free energy is being reduced. The recent literature on the predictive brain has connected 
the valence of  emotional experiences to the rate of  change in the reduction of  prediction error 
(Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Van de Cruys 2017). In this literature valenced emotional experiences 
are hypothesised to be identical with changes in the rate at which prediction error is reduced. 
Experiences are negatively valenced when overall prediction error increases and are positively 
valenced when the sum of  prediction errors decrease. We offer an ecological-enactive 
interpretation of  the concept of  valence and its connection to rate of  change of  prediction 
error. We show how rate of  change should be understood in terms of  embodied states of  
affordance-related action readiness. We then go on to apply this ecological-enactive account of  
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error dynamics to provide an answer to the first question we have raised: It may explain why it 
should feel good to an agent to be curious and playful. Our ecological-enactive account also 
allows us to show how error dynamics may provide an answer to the second question we have 
raised regarding how precision-weighting works in active inference. An agent that is sensitive to 
rates of  error reduction can tune precision on the fly. We show how this ability to tune precision 
on the go can allow agents to develop skills for adapting better and better to the unexpected, and 
search out opportunities for resolving uncertainty and progressing in its learning.  
4.1 Introduction 
Cognitive neuroscience is on the brink of  formulating an elegant unifying theory that shows how 
the principles that define living systems, also explain the workings of  the human mind. The 
foundations of  this theory come from a mathematically complex principle—the so-called “free 
energy principle” (FEP), which can be applied to every biological system that resists a tendency 
to disorder (Friston 2009, 2010, 2013; Kirchhoff  and Froese 2017).  Friston has proposed that 19
everything that can change in the brain will change so as to maintain the adaptive fit of  the agent 
to its dynamically changing environment. The brain (as an integrated part of  larger agent-
environment system) should steer the agent’s interactions with the world so as to maximize the 
probability that it stays in the physiological and sensory states that are expected given its 
embodiment and the niche it inhabits. For example, the human body has a high probability of  
having a temperature of  around 37◦C. Homeostatic processes in the brain should then regulate 
body temperature so that the thermal states of  the body stay as close as possible to this expected 
value. In other words, the brain should be organized in such a way as to suppress “surprise”, 
which will remain low when the organism maintains itself  in physiological and sensory states that 
are expected, and will increase should the organism find itself  in states that are improbable and 
hence unexpected. “Surprise” is a technical term and relates to predictions of  sensory and 
physiological states over time—it is future oriented. More precisely, surprise is associated with 
trajectories or sequences of  sensory input; thereby lending it a dynamic and anticipatory aspect. 
In this treatment, we will be concerned with the surprise of  extended sensory outcomes, 
 Elsewhere we have provided a detailed philosophical overview and analysis of  the free-energy principle (FEP), 19
showing how the FEP should be interpreted in ecological-enactive terms (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg 
et al. 2016). Here we restrict our focus to dealing with a problem that seems to arise for FEP when it comes to 
accounting for behaviours that are motivated by curiosity, exploration and playfulness. We provide only as much 
theoretical background in this paper as is needed for generating the problem. For readers interested in learning more 
about FEP we recommend they consult the papers by Friston we cite here and the recent special issue on predictive 
brains in this journal. 
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consequent upon the pursuit of  action policies. The brain contributes to ensuring that the agent 
avoids surprise by anticipating how the agent’s sensory and physiological states will change over 
time as it moves through its environment. So long as the brain succeeds in minimizing the 
divergence between the change in sensory states that it anticipates and the changes in sensory 
states that actually ensue, it will succeed in keeping the agent away from surprising outcomes, 
and maintain the agent’s adaptive fit to its environment.  
Friston provides a precise mathematical framework for quantifying the value of  this divergence 
between the change in sensory states the brain anticipates and the change that actually occurs, 
using the information-theoretic concept of  free-energy. Friston claims that self-organising 
adaptive systems will avoid surprising states by having a functional organization that 
continuously minimizes free-energy over the long run.  Free energy is related to entropy, it is a 20
measure of  the biological agent’s order. In thermodynamics and statistical mechanics it refers to 
the amount of  energy that can be extracted from a system and put to work (McEvoy 2002; Clark 
2013: p. 186), which is roughly the “difference between the energy and the entropy of  the 
system” (Friston and Stephan 2007: p. 419). The concept of  free energy at work in the free 
energy principle is variational free energy, a “measure of  statistical probability 
distributions” (Friston and Stephan 2007: p. 420). More precisely, what free energy measures is 
the divergence between a probability distribution typically interpreted as encoding “prior beliefs” 
about the hidden statistical structure in data, and current sensory evidence. This divergence 
provides a means of  quantifying the information that is available for use in the current sensory 
evidence. The lower the free energy, the better the system’s “beliefs”. This is to say that the 
system’s cognitive resources are being put to work in ways that are maximally useful for adapting 
it to the environment. Free energy increases when the biological agent finds itself  in states 
(potentially life-threatening) that are unexpected relative to its beliefs about the world. The more 
free energy, which is to say the more often the biological agent finds itself  in unexpected sensory 
and physiological states, the less useful work the biological agent’s “beliefs” about the world do.   21
 Whenthesedynamicsareinstantiatedinanembodiedorganismthenaturalresultofthisongoingreduction of  error at all 20
levels is the generation and maintenance of  homeostasis (Seth 2015; Bruineberg et al. 2016). 
 Free energy is for this reason sometimes defined in terms of  accuracy minus complexity (Friston 2010). Accuracy 21
is a function of  how much prediction error the model produces over time—how well does the model do at reducing 
surprisal over the long-term. Complexity is measured technically in terms of  Kubler–Leibler (K–L) divergence. It 
refers to the divergence between the prior probability of  the hypothesis and the hypothesis selected based on the 
evidence. Complexity is high when many changes were made to the priors to fit the evidence (i.e. the divergence is 
large). Complexity leads to models that may fit current evidence very well but end up doing worse over time, 
generalising poorly to new situations (they are overfitted) (Hohwy 2015: p. 5). 
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Wherever there is free energy there is room for improvement—there is sensory prediction error 
that is not currently accommodated by one’s model. This prediction error can then be 
accommodated through action, or by improving one’s existing model. In this paper we will be 
concerned with the prediction of  the temporally-extended sensory consequences of  action, or 
expected free energy. We say more about the latter concept below. The FEP therefore claims that 
biological systems are organised in such a way as to minimise free energy continuously over time, 
which is equivalent to minimising uncertainty in an agent’s active engagement with its 
environment.  
If  free-energy minimisation is a fundamental organising principle of  the brain why is it then that 
our brains don’t steer us towards environments in which sensory states can be easily predicted 
such as empty dark rooms? In the next section we outline the dark room problem and the 
solution that has been proposed. We agree with others that the dark room problem is in some 
ways a red herring (e.g. Friston et al. 2012b), however we will argue that a significant problem 
remains. The real problem is that of  explaining why a biological system that acted based on the 
imperative to resist a tendency to disorder would be curious, motivated to explore its 
environment and seek out novelty. The free energy principle would seem to imply that valuable 
states are the ones the agent expects to be in. Yet curiosity and playfulness will more often than 
not lead an agent into states that are unexpected. Thus it looks at first glance as if  a free energy 
minimising (FEM) agent ought not to be a curious and playful agent.  
In Sect. 1 we outline this challenge in a little more detail. Section 2 shows how the problem has 
been addressed in recent work on “epistemic action”. Epistemic actions are actions an agent 
engages in to reduce uncertainty. They allow the agent to “disclose information” through 
exploration “that enables pragmatic actions in the long run” (Friston et al. 2015: p. 2).  The 22
research on epistemic action leaves two questions unanswered. First, it fails to explain why it 
feels good to the agent to engage the world playfully and with curiosity. Pleasure is a part of  the 
value of  curiosity and play for agents like us. Existing accounts of  epistemic action do not fully 
explain how value works in epistemic action. Second, an appeal is made to precision-estimation 
to explain epistemic action, yet it remains unclear how precision-weighting works in active 
inference. We argue that the answer to both questions may be found in the bodily states of  an 
agent that track the rate at which free energy is being reduced. In Sect. 3 we take up the first of  
these questions and show how the agent can be sensitive to rates of  free energy minimisation 
 Pragmatic actions are actions that minimise free energy directly leading the agent to occupy the states they expect 22
to be in based on past learning. We discuss Friston and colleagues’ distinction between pragmatic and epistemic 
actions in more detail in the next section. 
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(FEM). This information about rate of  change is given corporeally as states of  affordance-
related action readiness that are simultaneously affective and behavioural (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 
2014; Rietveld, Denys & van Westen, 2017). We show how felt states of  action readiness can 
account for the positive and negative hedonic tone that is often a feature of  novel experience. In 
Sect. 4 we turn to the second question about precision-weighting and show how sensitivity to 
rate of  change may play a role in tuning precision on the fly. This can ensure that the agent is 
steered towards opportunities for reducing uncertainty. We finish up in Sect. 5 by showing how 
an agent that is sensitive to error dynamics (rate of  FEM) will be a curious agent, motivated to 
explore and play in its environment.  
4.2 Worries About dark rooms 
In FEP, agents act so as to keep themselves within expected sensory states given their 
embodiment and the niche they inhabit. The value of  a sensory state is a function of  how 
surprising it is. We are using the term “surprise” here in the technical sense introduced above 
that makes a conceptual connection between “surprise” and sensory states that are highly 
probable and thus expected given an agent’s embodiment and the niche it lives in. Unsurprising 
states (states highly frequented) are expected and are thus highly valued. Surprising states are not 
expected (they are improbable), and thus negatively valued. Positively valued states are often 
associated with reward (sometimes understood in terms of  pleasure), while negatively valued 
states are typically associated with punishment and are consequently aversive. It follows that 
unsurprising states should be associated with pleasure, according to FEP and surprising states 
should be aversive (Friston et al. 2012a). A novel outcome of  this perspective is that while it 
might feel as though we seek pleasures and avoid pains and so end up frequenting pleasurable 
states more often than painful states, according to FEP highly frequented states are themselves the 
rewards. Through a process known as “active inference” the agent acts to keep itself  in states that 
are expected. A consequence of  minimising free energy is that some states are occupied more 
than others. These are the states that are positively valued by an agent (Friston et al. 2014: p. 2). 
This means that we are not so much drawn to rewards, but are instead rewarded for reducing 
errors between expected and actual states. Traditional reinforcement learning models describe 
goal- directed behaviour as a product of  the agent working out how best to maximize an 
expected reward (Schutz et al. 1997; Sutton and Barto 1998). In active inference the rewarding 
states are the states the agent learns to expect to occupy through a process of  approximate 
Bayesian inference. Subsequent behaviour unfolds as the system attempts to reduce the 
discrepancies between the current state and the expected reward state (Schwartenbeck et al. 
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2014).  
This view of  decision-making as the outcome of  active inference comes with a puzzle. If  highly 
frequented (more expected) states are themselves rewarding and less frequented states (more 
uncertainty) are aversive, why then should agents ever be motivated to seek out novelty? A good 
strategy for guaranteeing that one remains in sensory states that are expected might seem to be 
to seek out a simple, static environment such as a dark empty room in which very little ever 
changes (Friston et al. 2012b). The agent adopting such a strategy would be pretty much 
guaranteed to only occupy the sensory states they expected to occupy given their model of  the 
dark room. Nothing unexpected happens in a dark empty room. Thus, once one has learned a 
good model of  such an environment, one is pretty much guaranteed to remain in the states one 
expects.  
The problem of  why free energy minimising agents tend not to retreat and hide away in dark 
rooms has already been well answered by Friston et al. (2012a). On the whole embodied 
creatures expect to stay warm, well fed and healthy. Dark rooms are not the kinds of  
environments that allow living agents to meet these basic biological needs. An agent that “felt the 
pull of  the dark room” (Clark 2017a) would be an agent that would after a while experience 
dehydration and hypoglycaemia, bodily conditions that are highly surprising.  
While this response is clearly correct it only takes us so far. What is missing still is an explanation 
of  the adaptive importance of  things such as curiosity, play, and the spirit of  adventure. Why 
would an agent that aims to occupy only those sensory states that are expected ever engage in 
behaviours that lead to novel and surprising discoveries, as happens when we play and explore? 
More specifically, why would agents ever be motivated to engage in such behaviours? If  
positively valued states are sensory states that are expected while negatively valued states are 
surprising, an agent whose actions are the result of  active inference should only act to bring 
about sensory states that are expected. Novel sensory states such as those that occur as a result 
of  exploration should be negatively valued (i.e. highly aversive). Yet this is not the case: many 
valued experiences are discovered by us through exploration.  
4.3 The exploit/explore dilemma 
In recent work, Friston and colleagues have shown that in active inference agents don’t only act 
to keep themselves in states that are expected, but also act so as to minimise uncertainty about 
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future outcomes (Friston et al. 2014, 2015, 2017; Schwartenbeck et al. 2013). They show how 
curiosity and novelty-seeking, and exploratory behaviour more generally, allow agents to reduce 
or resolve uncertainty about the world. Consider a scenario in which the agent is uncertain about 
which outcome to prefer, such as a mouse in a maze that needs to find its way to an unknown 
location of  a reward while avoiding harm along the way. Recall that in active inference, 
preferences take the form of  sensory states the agent expects to occupy or regularly frequent 
over time. The mouse is uncertain about where the dangers lie, and where the rewards are to be 
found. Its priors therefore tell it to keep its options open. It should resolve its uncertainty by 
further exploring the maze.  
Friston and colleagues call priors that inform agents about which states they can expect to 
frequent over the long run “policies”. An “action policy” as Friston and colleagues use this term, 
can be thought of  as a rule for the selection of  a sequence of  actions. We could think of  policies 
in terms of  paths of  activity some of  which are more probable than others to lead you to be in 
the states you expect to be in. Policies should serve to minimise future free energy, or what 
Friston and colleagues understand in terms of  “expected free energy” (Friston et al. 2015, 2017). 
Expected free energy is the free energy an agent expects to receive for each of  its different 
policies, were it to pursue them (i.e. the trajectory or sequence of  sensory states it expects in the 
future as a consequence of  its actions).  The only prior belief  about a policy that is consistent 23
with an agent’s continued existence is that it will pursue policies that reduce expected free energy. 
An agent that didn’t select policies based on such a prior would be unable to stay well adapted to 
its niche, and would eventually cease to exist.  This implies that policies that have the highest 24
prior probability are rules for generating action that will most likely help the agent to attain what 
they want in the future.  This is because free energy is the divergence between the states an 25
agent predicts it is likely to occupy (its posterior predictions) and the state it believes it should 
occupy if  it is to satisfy its preferences (i.e. the states it expects to be in over time). The higher 
 Technically, the expected free energy also includes an ambiguity term; in other words, the expected free energy or 23
uncertainty comprises the pragmatic value of  behaviour in relation to prior preferences plus an epistemic term that 
resolves ambiguity about the causes of  sensations. We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to 
this important detail. 
 Based on this assumption that the probability of  a policy is proportional to expected free energy, Friston and 24
colleagues have built simulations of  economic decision making and foraging behaviour (Friston et al. 2014, 2015, 
2017). 
 It should be noted that decision-making is always playing out in a hierarchically organised biological architecture 25
in which there are multiple policies in play operating over multiple time scales. This reflects the individual’s 
simultaneous openness to multiple relevant affordances (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). 
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the prior probability of  a policy, the less free energy an agent can expect in the future. When a 
policy has a high prior probability, the agent can allow the policy to drive action and be confident 
it will attain what it expects. We see this, for instance in the case of  habitual behaviours. These 
are behaviours we have performed on many occasions that reliably lead to comfortable and 
familiar outcomes. They are policies that for this reason have a high probability because the free 
energy we can expect from following them is low.  
According to Friston and colleagues, FEP mandates that an agent’s choices should reflect their 
beliefs about which policies have the highest prior probability of  causing them to occupy the 
states they expect in the future. These beliefs inform the agent about the probability of  reaching 
the states it expects from the states it currently occupies. An action policy will be assigned a 
value based on how well it is predicted to do at minimising the divergence between the states an 
agent is likely to occupy, and the state it believes it should occupy (i.e. its desired states such as 
securing a maximum payoff  in a game). When the pursuit of  an action possibility does not lead 
to the consequences an agent expects, she will engage in an epistemic action and explore her 
environment. By contrast, when the pursuit of  action possibilities does lead to the consequences 
an agent expects, and a policy allows an agent to predict a clear path from her current states to 
the states she wants to occupy, she will treat the policy as highly probable. Policies that the agent 
believes have a high probability (such as habits) drive an agent’s actions since they stand the best 
chance of  minimising free energy.  
Friston and colleagues characterise the agent’s beliefs about the probability of  a given policy in 
terms of  the “precision” of  a policy (Schwartenbeck et al. 2014). Precision weighting adds a 
second-order layer to active inference. In addition to estimating the probability distributions of  
outcomes the predictive brain must also track the reliability (or precision) of  its own estimates 
given the state of  the organism and the current context. It uses this estimation of  reliability to 
flexibly adjust the gain (or the “volume”) of  particular error units: increasing the impact those 
units will have on the unfolding process (Friston 2010).  26
The agent’s overall confidence in a policy is reflected in the precision of  its policies. This precision 
 Much of  the argument in this paper is based upon formulations of  active inference in terms of  expected free 26
energy using discrete state space (Markov decision) processes (MDP). The concept of  prediction error units appeals 
to a slightly different formalism; namely, predictive coding and Bayesian filtering. However, it is possible to 
formulate the belief  propagation in discrete (MDP) schemes in terms of  prediction errors. We can therefore borrow 
the notion of  attention and precision as it is used in predictive coding, when referring to active inference in 
choosing discrete policies, with no loss of  generality. We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to 
this difference. 
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is updated as a function of  the predictive success of  the consequences of  actions. When the 
consequences of  acting on a policy are correctly predicted (i.e. the potential outcomes are clearly 
consistent with prior preferences), precision increases and it decreases when new sensory input is 
surprising. In other words, if  things are unfolding as expected, we become increasingly confident 
in the policy that we are pursuing. The precision of  our beliefs about our own behaviour will 
increase as expected free energy decreases.  
Low precision skews the prior over policies to a flat distribution, which reflects the likelihood 
that policies will be explored with roughly equal probability. Low precision causes the agent to 
keep its options open, and explore different options (as in the maze example sketched above). 
High precision by contrast, skews the prior to those policies that have the lowest expected free 
energy.  It is the precision of  beliefs about competing policies that Friston and colleagues 27
hypothesise will decide whether an agent continues to follow a well-trodden path or departs 
from this path to actively explore the world.  We can think of  epistemic actions as being 28
selected based on a recognition of  the current state of  the world as offering what one might call 
epistemic possibilities for action or “epistemic affordances”. The world is recognised as offering 
epistemic affordances when to put it in Friston’s terms (1) there is uncertainty to be resolved and 
(2) there is a clear and precise way forward that is driven by our beliefs about the policies that 
will best minimise expected free energy.  An example might be the uncertainty one experiences 29
about the colour of  an item of  clothing due to artificial shop lighting. One might resolve this 
uncertainty by say asking the shop assistant if  one can take the item of  clothing out of  the shop 
to view it under natural light, or by comparing it with other items whose colour one is more 
certain about.  
While Friston and colleagues have provided an elegant set of  formal tools for explaining 
exploratory behaviour and how agents resolve the so-called “explore- exploit” dilemma, their 
proposal nevertheless leaves us with two questions unanswered. It is these questions we take up 
 It should be noted that epistemic actions are not always associated with low precision. If  there is a clear and 27
obvious uncertainty-reducing sequence of  actions available, precision will increase to effectively render that 
epistemic course of  action more likely to be selected. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this point 
to us. 
 We thank Jelle Bruineberg for clarifying discussion of  Friston and colleagues’ complex work on epistemic value 28
and for helping us fine tune some of  our formulations of  these ideas in the text. 
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggested characterisation of  epistemic action in terms of  recognition 29
of  epistemic affordances. For previous discussion of  the concept of  epistemic affordances, though not in the terms 
of  Markov decision processes we are employing in this paper (see Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). 
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in the remainder of  our paper.  
First, play and curiosity result in surprising and unexpected discoveries which are often 
experienced as having positive hedonic value. The novel experiences we have as a result of  
exploring our environment often feel pleasurable. Think of  visiting a new culture as an example. 
The positive feelings of  pleasure are part of  what motivate us to engage in this type of  
exploratory activity rather than sticking with the comfortable familiarity of  what is already 
known. Friston and colleagues suggest that this feeling of  pleasure should be a consequence of  
recognising the action opportunities the world offers to reduce or resolve uncertainty (i.e. an 
epistemic affordance of  the agent’s situation). Recall how the states an agent values are 
unsurprising states the agent expects to occupy. These states are the consequences of  the 
behaviours the agent performs in seeking to minimise expected free energy. In other words the 
states an agent expects to occupy given its priors should be states with positive hedonic value. 
This however leaves it unexplained why novel experiences that reduce uncertainty should feel 
good. Why should there be a positive phenomenology that comes with exploring and making 
progress in reducing uncertainty? We enjoy being curious. This is part of  the value we assign to 
these activities. Insofar as current work on epistemic action doesn’t account for the positive 
feelings that characterises curiosity and play, it doesn’t yet fully account for how value works in 
epistemic action.  
Second, the success of  Friston and colleague’s account depends on their explaining how it is that 
agents are able to optimise the precision of  their policies. They say that precision estimation is a 
consequence of  free energy minimisation. They show how the optimisation of  precision 
estimations has dynamical properties that closely resemble those of  dopaminergic systems in the 
brain.  This provides a candidate mechanism for the implementation of  precision in active-30
inference. However it leaves us with questions still about how precision is weighted in a given 
context. We will show how these two questions may turn out to share a common answer. Bodily 
feelings in the form of  affordance-related states of  action readiness turn out to be a part of  
what allows an agent to estimate precision on the fly.  
4.4 The feeling of  action readiness 
 It has been suggested that precision weighting is the result of  neuromodulators (such a dopamine).Kanai and 30
Friston have suggested that, “this may explain why superficial pyramidal cells have so many synaptic gain control 
mechanisms such as N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptors and classical neuromodulatory receptors like D1 
dopamine receptors” (Kanai et al. 2015). 
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We’ve seen in the previous section how expected free energy gets to decide whether the agent 
exploits familiar solutions or explores the environment to reduce uncertainty. Precision 
influences how evidence is accumulated and thus how “beliefs” are formed by an agent. 
Precision estimates are made more generally by the brain to separate out organism-important 
error signals from the surrounding unimportant noise (Feldman 2013). For example, while 
walking home on a familiar busy street one might barely notice the general buzz of  the people 
around you. Day to day the buzz is inevitably different in shape—different people interacting in 
different ways. Nevertheless, while the exact shape of  the buzz is exceptionally unpredictable it 
draws almost no attention: no further processing is allocated. Now if  someone were to 
unexpectedly fall close by and seem to require assistance this bit of  error would suddenly be 
pertinent. If  we think of  error signals as broadcasting newsworthy information then we must 
also explain how the brain decides which channels it should “listen to” (Kanai et al. 2015; c.f. 
Kwisthout et al. 2017). Estimating the precision of  a policy is a special case of  a more general 
phenomenon in which the agent is continuously engaged in monitoring its own level of  
confidence in its predictions about the world.  
The foregoing concerns the precision of  prediction errors in relation to states of  the external 
environment. However we have been discussing precision in relation to action-selection, and 
have therefore been discussing the precision of  beliefs about policies. These notions of  precision 
turn out to be closely related and intertwined on our account.  Policies consist of  interrelated, 31
and nested states of  action readiness, which are patterns of  readiness for the sensory 
consequences or outcomes of  action. We therefore suggest that in assigning precision the brain 
isn’t only concerned with the reliability of  the PE signal. It is more accurate to say that precision 
relates to how well the agent is doing at engaging with expected uncertainty in relation to the 
sensory consequences of  temporally extended sequences of  actions. Precision doesn’t just 
concern the agent here and now and its momentary state of  uncertainty with regards to some 
current prediction error. We’ve seen above how expected or future uncertainty is also important 
when it comes to assigning precision to policies. FEM agents actively seek a means of  managing 
uncertainty over time. The rollercoaster of  continual increases and decreases of  errors that 
accompany life become expected and are folded into our expectations. For such a system it 
becomes important not only to track the constantly fluctuating instantaneous errors, but also to 
pay attention to the dynamics of  error reduction over longer time scales. This means paying 
attention to the rate at which those errors are being reduced or increasing. Rate of  change is an 
important (but largely overlooked dimension) of  free energy minimisation. If  we compare two 
 See our earlier footnote 8. 31
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agents both of  which succeed in dealing with prediction error the agent that does it faster will do 
better in the long run than the agent that takes longer.  32
We can think of  the rate of  change of  prediction error reduction by analogy with velocity 
(Joffily and Coricelli 2013: p. 3). The velocity of  an object is the rate of  change in the position of  
an object relative to a frame of  reference over time. So velocity is equivalent to the speed of  an 
object moving in a particular direction. Rate of  change in relation to prediction error reduction 
thus refers to how fast or slow prediction error is being reduced relative to the states of  the 
whole agent-environment system. If  the speed of  error reduction increases, this equates to 
decrease in free energy over time (relative to what was expected). If  speed of  error reduction 
decreases, this equates to an increase in free energy over time.  
Each agent’s performance in reducing error can be plotted as a slope that depicts the speed at 
which errors are being accommodated relative to their expectations. The steepness of  the slope 
indicates that error is being reduced over a shorter period of  time and so faster than the agent 
expected: the steeper the slope, the faster the rate of  reduction. Think of  mastering a second 
language and finding it easy to take part in a conversation with a stranger in this second language. 
A gentle slope by contrast indicates that error is being reduced at a slower than expected rate. The 
agent has encountered an error that is proving difficult to deal with. This has the result that they 
reduce fewer errors over time. Suppose for instance that a person has broken a leg and they now 
need to get around their environment on crutches. They are now much slower to move around
—the rate at which they are able to get into the states they expected to be in has slowed 
dramatically. This is typically the source of  some frustration for the person.  
Once we have the idea of  rate of  change in play, we see that even large instantaneous errors 
(sudden spikes in the slope) could be experienced as positive as long as the error takes place 
within a more general reduction of  error over time. This is to say that a large but resolvable error 
signal informs the agent that the environment offers the opportunity to resolve uncertainty. An 
epistemic action then becomes an attractive option.  
This goes a long way to helping make sense of  why certain errors are accept- able and even 
highly desirable. The environment offers an epistemic affordance, an opportunity for 
 Technically, what we are saying here is that the path or time integral of  prediction error ( or expected free energy) 32
is the important thing. Crucially, because these time integrals or averages are known as Hamiltonian Action, we are 
saying is that the best policies will conform to Hamilton’s Principle of  Least Action. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for the formulation of  this technical point, and for making the connection to Hamilton’s principle. 
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information gain that allows one to pick up on a free-energy lowering policy. Information about 
rate of  change is thus highly important for updating one’s expectations, changing the course of  
action entirely or rather continuing on the same course of  action. It informs the agent whether, 
given what they know already, there is still room to improve. Perhaps there is no room for 
improvement because error rate just keeps increasing in which case what you should do is just 
try something differ- ent. You shouldn’t change what you anticipate happening when the result 
of  making such a change will just be more error. You should instead explore and look for new 
opportunities that help you to learn to grip better.  
In the recent literature a number of  authors have begun to relate information about rate of  
change in error reduction to the valence of  full-blooded emotional experience like happiness, 
disappointment, hope and fear (Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Van de Cruys 2017; Van de Cruys and 
Wagemans 2011). These authors hypothesise that the valence of  different emotional experiences 
is a reflection of  unexpected rate of  change in prediction error reduction. When free energy is 
increasing at a greater than expected rate this can feel bad, it can for instance be experienced as 
frustrating. Conversely when free energy is decreasing at a faster rate than expected this can feel 
really good. For example, a positive emotion like happiness is a reflection of  an unexpected 
reduction of  prediction error (e.g. error being reduced at a rate faster than expected), while a 
negative emotion like disappointment reflects an unexpected decrease in prediction error 
reduction (e.g. error being reduced at a rate slower than expected).  
In this section we’ve been applying the notion of  rate of  change to explain why an agent might 
be moved to explore rather than exploit. Assuming these authors are right to tie valence to rate 
of  change, our proposal is that it is valence that plays this role of  motivating an agent to to 
engage in exploratory actions rather than exploit.  The concept of  “valence” is used by these 33
authors to refer to the positive or negative (approach or avoid) character of  an emotional 
experience that inform the organism about its current relationship with the environment. 
Pleasurable states have positive hedonic value and are associated with approach behaviours. 
Aversive states have negative hedonic value and are in turn associated with avoidance behaviours. 
 A closely related proposal can be found in Van de Cruys (2017). He emphasises that valence as error dynamics 33
helps guide the organism in its exploration to niches that have maximum gain in prediction-error minimisation. Van 
de Cruys doesn’t explicitly apply this hypothesis to the case of  epistemic action as we have been doing in this paper. 
However, we can suppose that sometimes increasing PE may lead an agent to shift into an exploratory mode of  
engagement with their environment, while on other occasions it may lead the agent to shift to another reliable 
exploit mode. Exactly what the agent does next will depend on the precision of  the policies it is enacting as 
discussed above. Differences between our ecological-enactive account of  valence and the view that can be found in 
Van de Cruys are discussed below. 
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Their claim is not so simple as to say we feel good when our predictions fit and bad when they 
do not. They claim (rightly) that the predictive organism is in a constant state of  error 
management at all levels of  the hierarchy, and yet clearly there is not a felt experience of  each 
and every fluctuation. Errors are reviewed on a background of  learned expectations concerning 
how fast or slow (the rate) such errors have been reduced previously (Joffily and Coricelli 2013). 
We suggest thinking of  valence differently in terms of  multiple states of  affordance- related 
action readiness that are simultaneously affective and behavioural (Rietveld 2008).  At the same 34
time as emotional experiences feel good or bad they also prepare or make us ready to act on 
relevant affordances (possibilities for action offered by the environment). It is the relevant 
affordances of  the environment that have valence. This valence consists in solicitations or 
invitations to act: relevant affordances attract or repel the agent’s actions (Bruineberg and 
Rietveld 2014). Think of  how the apple sitting next to you as you work can look enticing to eat 
when you are hungry: it has positive valence. But when you take a bite into and find it is rotten 
inside it ceases to be enticing in the same way and takes on a negative valence. We thus disagree 
with Joffily and Coricelli (2013) and Van de Cruys (2017) who treat valence as the avoid/
approach character of  full-blooded emotional experiences. They treat valence as a property of  
emotional experience while we suggest understanding valence in relational terms, and as 
necessarily environment involving: it is relevant affordances that have valence in virtue of  which 
they solicit or invite some form of  action on the part of  the agent.  
In addition to valence at the level of  individual relevant affordances we suggest it also makes 
sense to think in terms of  the field of  relevant affordances as a whole as having valence. This is 
the kind of  valence that is made explicit when someone asks how things are going, or how one 
feels in a situation. One’s initial response to this question relates to the situation as a whole, 
though of  course it is possible to zoom in on particular aspects to make things more specific. 
The field of  relevant affordances comprises the multiple relevant affordances that get the agent 
bodily ready to respond. One is ready to respond to each of  the relevant affordances but one 
 Here we are drawing upon the analysis of  emotion found in the research of  the emotion psychologist, Nico Frijda 34
(see (Frijda 1986, 2007), in which states of  action readiness are central. We will have nothing to say here about so-
called full-blooded emotions that Frijda analyses (e.g. happiness, sadness, anger, etc.). Our interest will be instead in the 
myriad ways that the brain and body change as part of  our meaningful engagement with the world. Our use of  felt 
states of  action readiness to refer to the individual agent’s openness to a field of  relevant affordances closely 
parallels Matthew Ratcliffe’s account of  “existential feelings” (2008). Existential feelings are background bodily 
states of  action readiness that orient us in the world. They are what attune us towards or away from relevance. While 
existential feelings are certainly felt, the affective changes can themselves be more or less explicit, foregrounded 
objects of  attention. So for example, we may be expressly aware of  our experienced anxiety, or we may simply 
perceive a situation (through our anxious state) as worrisome. 
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also has an overall grip on the situation. It is this valence at the global level of  the field as a 
whole that we propose to understand in terms of  rate of  change. Global level valence gets the 
agent ready to either exploit the particular inviting relevant affordances or to seek out epistemic 
affordances that offer opportunities for information gain, thereby allowing one to pick up on a 
free-energy lowering policy.  
Valence can thus be thought of  both at the global level of  the agent in relation to the field as a 
whole, and at the more local level of  micro-level states of  action readiness elicited by relevant 
affordances that invite the agent to act. The former (“global valence”) is best thought of  in the 
context of  what we’ve earlier described as the tendency towards an optimal grip on the field of  
relevant affordances (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). The relation between multiple micro-level 
states of  action-readiness and macroscopic patterns of  activity at the level of  the individual 
agent as a whole is analysed in terms of  self-organising dynamics in our earlier work (Bruineberg 
et al. 2016; Rietveld, Denys & van Westen, 2017).  
In earlier work (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. 2016), we’ve proposed an 
ecological-enactive reading of  the FEP, providing an analysis of  free- energy in terms of  
disattunement of  internal and external dynamics, a dynamic state of  disequilibrium within the 
agent-environment system as a whole. In active inference, agents prepare actions that will reduce 
disattunement and thereby lead them closer towards some dynamical equilibrium or grip on the 
situation. States of  action readiness originate in fluctuations of  affect that orient us towards 
affordances that matter to us, preparing us for sensory consequences that arise from responding 
to inviting possibilities for action. Emerging a few hundred milliseconds after an event, action 
readiness is the earliest coordinated evaluation of  the new situation by the organism as a whole 
(Klaasen et al. 2010). Positive and negative feeling should be thought of  as an integral part of  
tending towards an optimal grip. As Frijda notes:  
“Emotional feeling is to a very large extent awareness, not of  the body, but of  the body 
striving, and not merely of  the body striving, but the body striving in the world... 
emotional experience is to a large extent experienced action tendency, or experienced state 
of  action readiness.” (Frijda 2004: p. 161, quoted by Lowe and Ziemke 2011: p. 8)  
Felt states of  action readiness manifest as a “complex space of  polarities and 
combinations” (Colombetti 2005; Thompson 2007: p. 378). The agent prepares to move 
towards/away, approach/withdraw, and is receptive/defensive to affordances in the environment 
that are exerting a pull on, or repelling the agent. These movement tendencies can also be 
consciously felt as pleasant/unpleasant, positive/negative, and they relate to affordances the 
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individual likes/dislikes, is attracted/repelled by. We suggest that felt states of  action readiness 
arise when there is an unexpected change in rate of  error reduction at the level of  the agent-
environment system as a whole. Rate of  change is an important source of  information for the 
agent because it can help them to always be ready for opportunities for improving grip, and 
living systems continuously strive to improve grip (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014).  
This ecological-enactive analysis of  rate of  change can help us to address the first of  the 
questions we raised about epistemic action in the previous section. There we raised the question 
of  why reducing uncertainty through epistemic actions should feel good to the agent. Why 
should novel experiences have a positive phenomenology? We’ve just suggested thinking of  rate 
of  change as the changes felt in the skilled body (in its relation to the field of  relevant 
affordances as a whole) with a positive or negative hedonic value. When an agent succeeds in 
reducing error at a faster than expected rate (or recognises the opportunity to do so) this feels 
good. It is thus not uncertainty reduction alone that the agent cares about, but also the rate at 
which uncertainty is being reduced. Pleasurable feelings arise in the form of  feedback as part of  
the process of  our moving towards, or being drawn towards affordances that are relevant to us. 
We are drawn towards opportunities for improving grip, and positive feelings arise when we 
improve grip at a faster than expected rate. This is to say that the slope one could plot describing 
the rate of  error reduction would have a steep incline.   35
Conversely, negative affect is experienced by the agent in terms of  being repelled from a 
situation. This occurs when we do worse (or anticipate doing worse) than expected at reducing 
error, and the slope describing error reduction has a gentle incline. Consider boredom as an 
example. Suppose you find yourself  stuck in a seat in a music hall sitting through a boring 
symphony. The music you are hearing has nothing to offer. It is boring because there are no 
salient regularities to be harvested relative to the skills you have that attune you to the 
environment. There is no opportunity to do better than expected at reducing prediction error 
because the skills you have already attune you to the music without this requiring any effort from 
you. Alternatively the skills of  the individual may be such that the structure of  the music is too 
complex to get a grip on it. This is an inherently frustrating situation for the listener stuck in 
their seat who nevertheless aims to continuously improve their grip on the world. The felt 
frustration manifests as boredom for the music and agitation, a drive to get up out of  your seat 
and leave.  
 Again we see Hamilton’s Principle of  Least Action in play. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 35
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In the next section we argue that rate of  change may also play a key role in precision estimation as it 
occurs in active inference. Active inference can be tuned by rate of  change in agents that are 
sensitive to this feedback signal. They can use this feedback signal to allow themselves to be 
pushed towards or pulled away from aspects of  the environment that offer opportunities for 
making progress in uncertainty reduction. The hypothesised role of  rate of  change in precision 
estimation is among the important novel contributions of  this paper.  36
4.5 Using rate of  change to tune precision-weighting on the fly  
How is precision weighted in active inference? We suggest in line with our ecological- enactive 
reading of  FEP that precision should be understood in the context of  tending towards an 
optimal grip on the affordances available in the ecological niche. Precision is what sets the degree 
of  influence on behaviour (or more precisely, action readiness) of  the multiple relevant 
affordances inviting us to act.  Error dynamics (rates of  FEM) are “grasped corporeally”, we 37
feel the dynamics of  error-reduction (and whether it is going well or badly) in our attunement to 
the world (Patocˇka 1998). The agent doesn’t simply act so as to improve grip; it is a part of  their 
acting skillfully that they can do so with sensitivity to how well or badly they are doing. Agents 
that make use of  feelings that arise from rates of  change can continuously do better at 
improving their grip on what is relevant in the landscape of  affordance by exploring and seeking 
out novelty. They can aim to better engage with error, and attune to the unexpected so as to 
broaden their skills and grip in more and more domains of  their ecological niche.  
Once we understand FEM as always being enacted in an ecological context as we propose, it 
makes sense to suppose that in general, FEM agents will be on the lookout for opportunities 
that are rich in the kinds of  error they can manage given their skills (eg. manageable errors). We 
suggest this is the kind of  error that will allow an agent to improve on their level of  skilled 
engagement with affordances. Unexpected improvements or setbacks, in relation to the expected 
rate of  error reduction, then provide a particularly valuable learning signal that can direct 
resources to opportunities for improvement or speak in favour of  task-switching (see Rietveld 
and Brouwers 2016 for real life examples of  this). FEM organisms do not try to maximally reduce 
 It is a possibility that has not to our knowledge been recognised in previous work that has appealed to error 36
dynamics to explain the valence of  emotional experience. 
 This hypothesis about the precision mechanism is developed in more detail in Miller and Clark (2017). 37
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error, since sometimes error can be invaluable for learning,  and in any case prediction error is 38
unavoidable. When we think about a day that has gone well, we evaluate the day as a whole in 
part based on the surprising and unexpected things that happened to us and how well we 
managed to deal with them. A good day is not only one in which we succeeded in reducing 
prediction error relative to our expectations. It is one in which we were met with all manner of  
unexpected events and we did well at meeting these challenges.  
Agents can be sensitive to different degrees to how well or badly they are doing at gripping to 
their environment. To put this in terms of  rate of  change of  FEM, they are sensitive to different 
degrees to the increases and decreases in FEM. Given an advanced level of  skill we expect our 
skilled body (as a model of  the world) to do well at attuning to a given context. When we run 
into more troubles than we anticipated, this slows down the rate at which our current skills 
succeed in attuning us to unexpected changes in the environment. Think about a difficult day at 
work in which many problems come up that you fail to solve. The feeling of  frustration in this 
case is feedback that informs us that things are going worse than expected. This is important 
information for an agent because it can be used to move us to do things differently. When free 
energy is rapidly increasing, this is a sign that the agent is doing poorly over time at 
accommodating sensory input. An agent that possesses this information about rate of  change 
should downgrade confidence in their policies. Equivalently, they should assign more confidence 
to prediction errors relative to their policies.  
Now consider a more positive scenario in which prediction error progressively decreases like in 
the example of  the day in which lots of  unexpected events occur that we nevertheless manage 
well. The agent’s policies are performing well at attuning them to change in the environment, and 
thus they have good cause for being highly confident in their policies.  
The more an agent takes note of  rate of  change, the more sensitive they are to how well they are 
gripping in a given situation. Agents that lack sensitivity to felt states of  action readiness will be 
more likely to get stuck in situations that are frustrating to them. Feelings provide them with the 
impetus or impulse to switch. When people are not sensitive to these feelings, this can lead them 
to be overconfident or underconfident in their policies. Overconfidence in one’s policies can lead 
one to overlook unexpected changes in the environment that bodily feelings attune us to. 
Underconfidence in one’s policies can make an agent dissatisfied with what they are doing when 
 Schouppe et al. (2014) shows that more reward comes from resolving incongruent stimuli than from  38
congruent stimuli in a Stroop task. These findings points to initial errors being conducive to higher rewards. 
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they are doing just fine at adapting to the unexpected. Sensitivity to rate of  change and to the 
feelings it gives rise to can be used to tune confidence as we go.  This is maybe one of  the 39
essential ways in which agents are able to stay attuned to what matters to them. Failure to tune 
confidence as we go along leads to inflexibility and failure to switch activities based on changes 
in the environment or changes in internal state (e.g. homeostatic needs). An agent might for 
instance persist with some activity that has been weighted as highly important, but is failing to 
reduce free energy at the expected rate because of  some other pressing need that is being 
neglected. Sensitivity to rate of  change, which reflects how things are going at the global level of  
the agent as a whole, would tell the agent that they need to assign priorities differently allowing 
them to do better at reducing free energy overall by continually tuning their confidence in the 
expectations that are driving their actions on the fly.  40
Why are people so curious and playful? We can remove some of  this mystery we suggest, once 
we appreciate the role of  rate of  change in precision estimation. Agents that weight precision 
based on feedback from the feeling of  grip will be attracted to opportunities for continually 
improving in their skills. Positive and negative hedonic value is felt in the body and can (in the 
agent that is sensitively attuned to these feelings) provide feedback that moves the agents 
through the environment leading them to places where they stand to learn the most.  
4.6 Novelty seeking and learning progress 
We’ve been arguing it is not only prediction error that the agent seeks to reduce in their skilled 
engagement with the environment, but also the rate of  change in prediction error (i.e. the 
opportunity to reduce uncertainty in the future). Anticipation isn’t just about determining what is 
most likely to happen next. Optimising one’s engagement with a dynamically changing 
environment requires in addition, sensitivity to how well one is doing at reducing disattunement 
 Although beyond the remit of  our current treatment it is a prediction of  our arguments that the dopamine system 39
should play a central role in this online tuning of  precision in active inference (thanks once again to an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this point to us). This is because, in physiological versions of  predictive coding and active 
inference, precision is thought to be mediated by neuromodulatory effects (see e.g. Friston et al. 2012a). Key among 
these (in the domain of  motivated behaviour) is dopamine—a neurotransmitter strongly implicated in hedonics, 
reward and emotional learning. 
 Inflexibility that arises from failure to tune confidence on the fly may go some way towards accounting for the 40
current political climate in which people are falling back on comfortable, familiar certainties from the past in 
response to the many complex, hard to manage uncertainties of  the future. The current political situation presents 
people with a tremendous amount of  uncertainty that is far too complex for them to integrate. One natural 
response to this is to fall back on outdated but familiar and entrenched patterns of  interaction that no longer give a 
grip on current events, which for interesting sociological reasons people nevertheless overlook. 
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over time. Sometimes it feels good for the agent to generate more prediction error in their 
interaction with the environment as a part of  their epistemic foraging.  
Irreducible error means environmental complexity is too high for the agent—and this feels bad, 
as in the example of  the symphony that one finds boring because its complexity is too high. Too 
little error in our dealings with the environment means that our model is already fitting well to 
the environment, there is nothing further to be learned and we feel bored. Value in epistemic 
action thus seems to be a matter of  finding the right balance so that the agent is continuously 
improving in the speed at which they are reducing prediction error.  
Imagine signing up for a one hour swimming lesson to improve one’s swimming skills. When 
one arrives for the first time at the swimming pool for the training one finds out that the group 
is very large and that it is not a beginners group. Most people in the class are already proficient at 
doing breast-stroke for instance, something one has not yet mastered. Given the size of  the class, 
the teacher probably notices that one’s level of  performance is lagging behind other members of  
the class but is unable to give one the attention needed for acquiring a new skill. One feels that 
things are going a good deal worse than one expected, and one’s swimming ability is not at all 
improving. Every new exercise during the class is too difficult. The valence of  this situation is 
negative; one feels out of  place and has the action tendency of  leaving the class, and joining a 
different one that is better suited to one’s level of  ability. Rather than being determined to keep 
trying until one has mastered the exercises sufficiently, one might well decide it would be better 
to switch and find a class that is targeted at beginners and has more personal attention for the 
participants.  
The richest opportunities for improving in FEM will come from situations that are neither too 
complex, nor so simple and straightforward that we already know how to deal with them. In 
finding this balance of  complexity and simplicity an agent is able to learn optimally and so is able 
to do better, while nevertheless always falling short of  fully attaining an optimal grip or 
equilibrium with the environment. This means being sensitive to the felt states of  action 
readiness that attune one to positively or negatively valenced relevant affordances. Negatively 
charged feelings of  action readiness tell one that things are not going well. One is failing to grip 
in the way one expects given one’s level of  confidence. This may make switching activities or 
strategies an enticing option so long as one is sensitive to this feeling. Positive feelings tell you 
that you are doing well at dealing with, and adapting to unexpected changes. This provides you 
with valuable feedback for further improving your skills.  
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Various lines of  research support the view that agents seek out environments with optimal 
amounts of  novel complexity (error). For example, Berlyne (1966) argues that organisms actively 
seek out stimuli that are slightly above the complexity the organism is used to. A few good 
examples of  this come from research on early childhood development in which newborns were 
found to attend longer to stimuli that are neither too simple nor too complex (Kidd et al. 2012). 
In non-human studies, rats were found to frequent parts of  a maze that were decorated in a 
slightly more complex fashion than parts they commonly frequented in the past (Dember et al. 
1957). Learning environments in which the complexity is just above the abilities of  the agent 
offer the largest accelerations of  error reduction. These are the environments the rats like to 
explore the most because they offer the most opportunities to learn relative to what they know 
already. Exploration of  these environments feels good to the rats because it is in such 
environments that acceleration of  FEM is at its greatest. We hypothesise that the rats are 
motivated to explore because it feels good to explore this kind of  environment—doing so offers 
them the greatest opportunity for acceleration of  FEM.  
A similar line of  thinking comes from recent research on error reduction dynamics in artificial 
intelligence and robotics (Oudeyer et al. 2007, 2013; Schmidhuber 2010). Kaplan and Oudeyer 
take the rate of  error reduction to be associated with intrinsic rewards in humans (2007).  By 41
linking error reduction dynamics and intrinsic rewards they offer a model of  learning in which 
agents are intrinsically driven to investigate particular regions of  the environment as long as 
there are learnable regularities left to harvest given their current skill level. Being sensitive to 
error dynamics guarantees that the agent avoids wasting time in places where regularities are 
either already learned or too complex given the agent’s skill level. To put this in the terms of  our 
paper, sensitivity to felt states of  action readiness tunes the agent to, and draws them to explore, 
learning-rich places simply by tracking local learning progress. Such systems will naturally and 
spontaneously move from one stage of  development to the next, from one level of  complexity 
to another, as error reduction becomes less available (either all that’s left is uninteresting noise or 
the complexity is yet too high to be managed given the skill level of  the organism). A neat 
outcome of  such systems is the self-organization of  developmental and learning trajectories that 
naturally move agents from acquiring simple to more complex skills over time (Oudeyer and 
Kaplan 2006; Oudeyer et al. 2007; Kaplan and Oudeyer 2011; Moulin-Frier and Oudeyer 2012).  
These ideas about learning progress have shown promise in developmental robotics, allowing 
 In the free energy framework, the concept of  intrinsic motivation that underlies (self) exploration (e.g. motor 41
babbling) and novelty seeking is understood in terms of  expected free energy; also referred to as Bayesian surprise, 
information gain in the literature. Intrinsic value is the value of  information or epistemic value (see Sect. 2 above). 
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robots implementing these routines to “efficiently learn repertoires of  skills in high dimensions 
and under strong time constraints and to avoid unfruitful activities that are either well learnt and 
trivial, or which are random and unlearnable (Pape et al. 2012; Ngo et al. 2012; Baranes and 
Oudeyer 2013; Nguyen and Oudeyer 2013)” (Gottlieb et al. 2013: p. 9). There are good reasons 
to suspect a similar approach to learning takes place in humans. Progress-based systems in 
robotics simulate closely infant sensorimotor development. This has led to the hypothesis that 
certain patterns of  information-seeking behaviour in humans may emerge from a particular 
embodied system (morphology, etc.) intrinsically motivated by progress-based learning strategies 
(Smith 2003; Kaplan and Oudeyer 2007; Oudeyer et al. 2007). To put this point in our own 
words: the sensitivity to the valence of  a situation moves agents to explore situations that 
maximize learning progress by directing them towards a trajectory of  action possibilities whose 
complexity is neither too simple nor too novel. Oudeyer and colleagues refer to these learning 
sweet-spots as progress niches:  
“Progress niches are not intrinsic properties of  the environment. They result from a 
relation between a particular environment, a particular embodiment [...](sensors, actuators, 
feature detectors, and techniques used by the prediction algorithms), and a particular time 
in the developmental history of  the agent. Once discovered, progress niches progressively 
disappear as they become more predictable.” (Oudeyer et al. 2007, p. 282)  
By tracking their own progress in learning, agents are moved to seek out opportunities that 
present them with just the right level of  complexity that they can make something of  these 
opportunities given their current level of  ability.  FEM agents don’t need to orient towards 42
novelty indiscriminately. Agents that make use of  their sensitivity to how well they are doing at 
tending towards an optimal grip can orient to the right kind of  novelty—the kind that maximises 
their own learning rate or the opportunity to do better at improving their grip on what matters in 
the environment. They will be agents that are intrinsically motivated to explore, seek out novelty 
and along the way improve their skill at gripping.  
To offer a rather extreme example of  this, some people are able to forecast events like election 
results, economic collapses, famines and wars with an accuracy much better than chance. They 
have been shown to perform on average 65% better than the average person and 30% better 
than US intelligence agents that forecast these kinds of  events for a living (Tetlock and Gardner 
 We don’t mean to suggest that progress niches are discovered by individual agents all by themselves. Often other 42
people from the practice, more experienced practitioners, give the most relevant feedback about how well one is 
performing and educate one’s attention to relevant affordances. 
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2015).  These people are highly skilled at estimating the probable outcomes of  counterfactual 43
scenarios. It is a prediction of  our arguments that the secret to their success must lie in their 
ability to form better expectations than the average person about how errors will arise. They do a 
way better job than the average person of  anticipating when the unexpected is likely to arise and 
adapting their probability estimates accordingly. If  our arguments are along the right lines, this is 
something they are able to do by paying close attention to what their feelings tell them to do so 
they can continuously tune the confidence they have in their own estimations of  what could 
happen in the future. They are always looking for opportunities to incrementally improve in how 
they are doing at reducing error, and they don’t care so much about the end product. They are as 
Andy Clark nicely put it to us in conversation “slope-chasers”.  
4.7 Conclusion 
We started the paper by raising a puzzle for FEP about why an agent would be motivated to play 
and explore if  all they ever aim to do is keep themselves in states that are expected relative to its 
model of  the world. We’ve argued that a FEM agent should naturally engage in epistemic 
foraging, and seek out epistemic affordances or opportunities to reduce uncertainty in relation to 
their policies. We’ve raised two questions for an account of  epistemic foraging in terms of  FEM 
and active inference. The first question asks why it should feel good to an agent to engage in 
exploratory, curiosity- driven behaviours. We’ve offered a new perspective on recent work on the 
rate of  change in error reduction to address this question. According to this earlier work, it feels 
good for an agent to increase in the speed of  error-reduction, and it feels bad for an agent when 
they reduce error at a slower than expected rate. We’ve suggested that what rate of  change tracks 
are affordance-related changes in states of  action readiness. Our contribution is thus two-fold. 
First we have proposed an ecological and enactive interpretation of  these relatively recent ideas 
about what rate of  change might be doing in predictive-processing. Second we have put this 
interpretation to work to explain the positive and negative hedonic value that can motivate an 
agent to engage in epistemic actions.  
The second question we’ve raised asks how precision-weighting might work in active inference. 
Precision-weighting plays a crucial role in epistemic action since it is the precision that is 
assigned to a policy that settles the question for the agent as to whether to exploit what one 
already knows, or to explore and seek out novelty. Building on our ecological-enactive 
interpretation of  FEM we’ve proposed that sensitivity to rate of  error reduction may play a role 
 Many thanks to Andy Clark for suggesting this fascinating example of  super-forecasters. 43
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in precision estimation. Active inference can be tuned on the fly in agents that use rate of  change 
as a feedback signal, thereby guaranteeing that they continuously make progress in reducing their 
own uncertainty.  
An organism wired to be rewarded for reducing disattunement at a faster rate should naturally 
and spontaneously orient itself  to places in the ecological niche that offer opportunities where 
disattunement can be managed the best. They should be motivated to seek out opportunities for 
managing errors that are just above their current level of  ability and to develop new skills. This is 
to say that the FEM agent ought to be a curious agent, motivated to explore and play in their 
environment, constantly pushing the boundaries of  what they know how to do. In their 
exploratory engagement with their ecological niche, curious agents discover novel affordances 
that allow them to constantly improve in their skills.  
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Chapter 5 
Desire and the predictive organism 
Abstract 
People tend to feel good when they attain something they desire, and frustrated when they fail to 
do so. They tend to value positively feelings of  pleasure, and value negatively feelings of  
frustration. While no doubt true these generalisations leave open the exact nature of  the 
relationship between reward, value and desire. We will address this question by starting from 
predictive processing theories in cognitive neuroscience that offer explanations of  reward and 
value in terms of  probabilistic expectation. The predictive processing theory suggests that desire 
should be understood in terms of  its effects on attentional processes. Attentional processes 
estimate the significance of  prediction error. Desires steer the predictive organism towards or 
away from things of  reward or value in the environment. What this leaves unexplained however 
is the phenomenology of  desire - why should it be that when prediction errors are assigned high 
precision this exerts a strong push or pull on the agent? We provide an answer to this question, 
and thus offer an account of  the phenomenology of  desire in predictive processing terms. 
5.1 Introduction 
People tend to feel good when they attain something they desire, and frustrated when they fail to 
do so. They tend to value positively feelings of  pleasure, and value negatively feelings of  
frustration. While no doubt true these generalisations leave open the exact nature of  the 
relationship between reward, value and desire. We will address this question by starting from 
predictive processing theories in cognitive neuroscience that offer explanations of  reward and 
value in terms of  probabilistic expectation. In the predictive processing (PP) theory reward and 
value map onto processes in the brain that generate predictions of  the sensory and bodily states 
the organism expects to occupy. The brain then processes information in such a way as to keep 
the error in its predictions to a minimum. Our main aim in this paper is to determine how to 
think about desire in the PP theory. 
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Timothy Schroeder (2004) has developed a naturalistic theory of  desire that explains desire in 
terms of  its effects on reward learning in the brain. He has shown how desire has three faces 
which show up in its effects on what an individual finds pleasurable, how the individual is 
motivated to act, and learning how to frequent states that are valuable or rewarding, and avoid 
not occupying those states. We make an analogous proposal in relation to PP models that take 
value and reward to be the brain’s predictions. Does it follow then  desire should also be thought 
of  as driving prediction-error minimisation (PEM)?  
The predictive processing (PP) framework suggests that desire has its effects on feeling, 
motivation and learning through its effects on attentional processes. We will show how 
attentional processes estimate the significance of  prediction error. Desires thus steers the 
predictive organism towards or away from things of  significance in its environment. We propose 
desire has these effects by generating in the organism bodily states of  affective tension in relation 
to aspects of  its surroundings. We therefore add an important ecological twist to the PP story. 
We propose a view of  desire as states of  a larger organism-environment system. Desires 
manifest as embodied states of  action-readiness that move us towards or away from possibilities 
for action we care about as agents.  
Our paper is divided into five main sections. In the first section we briefly explain how desire, 
reward and value are standardly taken to be related in the reward learning theory of  desire 
(Schroeder 2004). Section two shows how reward learning is understood within PP. We show 
how the reward learning system is implicated in attentional processing, setting the precision on 
prediction errors at multiple scales in the brain based on what the organism has found to be 
rewarding and valuable. The PP account of  desire however seems to fail to account for the 
phenomenology of  being a desiring creature. In section three we show how PP may after all be 
able to explain the phenomenology of  desire. We argue that the role of  reward and value in 
modulating attention should be understood as taking place in the organism’s body and not only 
in its brain, as the organism as a whole prepares to act on what matters to it in the environment. 
In section four we show how the predictive organism weighs precision on the basis of  affective 
tension with the environment. We show how affective tension is rooted in expectations of  how 
fast or slow the organism expects to reduce prediction error. The organism doesn’t only track the 
significance of  prediction error but also how fast or slow it is reducing prediction error relative 
to what it was expecting. We call this rate of  change in error reduction, “error dynamics.” Section 
five shows how error dynamics can account for what Schroeder calls the three faces of  desire. 
Desire has its effects on feeling, motivation and learning because of  an organism’s sensitivity to 
error dynamics. We conclude that in PP the phenomenology of  desire is due to the organism’s 
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being drawn into action by the multiple things it cares about in the environment. Desire guides 
the organism to seek out spaces in which they can simultaneously maintain grip on and balance 
the many things that matter to them in their environment.  
5.2 Reward, value and desire 
If  you have felt the pangs of  hunger, the heat of  romance, or the burning need to do better in a 
skilled activity, you know what it is to desire. Desire is the force of  attraction that leads us 
through the world, it is the felt urge that gets us moving towards what matters to us, and it is the 
source of  our pleasure and frustration as we succeed or fail to attain what we care about.  
While we know what desire is from our first-person experience of  being desiring creatures, how 
does this first-person experience relate to biological processes describable in the third-person 
terms of  the natural sciences? In what follows we will mostly be concerned with intrinsic desires 
- desires whose target is states of  affairs that are wanted for themselves and not as means to 
other ends. Examples are pleasure, avoidance of  suffering, adequate nutrition and hydration, the 
affection of  others, and wellbeing of  those one cares about, and so on. Intrinsic desires are 
distinguished from instrumental desires in which the object of  one’s desire is a means to 
attaining some other end that is intrinsically desired. A person might desire money for instance 
not as an end in its own right but because it buys power and influence, or simply as a means to 
providing for one’s family. Intrinsic desires are arguably an essential part of  a person’s moral 
psychology. They help to guide the person towards courses of  action that are right, virtuous and 
praiseworthy (Arpaly & Schroeder 2013). Our concern in this paper is however not so much with 
the moral work intrinsic desires do for the person. Our concern is with the nature of  desire and 
what it is for people to desire the things they do.  
One way naturalistic philosophers have commonly understood desire is by looking at its 
common effects on cognition and behaviour. To desire a thing has been conceptualized as 
having a tendency to pay attention to that thing when it is present (Scanlon 1998), behaving in 
ways that the agent believes will help them attain that thing (at least when appropriate) (Smith 
1987), and a tendency to feel good when we attain the object of  our desire and suffer when we 
don’t (Davis 1986; Morillo 1990; Schueler 1995). The naturalisation of  desire has then proceeded 
by appeal to neuroscientific research to account for these effects. Timothy Schroeder (2004) for 
instance developed a neuroscientifically grounded theory of  the effects of  desire in terms of  
reward-based learning mechanisms in the brain. According to Schroeder, to desire an object X is 
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for a representation of  X (perceived or imagined) to have the power to contribute to the 
calculations that produce reward-based learning signals (as described below). In other words, to 
desire p is for representations of  p to drive reward-based learning in part in the form of  
dopamine production and distribution.  
Reward learning is now a well studied model of  probabilistic learning in which the agent learns 
which kinds of  actions are to be valued in themselves and which actions one should have an 
aversion to because the costs of  performing them outweigh the benefits (Montague, Dayan & 
Sejnowski 1996; Schultz, Tremblay & Hollerman 2000). The outcome of  this learning is that the 
agent comes to associate an action with either a positive or negative value. This value is the 
expected reward or punishment. Reward learning takes place when an action or event elicits a 
“reward prediction error” (RPE) signal. This signal reports something better or worse than 
expected just happened. The reward prediction error signal is the expected reward value less the 
actual reward received. Dopamine neurons in two midbrain structures called the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and the pars compacta of  the substantia nigra (SNpc) have been found to 
fire at rates that directly correlate with an RPE signal. These subcortical midbrain areas are 
believed to be the core of  what's known as the brain’s reward system (although reward learning 
should be thought of  as the result of  a constellation of  areas working in concert). 
Consider as an illustration the famous experiments in which a monkey was given a sip of  sweet 
juice one second after a light was shown (Schultz and Romo 1990; Romo and Schultz 1990). The 
monkey has no response to the light initially, but responds to the juice with a huge spike in 
dopamine. After a short time of  this pairing being presented the dopamine activation changes. 
Now, it is the light that activates the dopamine spike, while the arrival of  the juice ceases to make 
a difference. By this time the monkey has come to unconsciously expect the juice upon seeing 
the light, the arrival of  the juice is now taken for granted. However, what remains uncertain is 
when the light will be presented. The light comes to function as a cue that predicts reward. What 
is important now for the organism is tracking and learning about the occurrence of  the light. In 
the final stage of  the experiment, the light is shown (which increased dopamine) but the juice is 
withheld. The result is a drastic decrease in the production of  dopamine when the juice was not 
received. The monkey has learned the light no longer predicts sweet juice.  
Reward learning steers an agent through the world, making it highly likely that they will come 
into contact with and thus attain the things they intrinsically desire. A natural consequence of  
this type of  learning is that habits solidify - we learn to make more or less automatic and 
unthinking use of  opportunities for reward when they arise. As long as there are predictable and 
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learnable opportunities for rewards in the environment then the organism will act in ways that 
will increase the probability of  obtaining rewards, while decreasing the probability of  failing to 
attain what is desired. Reward learning tunes the organism to what is valuable motivating the 
organism to seek out what is rewarding and avoid what is aversive in ways that lead to pleasure 
and not to pain. These are Schroeder’s three faces of  desire: pleasure, motivation and learning 
(Schroeder 2004).  
The reward theory of  desire takes desire to consist in representations of  objects or states of  
affairs that drive reward based learning. In the next section we will see how in the prediction error 
minimisation (PEM) framework reward and value are explained as predictions that drive error 
reduction routines. Does it follow from this account of  reward and value that desire should also be 
understood in terms of  PEM?  
5.3 The predictive processing theory of  reward 
It is intuitive to think that agents are motivated to seek out rewards and to avoid punishments, 
and that reward learning teaches agents how to frequent rewarding spaces more often.  
Predictive processing theories of  decision-making however reverse this intuitive way of  thinking 
about expectation and reward (Fitzgerald et al 2014; Friston et al 2012; see also Friston, Mattout 
and Kilner 2011 pp 138). Reward is understood in terms of  the sensory states the organism 
frequently occupies and punishment with sensory states that are infrequently occupied. The 
frequency with which a location in a state space of  possible behaviours is visited (or a signal is 
encountered) equals the reward value (Moutoussis, Story and Dolan 2015). This is because the 
states the agent ought to revisit regularly are the states that are highly probable given the 
environment it inhabits and the kind of  being it is. Think of  a fish in water: the sensory states 
associated with an aquatic environment are highly probable for the fish. Being out of  water is by 
contrast highly improbable for most fish. Should they find themselves momentarily out of  water 
they need to take immediate action to return to their familiar environment. The agent thus needs 
to avoid improbable states that threaten its integrity, or in some other way conflict with the life it 
leads.  
PP claims that agents come to develop or “embody” a “generative model” of  their environment 
that is shaped by a history of  reward and punishment, and thus by what the agent finds valuable 
(Friston 2011). Based on the generative model the organism predicts that it will occupy on 
average and over time the sensory states that are rewarding to it. These predictions are fulfilled 
Chapter 5: Desire in the Predictive Organism !105
when they fit with the sensory states the organism tends to occupy on average and over time.  In 
an effort to improve this fit, humans are able to make use of  both habitual (pragmatic policies) 
and goal-directed behaviours (including epistemic policies) (Pezzulo et al 2015). Some of  the 
action possibilities the agent acts on will serve purely pragmatic ends. They will be action 
possibilities that are already trusted and familiar, and the agent can simply rely upon habitual 
ways of  acting in exploiting them. For example, the action sequence that constitutes my sipping 
coffee while I work on this paper takes care of  itself. Other action possibilities the agent selects 
will serve epistemic ends of  reducing uncertainty. If  I want a coffee but am working in a new 
office today, then action policies are chosen that help fill out our expectations about such spaces 
so that in the future pragmatic policies may be applied (eg. I wander around the nearby area 
looking for a cafe). The agent selects exploratory actions in ways that yield new information that 
can be used to guide action in improved ways reducing its uncertainty about the environment in 
the future (Kiverstein et al 2017).  
The organism will thus select actions that fulfill the predictions of  its generative model. This will 
however only result in the organism occupying rewarding and valued sensory states if  the 
organism can be confident in the predictions of  its generative model. To minimise prediction 
error in the long run the organism must select actions that have a high probability of  taking 
them from the sensory states they currently occupy to the rewarding sensory states they expect 
to frequent. They must minimise the divergence between the outcomes that are likely given a 
certain course of  action and the outcomes that are desired.  The organism will need to 44
maximise their certainty that a policy (a sequence of  actions) will minimise the difference 
between the predicted and valued outcomes in a given context. It will need to evaluate the 
“precision” of  the policies it uses to select actions (Schwartenbeck et al 2015).  
“Precision” refers to the agent’s confidence in a policy. More precisely, it refers to the degree of  
confidence that the predicted sensory consequences of  action will match as closely as possibly 
the sensory states the agent values. Thus when hungry the agent expects food. The brain 
predicts the consequences of  the sequence of  actions (the policy) that leads to the agent finding 
and consuming food. The agent must then select the policy it has the most confidence will lead it 
to satisfy its hunger in its current context.  
 This is technically referred to as the Kullback-Leibler divergence - the difference between the agent’s prior 44
preferences (the desired outcomes) and the posterior beliefs about likely outcomes given current sensory 
observations (i.e. the agent’s current context).
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Schwartenbeck and colleagues have shown that changes in expected precision directly correlate 
with the activity of  dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain (Schwartenbeck et al 2015).  45
Organisms should expect different degrees of  precision in different contexts. A policy that 
works in one context may no longer work in a different context. We can thus think of  organisms 
as harboring prior beliefs about the precision of  their behavioural policies - beliefs about how 
probable it is that a policy will lead to desired outcomes in a given context. If  the agent is to 
minimise prediction error in the long run it will prove essential for the precision of  a policy to be 
continuously updated based on the agent’s current sensory observations. The agent should only 
act on a policy when they are confident that doing so is more likely to take them from their 
current sensory states to the outcomes they desire than acting on some other policy. Based on 
precision expectations, prediction errors will be assigned different precision weightings. The 
weighting of  prediction errors will determine the influence prediction errors have on 
downstream processing. Prediction errors that are weighted high will have high impact, while 
prediction errors that are weighted low because of  weak confidence in a policy will be muted.       
Desire thus reemerges here as the effect of  interactions among precision weighted probabilistic 
expectations that arise in response to the dynamically changing environment. It has the three 
characteristic effects that Schroeder (2004) describes on pleasure, motivation and learning as a 
consequence of  prediction-error minimisation. The sensory states the organism expects to 
regularly frequent just are states with positive hedonic value it feels good to occupy. The agent is 
motivated to act when predictions errors that arise from mismatch in its predictions and its 
current sensory states are weighed as precise. It is so motivated because of  learning driven by the 
precision-modulated imperative to minimise prediction error in the long-run.  
One key weakness of  this proposal is its apparent failure to account for the rich phenomenology 
of  desire, or what it is like to be a desiring creature (e.g. Seth 2013; Clark 2017b). It fails to 
account for the “oomph” of  desire - the way in which desires affect us by energising the body, 
motivating the agent to seek out and attain valued objects. Precision explains why certain policies 
are acted on, but what it doesn’t so obviously explain is why there should be a tension in the 
body, an urge or need to take action that can sometimes show up in the agent as a feeling of  
 Precision expectations closely resemble reward prediction errors. A reward prediction error recall reports the 45
difference between expected and actual reward. Precision expectations behave like reward prediction errors by 
contributing to processes that maximise expected utility. The reward prediction error in PP reports change in 
confidence that actions will lead to rewarding outcomes (Schwartenbeck et al 2015: 3442). In PP however decisions 
are made not only to maximise expected utility but in addition to minimise long term prediction error. Unsurprising 
states are the rewarding states. So by minimising prediction error (i.e. by avoiding surprise) the agent will in the long 
run be guaranteed to maximise the probability of  occupying rewarding states.  
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affective tension. We draw out the problem further in the next section, and propose a solution in 
section 4.   
5.4 Being moved towards what matters 
Desires arise in the body and manifest for the agent as an affective tension that draws us towards 
the things we want. As Koffka (1935) put it, “a fruit says, ‘Eat me’; water says, ‘Drink me’; 
thunder says, ‘Fear me’, and woman says, ‘Love me’” (p. 7). Both Lewin and Koffka called this 
the ‘demand character’ of  the environment (Withagen et al 2012: p.251). 
  
Intrinsic desires are embodied affective states that relate to what an organism cares about in its 
environment. The organism always stands in a particular evaluative relation to its environment 
because every organism as a living being is simultaneously “in a state of  relative equilibrium and 
in a state of  disequilibrium” (Merleau-Ponty 1968/2003: p.149; c.f. Bruineberg et al 2018, 
Kiverstein et al 2017). The organism is in a state of  relative equilibrium insofar as it succeeds in 
maintaining its biological organisation in its interactions with the environment. It is 
simultaneously in a state of  disequilibrium so long as it remains alive, since there will always be 
something the organism needs but currently lacks. The organism will thus be moved to act so as 
to reduce its state of  disequilibrium. However it never fully succeeds in attaining equilibrium. To 
do so would mean death. Both the environment and the organism are dynamical systems that 
continuously undergo change. To act in a dynamically changing environment, the organism will 
continually need to adjust its actions to its own changing needs and to unexpected changes as 
they arise.  
The phenomenology of  desire can be aptly described, we propose, as an organism’s tending 
towards an optimal grip on what is currently significant in its environment (Bruineberg et al 
2018).  This bodily stance is something the organism must actively maintain in relation to its 46
current situation, hence our describing it in terms of  grip. We talk of  grip as tending towards 
optimality because the organism is aiming at a relative state of  equilibrium with the environment.  
 In earlier work we have shown how the tendency towards optimal grip is consequence of  a more general 46
imperative of  the organism to minimise what Karl Friston has referred to as “variational free energy”. We showed 
how the concept of  variational free energy can be understood in dynamical systems terms as the disattunement 
between internal dynamics on the side of  the organism and external dynamics on the side of  the environment. See 
(Bruineberg et al 2018, Kiverstein at al 2017).  
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The environment makes available to the organism many possibilities for action or affordances. 
Affordances are the possibilities for action provided by the substances, surfaces and other 
inhabitants of  an animal’s environment (Gibson 1979). Affordances are relevant for an agent 
when they contribute in some way to the agent’s concern to remain in the bodily states it expects 
to occupy. Recall that it is in terms of  the bodily states the agent expects to occupy that PP 
understands reward and value. Affordances stand out as relevant for an agent when there is a 
mismatch between the bodily states the agent predicts and the bodily state it currently finds itself  
occupying. In other words, affordances stand out to the organism as relevant because of  
prediction errors: the bodily states the agent expects on average and in the long-run fail to match 
with those it currently occupies.  
Now let us us return to the problem we raised at the end of  the previous section. We can now 
see why the actions that are selected on the basis of  precision-estimations of  prediction errors 
should affect the agent to different degrees. Relevant affordances attract or draw the agent 
towards them or force the agent away from them. They elicit in agents an affective tension with 
varying degrees of  intensity or importance. The variability in tension, we propose, can be 
thought of  as precision weighting. Recall how precision weighting is the outcome of  the 
updating of  precision expectations. It is not the case that precision is first set and the 
consequence of  this is affective tension in the agent. We propose instead that precision 
weighting and affective tension are one and the same process. Prediction errors move the agent 
to act only when they are assigned high precision. The affective tension that is elicited in the 
agent by relevant affordances is identical with prediction error that is being assigned high-
precision. We develop this proposal in more detail in the next section.  
5.5 Error dynamics as precision engineering 
Agents situated in an environment rich with affordances will typically be affected not just by one 
affordance but rather by a multiplicity of  relevant affordances simultaneously. Relevant 
affordances can thus be described as forming a field in which each affordance has a varying 
degree of  valence. Affordances differ in the degree of  urgency with which they solicit. Some 
demand we act on them now, while for other affordances in the field the need to act is less 
urgent. The relevant affordances that demand we act now correspond with expectations for 
immediate and fast error reduction. While the relevant affordances that are assigned less 
importance correspond with expectations for slower rate of  error reduction. The variations in 
valence that relate to the urgency of  action map onto what we will refer to as “error dynamics”. 
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The term “valence” is standardly used to refer to the felt positive or negative character of  our 
experience (Barrett 2006; for possible doubts see Colombetti 2005). We propose to understand 
valence in terms of  affordance-related embodied states of  action-readiness (Frijda 2007). The 
inviting or soliciting character of  relevant affordances can be given a description in 
phenomenological terms as the agent feeling attracted by certain affordances that she cares 
about, or being pushed away and repelled by other affordances that present a risk or threat 
(Dreyfus & Kelly 2007). Relevant affordances thus have a valence.  
     
Error dynamics refers to temporal comparisons of  the rate of  error reduction. We can think of  
the rate of  change in prediction error reduction by analogy with velocity (Joffily & Corricelli 
2013: 3). The velocity of  an object is the rate of  change in the position of  an object relative to a 
frame of  reference over time. So velocity is equivalent to the speed of  an object moving in a 
particular direction. Rate of  change of  prediction error reduction refers to how fast or slow 
prediction error is being reduced relative to what the agent expected. The agent’s expectations 
for fast or slow error reduction map onto affective tension. The greater the tension, the more 
urgency there is to reduce prediction error fast. Relevant affordances that elicit less tension do so 
because the agent expects to reduce prediction error for those affordances over longer time 
scales. 
The degree of  urgency given to a relevant affordance shouldn’t be conflated with the importance 
of  a relevant affordance. Many possibilities that are extremely important to us such as attaining a 
PhD or writing a book can only be achieved over very long time scales. They are assigned high 
importance perhaps outweighing all the other things in our lives that matter to us. But still we 
don’t expect error relating to these possibilities to be reduced fully and immediately. We do 
expect however to make progress in reducing error at a particular rate. So on some days when we 
are stuck on a problem it feels bad because we are not making the progress we expected. This 
may lead us to change perspective on a problem so that we find once again things begin to 
improve and we are back on track. The degree of  urgency that error reduction has is premised 
on things that are important to us. There is something we lack that is the source of  an increase in 
disequilibrium in relation to the environment. It is this disequilibrium that is the source of  
affective tension. As we just explained tension comes in degrees, and it is the degree of  tension 
that influences how fast or slow the agent expects to reduce error.  
We have seen above how prediction errors arise when the agent fails to occupy the bodily state it 
expects (those that are rewarding and valuable). We describe this in terms of  an increase in 
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disequilibrium in relation the environment. On some occasions this mismatch will be a matter of  
urgent importance, on other occasions less so. The more important it is to the organism to 
immediately occupy rewarding and valuable bodily states the greater the build up of  affective 
tension.  
Precision expectations may be optimised in a given context in part on the basis of  error 
dynamics. Second order error comparisons of  rate in error reduction are made available to the 
organism as affective feelings. Suppose the agent is expecting to reduce error fast but there are 
no affordances available to help them do this. This will feel bad. You are feeling hungry and you 
go to the cupboard for the snacks that can normally be found there. But all the snacks have been 
eaten by your partner. Your confidence in the policy of  where to find the snacks when hungry 
needs to be updated. The failure to reduce error at the rate that was expected gives rise to 
negatively valenced feelings of  frustration. This feeling gets to do part of  the work of  updating 
one’s precision expectations. One should no longer place so much confidence in the snack 
cupboard when it comes to the policies one selects for reducing hunger. Now consider what it 
feels like for things to go better than expected. You are hungry again and you go to the snack 
cupboard this time with the expectation that you’ll find it empty. But your partner has been 
shopping. Things go better than you expect, and this feels good.     
Our claim is not simply that positive or negative feelings are the product of  predictive 
confirmations or violations. It is not the overly simple claim that we feel good whenever our 
predictions fit the sensory evidence, and bad when they don’t. The organism is always managing 
some error within its hierarchy of  expectations, but it is clearly doesn’t feel each and every 
fluctuation. Instead errors are considered relative to expectations about the rate at which errors 
have been resolved in the past. Over time the organism comes to predict the rate at which error 
rises and falls in particular circumstances. One result of  this is that error could be experienced 
positively, if  it was expected as part of  a more general error reducing regimen. Take for example 
the necessary errors we expect to encounter while acquiring/mastering a new skill. What comes 
through as a feeling is unexpected change in the rate at which error is being reduced. This 
sensitivity to rate of  error reduction can help guide the predictive organism towards niches that 
are replete with reducible errors that are neither too complex to manage, and yet not too well 
learned and so unuseful.  
Also important for optimising precision expectations is a sensitivity to changes in the overall rate at 
which errors are being reduced or increasing over time. We suggest that the agent is sensitive to 
how well or badly it is doing in gripping to the field of  relevant affordances as a whole, and that 
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therefore the field as a whole can be thought of  as having a valence. When you ask a person how 
their day is going they will initially answer by giving a general overall sense of  how they are 
doing. They say they are doing well or badly or perhaps just fine. They are indicating something 
about their overall grip on the situation as a whole given what matters to them.  
Human agents are ready to respond in an integrated manner to multiple relevant affordances 
simultaneously. Their states of  action readiness combine in coherent ways so as to open them to 
a whole field of  relevant affordances. By using error dynamics to tune precision expectations, the 
agent can thereby ensure that she continues to remain attuned to the field as a whole. Precision-
expectations that are set in part based on error dynamics can enable agents to create and 
maintain metastable poise in relation to the environment. Metastable poise allows for fast and 
flexible switching between action possibilities (Kelso 2012). Think of  the boxer finding an 
optimal distance from the boxing bag where she is ready for all the relevant affordances the bag 
offers (Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014). She is ready to make jabs, uppercuts and hooks based on 
her distance from the bag. Given this bodily readiness it can then be a random fluctuation of  the 
bag that contributes to the selection of  which action unfolds (see Rietveld, Denys & van Westen 
forthcoming). This is crucial for adapting rapidly to situations in a way that does not need 
conscious control.  
Remaining metastably poised in relation to the field as a whole plays an important role in 
learning. It allows the agent to strike the right balance between relying on what they already 
know and exploring in search of  new information. This matters because it is necessary for 
minimising expected prediction error in the long run. There is always the possibility of  the agent 
ending up in surprising sensory states that are punishing precisely because they are unexpected. 
What the agent already knows won’t always be sufficient for dealing with unexpected prediction 
error in the future, and thus it won’t help them in the long run to always return to the familiar 
and rewarding sensory states. Thus to deal with unexpected increases in uncertainty in the future 
agents will need to be ready to switch from what they do as a matter of  habit. They must be 
prepared to sometimes favour policies of  exploring the environment in search of  new action 
policies that lead to surprising and unexpected events. As we make our way through the world 
we encounter various stable and persisting opportunities for action (attractors in the language of  
dynamics systems). These fixed points emerge and dissolve both due to environmental 
conditions, and changes in our own internal states and behaviours. However, we also have a 
tendency to actively destroy these fixed points therefore inducing instabilities and creating 
peripatetic or itinerant (wandering) dynamics (Friston, Breakspear, and Deco 2012). This type of  
readiness falls naturally out of  maintaining metastable attunement. Maintaining metastable 
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attunement just is equivalent to finding the goldilocks zone with just the right mixture of  novelty 
or uncertainty, and what is already well-predicted because of  the current model of  the 
environment (Kidd, et al 2012; Van de Cruys 2017; Kiverstein at al 2017). An agent that is 
prepared to break with habit in this way will be an agent that is well placed to return consistently 
to the sensory states it expects to be in (i.e. the ones that are rewarding and valuable).   
When all goes well precision weighting works to maintain metastable attunement with the 
environment. It is by remaining metastably poised in relation to the field of  relevant affordances 
as a whole that we do best at adjusting to a dynamically changing environment and thus at 
maintaining a grip on it. Agents that are sensitive to error dynamics can use this sensitivity to 
update their precision expectations thereby ensuring they remain metastably poised.  
5.6 Error dynamics and the three faces of  desire 
We are now in a position to show how Schroeder’s three faces of  desire - pleasure, motivation, 
and learning - are a consequences of  a sensitivity to error dynamics. We thus show how PP can 
account for the phenomenology of  desire once we have error dynamics in view. Pleasure is the 
result of  doing better than expected at attaining the familiar states that are expected. Familiar 
expected states recall are states that are valued and rewarding precisely because of  their 
familiarity. They are the bodily states the organism should expect to occupy given the life it leads. 
Pleasure arises in us when unexpected opportunities to reduce errors arise. Error means there is 
an important bodily state that one is predicting that doesn’t match one’s current bodily state. The 
prediction error is given high precision when it is one that the agent expects to reduce 
immediately through action. Pleasure thus arises when the agent finds an unexpected 
opportunity that fulfils this expectation.  
The individual is motivated to act by the relevant affordances of  its environment in ways that 
reduce the affective tension that arises from its being in a state of  disequilibrium with its 
environment. Relevant affordances elicit in the agent multiple embodied states of  action 
readiness. Each of  these states of  action readiness varies in urgency. If  the agent is to maintain 
metastable attunement these states of  action readiness must be integrated in such a way that the 
agent is able to manage the overall rate of  error reduction. Overall rate of  error reduction is 
important because error arises for each of  the things in the environment that matter to the 
agent. Therefore so long as the agent is succeeding in managing overall error this will mean they 
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are maintaining metastable attunement. They are managing to maintain a grip on the many things 
that matter to them. 
The organism that is sensitive to error dynamics will be a creature that learns how to return 
consistently to the sensory states it expects to be in when things change either in the 
environment or on the side of  the agent. It will be able to harness its learning to adapt to change 
and will be motivated to seek out better than expected opportunities for reducing prediction 
error. Recall that the agent isn’t only interested in reducing current prediction error but in 
minimising expected future uncertainty. This is essential for an organism that is able to minimise 
the effects of  random fluctuations in the environment. Minimising expected future uncertainty 
requires the agent to continuously be on the look-out for better than expected opportunities for 
reducing error. To see this consider the following three scenarios for an agent that is sensitive to 
error dynamics and uses this sensitivity for setting precision. 
In the first scenario precision is set high for a prediction error that relates to a relevant 
affordance - lets say a door handle that opens a door. The door handle turns, the agent enters the 
room and everything unfolds as they expected. Thus the agent doesn’t learn anything new about 
the affordances of  door handles. They already know what they need to know. 
In the second scenario everything is the same initially as in the first scenario. But this time when 
the agent tries to turn the door handle the door refuses to open. Prediction error is thus not 
reduced at the rate the agent was expecting. Now the agent can learn something new - something 
about the direction you turn this type of  door handle, or that the door is locked and the meeting 
they are late for is probably happening elsewhere.  
In the third scenario you encounter a door hand handle that has proven really hard to open in 
the past. You’ve stood there for many frustrating and embarrassing minutes trying to work out 
what to do to no avail. This time when you try to your astonishment the door springs open upon 
your first attempt. Things go much better than you were expecting. You take a moment to check 
what the secret was, and it works again. You have made progress in your learning.  
An agent that acts to minimise its own expected uncertainty will as we’ve seen above need to be 
an agent that is ready to break with habit. They will need to be the kind of  agent that is 
motivated to make progress in learning. As we saw above, the agent cannot always do this by 
ploughing the same ground, relying on what is already known. To deal well with uncertainty in 
the long run and return to the familiar and expected sensory states continuously, the agent will 
Chapter 5: Desire in the Predictive Organism !114
need to be curious. They will need to sometimes actively seek out niches that are replete with 
reducible errors that are neither too complex to manage, nor too well learned to be useless for 
making further progress in learning.  
The arguments of  this paper imply that intrinsic desires arise in organisms continuously striving 
to maintain grip on a dynamically changing environment. Desire manifests as embodied states of  
action readiness that are elicited by affordances that are relevant given the organism’s 
disequilibrium with its environment. It follows that - at an admittedly high-level of  abstraction 
and generality - everything that an organism cares about will be a reflection of  this more basic 
need to continuously be reducing disattunement with the environment. What organisms 
intrinsically desire is to remain well-attuned to relevant opportunities and risks the environment 
furnishes.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Our aim in this paper has been to use recent developments in cognitive neuroscience to develop 
a naturalistic theory of  desire. An increasingly influential theory in cognitive neuroscience takes 
the brain to regulate the organism’s interactions with the environment in such a way as to 
guarantee that the organism finds itself  in rewarding and valuable sensory states. The brain does 
this by building up a model of  its environment which it uses to predict its own sensory input.  
In PP desire is understood as tuning precision expectations. A weakness of  this proposal is 
however its apparent failure to account for the phenomenology of  desire and the way in which 
desires are felt in the body. We have corrected for this failing by showing how precision can be 
understood as affective tension. Affective tension is elicited in the body by relevant affordances 
based on prediction errors that reflect a mismatch between the bodily states the agent expects to 
occupy - the bodily states that are rewarding and valued - and those it currently occupies. The 
agent expects to reduce prediction error at a given rate. When this expectation is satisfied or 
violated this gives rise to feelings that can be used to update precision expectations. The effects 
of  desire on pleasure, motivation and learning are thus explained by the sensitivity to error 
dynamics. Pleasure, motivation and learning are all consequences of  desire. It follows that  desire 
has its effects through its contribution to long term prediction error minimisation.  
Precision is weighted in such a way as to ensure over time that the agent is able to balance the 
multiple possibilities for action they care about. Sensitivity to error dynamics tells the organism 
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how well it is doing at maintaining metastable poise. It guarantees that the agent assigns the right 
priority to the right states of  action readiness at the right time, so as to remain flexibly poised to 
switch between the many activities they care about.    
Is it a consequence of  our argument that all the predictive organism wants in the end is to keep 
the long-term prediction errors of  its generative model to a minimum? We don’t think so. 
Instead we suggest organisms desire to keep to a minimum the affective tensions that arise from 
disequilibrium with the environment. They want to continuously return to a state of  relative 
equilibrium with the environment when disequilibrium begins to increase as it inevitably will so 
long as they remain alive. Prediction error minimisation is driven by this basic need or concern 
of  the organism to remain metastably poised. Metastable attunement matters to organisms 
because it allows them to balance the many aspects of  the socio-material environment that they 
care about and remain flexibly open to the field of  affordances as a whole.    
We’ve argued that what the agent intrinsically desires is to maintain metastable poise. Doing so 
allows them to be maximally responsive to all the possibilities for action that matter to them. By 
setting precision on the basis of  error dynamics the agent is able to balance the many things that 
matter to them. It thus turns out that the effects of  desire are best understood in terms of  
prediction error minimisation as it plays out within a whole agent-environment system in which 
the agent is continuously aiming to do justice simultaneously to all the things that matter to 
them.        
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Chapter 6 
Embodying addiction: a predictive processing account 
Abstract 
Addicts engage in increasingly self-destructive cycles of  behaviour. Often they continue to do so 
long after the behaviours have ceased to bring them any pleasure. They do things they don’t want 
to do at great emotional costs to themselves and those around them. In this paper we show how 
addiction can be thought of  as the outcome of  learning. This is a hypothesis widely held in the 
empirical literature on addiction. We propose however an account of  learning as a self-organising 
process that leads to the progressive entrainment of  the behaviour of  addicts by the 
environment. We show further how to understand this self-organising process using the 
increasingly influential predictive processing theory of  the brain. Perhaps counter intuitively, it is 
a consequence of  our argument that while the brain plays a deep and important role in leading a 
person into addiction, it cannot be the whole story. Predictive processing is best interpreted in 
the wider context of  the agent’s dynamic coupling with its environment. The pathological nature 
of  addiction is thus not to be found in the brains of  addicts, we will argue, but in the larger 
organism-environment system of  which the brain is an important part. Our predictive 
processing account unlike other models of  addiction is able to do justice to the complex 
constellation of  causal factors - biological, biographical, societal and historical - that lead a 
person into addiction. A larger agent-environment system is broad enough to include all of  these 
factors. As a dynamical explanation it can also provide tools for explaining how these factors 
combine in ways that conspire to lead a person into addiction.   
6.1 Introduction 
Addiction has a devastating effect upon those whose life it afflicts. Addicts find their life 
increasingly dominated by their addictive behaviours. The other pursuits they care about begin to 
be crowded out as they devote increasing amounts of  time and energy to the pursuit of  their 
addictions. The undesirable outcomes of  their addictive behaviours are increasingly ignored, yet 
at the same time addicts feel compelled to continue acting on their addictions often long after 
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the addictive behaviour has ceased to bring any pleasure. Addiction can reach a point in a 
person’s life where it seems all that matters to them is doing what their addiction requires, yet at 
the same time this is something they do not want. As the director of  the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse Nora Volkow has said “I’ve never come across a single person that was addicted 
that wanted to be addicted” (Gugliotta 2003). 
In what follows we will propose an account of  addiction as a self-organising process that spirals 
out of  control due to feedback loops that entrain the behaviour of  the agent, locking them into 
destructive cycles of  behaviours. It is in the dynamic interaction between the agent and its 
environment that addiction is born and endures. Addiction is the outcome of  the formation of  
deep habitual tendencies further enhanced and strengthened by the impact addictive substances 
have on brain circuitry set up to build (but also to control) habits. Although we focus on 
substance addiction in what follows, our account generalises to other forms of  addiction such as 
gambling, eating, sex, shopping, exercise, video games, online social media, and even work . 47
We’ll argue that addiction in general should be understood as a self-organising dynamical process 
that unfolds through the agent’s coupling with its environment.  
Many accounts of  addiction in the literature give a central place to the learning of  habitual 
modes of  behaviour that override whatever other goals the agent may value (Lewis 2017; 
Heather et al 2017; Robinson & Berridge 2008). Our account differs from other learning models 
in that it conceives of  addictive behaviour not as a conditioned “response to stimuli” but as an 
“active engagement (or entrainment) with meaningful aspects of  the environment” (Lewis & 
Shelly under review). The environment is best understood not as made up of  cues that passively 
trigger the addict to act on their habits. It is made up of  meaningful possibilities for action, that 
is to say it is made up of  affordances (Gibson 1979). We will suggest that what is pathological in 
addiction is the narrowing of  the agent’s field of  relevant affordances to just those that 
contribute in some way to attaining the object of  their addiction. To understand how this 
narrowing occurs, we will argue, requires that we zoom out and take into consideration the wider 
organism-environment interactions.    
Our account provides an integrated framework for understanding the multiple causal factors that 
lead to addiction - biological, historical, social and cultural. We may therefore be able to reconcile 
previously opposing perspectives on addiction. All accounts of  addiction stress the importance 
 These behavioural forms of  addiction share much in common with substance addiction, both in terms of  genetic 47
predisposition (Lejoyeux et al 1997; Grant & Kim 2002; Raymond et al 2003) and changes in specific 
neurochemistry (Reuter et al 2005; Goudriaan et al 2006).
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of  recognising the complex suite of  causes that lead up to addiction. On one side of  the debate 
a prominent proponent of  the medical model of  addiction, Leshner writes:  
“Addiction is not just a brain disease. It is a brain disease for which the social contexts in which it 
has both developed and is expressed are critically important… If  we understand addiction as a 
prototypical psycho-biological illness, with critical biological, behavioral, and social-context 
components, our treatment strategies must include biological, behavioral, and social-context 
elements. Not only must the underlying brain disease be treated, but the behavioral and social 
cue components must also be addressed, just as they are with many other brain diseases, 
including stroke, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer’s disease.” (1997 p.46) 
On the other side of  the debate, opponents of  the medical model also emphasise the 
importance of  the societal and historical causes of  addiction (Alexander 2008; Levy 2013; Heilig 
et al 2016). These models typically emphasize, for example, that there is now converging 
evidence that physical abuse, economic inequality and injustice, and psychological trauma in early 
life increases the likelihood of  addiction in the future (Sinha 2008; Satel & Lilienfeld 2013).  
The account of  addiction we go on to develop can do justice to what is right in both these 
camps without falling on either side of  this divide. Medical models of  addiction acknowledge 
that social and environmental factors play a role in the development of  addictions. However they 
have an unfortunate tendency to downplay the agency of  the addict, assigning too much 
importance to the brain, while the contribution of  the environment is only to provide 
stimulation that passively drives the behaviour of  addicts. The behaviour of  the addict is treated 
as like a stimulus-response behaviour, the outcome of  operant conditioning. On the other side, 
in the research on the social and historical causes of  addiction, there is an unfortunate tendency 
to downplay the importance of  the brain in the development of  addiction. Learning models of  
addiction emphasize the role of  the person's environment and life experiences, but in doing so 
tend not to take into account the important changes that take place within the addicts brain. 
Interestingly in common with the medical models these accounts also treat the agent as largely 
passive in the causal history that leads up to their addiction. The addict is passively acted on by 
their historical and social circumstances. Both these accounts fail to strike the right balance 
between explaining addiction in terms of  its environmental causes and explaining addiction in 
terms of  its biological causes. We will argue by contrast that addiction is best understood as a 
phenomenon of  the whole agent-environment system.  
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We share much in common with medical accounts in proposing a learning model of  addiction. 
However learning as we will describe it is not a process of  operant conditioning as it is often 
taken to be in medical accounts of  addiction. We will show learning is instead best understood in 
terms of  predictive processing. As research is beginning to show the organism as a whole may 
best be described as a predictive system, facilitating intelligent behavior by predicting the sensory 
consequences of  its behaviour and keeping any resulting prediction errors to a minimum. The 
brain in this theory is hierarchically organised with each layer attempting to predict changing 
patterns of  activity in the layer below so as to build up the best overall guess as to what is 
currently causing sensory input in the world. Error signals propagate forwards in the hierarchy, 
and are used by the system either to improve future predictions, or to generate actions that when 
all goes well lead to sensory inputs that cancel out errors.  
A key component in the predictive processing theory is a mechanism that estimates the 
uncertainty or “precision” associated with an action policy - a sequence of  actions. Precision is 
here understood as the probability that an action policy will lead from the agent’s current states 
to the outcomes the agent desires. We will show how addiction may be the outcome of  precision 
estimation. So far this may sound very much like we are proposing to explain addiction purely in 
neurobiological terms. This however is not the case. We take predictive processing to be a self-
organising process that needs to be understood in terms of  the agent’s dynamical coupling to its 
environment (Bruineberg et al 2018).  Precision expectations tune the organism to the 48
possibilities for action that matter in the environment. We show how this process of  context-
sensitive updating of  precision expectations is what goes awry in addiction.       
      
The remainder of  our paper is organised as follows. In section 1 we outline the effects of  
addictive behaviours on reward processing in the midbrain. The medical model of  addition has 
led to advances in our understanding of  the effects of  repetition of  addictive behaviours on the 
dopaminergic systems in the midbrain. They have interpreted the changes in these brain areas 
that addictive behaviours induce in terms of  reward learning. In section 2 we show how to 
understand the effects of  substance use on reward learning in predictive processing terms. We 
show how the hijacking of  reward learning can be redescribed in terms of  precision weighting. 
In section 3 we draw on our earlier work on the role of  what we call “error dynamics” in 
precision weighting (Kiverstein at al 2017). “Error dynamics” refers to the expectation of  the 
  We call this interpretation of  predictive processing (PP) the ecological-enactive account. It is closely related to the 48
treatment of  PP found in Clark (2016) though there are also some important differences in how we characterise the 
situatedness of  the organism in its environment, and in our treatment of  the generative model. We return to the 
latter concept briefly in section five. 
Chapter 6: Gripped by Addiction !120
organism to reduce prediction error at a certain rate. We show how error dynamics are best 
understood in the larger context of  an organism aiming to improve grip on the things that 
matter in its environment. Section 4 then applies this model of  precision weighting to arrive at 
an account of  what is going wrong in addiction, where the problem lies not only in the brain but 
in the wider brain-body-environment dynamics. The brain is of  course a necessary part of  this 
story but it isn’t sufficient for understanding what goes wrong in addiction. In the final section, 
we develop this predictive processing account further. We show that it is the dynamics of  the 
addict’s coupling with the environment that makes their behaviour pathological. We finish up by 
considering the implications of  this hypothesis for the treatment of  addicts, and what a person 
would need to do to effect long-lasting change.       
6.2 “Mutiny in the mid-brain”  49
Normally reward processing in mid-brain areas leads us through the world in ways that increase 
our contact with what we find valuable and rewarding. Agents learn about values (e.g. expected 
rewards) in the world by minimizing the “reward prediction error” (RPE) which is the expected 
reward value less the actual reward received. Dopamine neurons in midbrain areas have been 
found to fire at rates that directly correlate with RPE signals and perceived reward values 
(Montague et al 1996; Schultz et al 1997). This strongly supports the hypothesis that dopamine 
functions as a learning signal in the brain. By signalling the mismatch between predicted and 
actual reward the agent learns to make the most of  these rewarding opportunities when they 
arise. Most animals respond with a similar reward learning signal when presented with objects of  
intrinsic desires such as food, water and opportunities to mate. In a similar manner humans 
respond to such things as money, success, favorite songs, and the flourishing of  loved ones.  
Substances of  addiction produce a similar response in the reward learning system - they produce 
a burst of  dopamine as if  the organism was encountering something which is intrinsically 
desired. They induce learning signals that convince the brain that the agent is progressing in the 
world in ways they intrinsically desire. This by itself  is not the problem. The real problem lies in 
how drugs of  addiction (and indeed other addictive pursuits) are able to “hijack” this system, 
and over time produce pathological levels of  wanting, cravings and compulsive acting (Robinson 
& Berridge 2008). Addictive substances promote unconscious learning in ways that over time 
progressively become untied from what the agent finds valuable. If  we have no desire to hear 
  We borrow this description of  the neural processes underlying addiction from Flanagan (2017). 49
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punk music attending a concert isn’t likely to be rewarding, but even if  one hates the idea of  
taking heroin the substance itself  acts on the brain as if  the substance was highly desired.  
RPE signals naturally diminish over time as the agent comes to learn about and anticipate 
regularities between cues and behaviours that lead to rewarding outcomes. Once a particular 
reward has become highly expected  it ceases to produce the same reward signal (Rescorla & 
Wagner 1972; Sutton & Barto 1981) This fails to happens with drugs of  addiction. Addictive 
drugs consistently produce strong reward learning signals long after non-drug induced learning 
signals should have vanished (Robinson & Berridge 2008). No matter how much the system 
expects the drug to be satisfying, it always registers as much more than that.  
  
Robinson and Berridge have offered a formula for how compulsive behaviour grows in addiction 
(1993, 2000, 2001, 2008). They call this process “incentive sensitisation”.  An important 50
benchmark in the development of  addiction is the point at which initial hedonic effects, the 
feelings of  pleasure associated with drug use, begin to wane, while the substance seeking and 
taking continue to become more consuming, more habitual and ultimately compulsive. A wealth 
of  animal studies suggest that at the level of  the brain this change from fascination to habit to 
compulsion occurs as the neural locus of  behavioural control shifts from prefrontal cortical 
areas to striatal subcortical areas, and again within the the striatum itself  processing moves from 
ventral to dorsal domains (Everitt & Robbins 2013). Once the dorsal striatum gets involved there 
is a an increasingly high probability that the learned behaviour will flow from the cues regardless 
of  perceived changes in value or reward.  51
This represents the final stage of  addiction. This transition from attraction to compulsion, from 
being attracted to and engaged by some stimuli to unthinking habitual behaviour, is all a natural 
part of  learning. For example, when our decision to wake up and run every morning stops being 
a conscious effort and becomes an automatic part of  our morning routine, it is because 
repetition and reward has encoded the selection of  those behaviours in the dorsal striatum 
 Although their work primarily looks at animal studies, the areas of  the brain they are interested in are not so 50
different in mice and humans. 
 Compulsivity isn’t a consequence of  this shift from cortical to sub-cortical control alone. This kind of  shift takes 51
place with any habitual behaviour, and is a natural part of  skill learning but not all habitual or skilled behaviours are 
compulsive. Addiction hijacks that process in an unexpected way quickly leading to undesirable actions (drug 
seeking behaviours) becoming more and more powerful (craving) and less and less controllable (habitual). Part of  
the power of  this compulsivity is due to the fact that in addiction the dorsal striatum begins to pull away from the 
influence of  cortical areas (such as the DLPFC) believed to ordinarily regulate and contextualize habitual responses 
(Yamamoto et al  2015; Lewis 2015). This leads to unthinking behavioural routines that can be driven by 
environmental cues that elicit powerful urges regardless of  their appropriateness. 
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(Wolfensteller & Ruge 2012). Addiction however is often described as “hijacking” this process, 
leading to undesirable actions (drug seeking behaviours) becoming more and more powerful 
(craving) and less and less controllable (compulsive). Once incentive sensitisation has happened 
addiction is hard if  not impossible to escape.  
Although the brain clearly plays an important role in the etiology of  addiction as the research we 
reviewed in this section clearly establishes, it would be a mistake to conclude that addiction is just 
a disorder of  the brain. We will argue that addiction is more to do with their bodily orientation 
towards the world. It isn’t just a problem located in their heads. To see this will however require 
us to better understand the contribution of  the reward learning system in the brain to addiction.  
6.3 The predictive processing perspective: reward tunes precision 
expectations 
Reward-based learning is standardly understood as the process by which the organism maximises 
expected utility while minimising costs and avoiding punishment (Sutton & Barto 1998; Delgado 
et al 2005; Arpaly & Schroeder 2013). In recent years a different account of  reward learning has 
begun to emerge that takes predictions of  reward to be part and parcel of  the prediction of  the 
sensory consequences of  our practical engagement with the world (Friston et al 2009, Friston et 
al 2012; Fitzgerald et al 2014; Clark 2016). It seems intuitive to think that we are motivated to 
seek out rewards and avoid punishments. Over time we thereby learn to frequent rewarding 
spaces (and avoid punishing spaces) more often than not. The predictive processing theory (PP) 
turns this intuition about expectation and reward on its head (Fitzgerald et al 2014; Friston et al 
2012). In contrast to traditional reinforcement learning models where decisions are made based 
on what set of  actions will maximize expected utility, in PP the rewarding sensory states are the 
sensory states the agent expects to occupy given the model of  the environment it has developed.  
In models of  reward-based learning the dopamine system is taken to track reward prediction 
errors. In PP dopamine performs a related but different function. Rewarding outcomes are those 
the organism expects given its phenotype and past-learning. They are the effect of  the organism 
predicting over multiple spatial and temporal scales the sensory consequence of  its actions. The 
organism’s choices are based on probabilistic beliefs about its action policies. The organism 
selects those actions that are most likely to lead to the outcomes it expects, which as we have 
seen in PP are rewarding outcomes. Beliefs about action policies are associated with confidence 
or precision. “Precision” refers to the organism’s degree of  confidence in the predictions that a 
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certain policy, or set of  behaviours, will bring about outcomes the organism values. Technically it 
refers to the inverse variance in the mean of  prediction error.  
When precision is expected to be high the “gain” is increased on prediction errors, thereby 
increasing the impact those error signals have on processing higher in the hierarchy. Error signals 
are just the sensory and physiological consequences of  action the brain expects that fail to match 
the organism’s current sensory and physiological states. By increasing the gain on certain 
prediction errors this can have the consequence of  prioritising certain actions as means of  
reducing prediction error. Precision thus ensures that the organism is always preparing for 
actions the effects of  which are valued. Dopamine instead of  being used for reward learning 
does the work of  updating precision expectations in ways that fit the agent’s current context. 
When all goes well the agent should weigh confidence in its action policies so as to maximise the 
probability that their actions will lead from their current sensory states to the outcomes they 
desire (Schwartenbeck et al 2014).   
Precision expectations track among other things what the organism assigns relevance to in its 
environment. There are always many things agents care about, and based on precision weighting 
they are able to balance the many things that matter to them. Precision expectations should thus 
be thought of  as the agent’s bodily stance in relation to what is relevant in its environment. The 
environment makes available to the organism many possibilities for action or affordances. 
Affordances are the possibilities for action provided by the substances, surfaces and other 
inhabitants of  an animal’s environment (Gibson 1979). Affordances stand out as relevant for an 
agent when there is a mismatch between the bodily states the agent predicts based on its past 
history of  interaction with the environment, and the bodily state it currently finds itself  
occupying. The relevant affordances that demand immediate action will give rise to prediction 
errors that are assigned high precision.  
Agents situated in an environment rich with affordances will typically be affected by a 
multiplicity of  relevant affordances simultaneously. Ideally an agent should be ready to respond 
in an integrated way to what we describe as a “field of  relevant affordances” (Rietveld & 
Kiverstein 2014; Bruineberg et al 2018). Each of  the affordances in the field will be relevant to 
the agent to different degrees. Some will call out for immediate action. The prediction errors that 
relate to acting upon those affordances will be assigned a high precision because of  the need to 
act immediately. The agent will thus expect fast error reduction for those relevant affordances 
that are being assigned high precision. Other relevant affordances will be assigned less 
importance. The agent can afford to delay acting on those possibilities. The agent will thus 
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expect slower rate of  error reduction for those relevant affordances. If  the agent expects to 
reduce error more slowly this may be because error reduction is more complex and will take 
them longer to deal with, or it may be because immediate error reduction isn’t so urgent. The 
agent can afford to wait. The more precise prediction error are weighted, the more urgency or 
priority is then assigned to reducing those prediction errors.  
Precision expectations are thus in part expectations the agent has to reduce error with a certain 
expedience. In the next section we explain how an embodied sensitivity to what we will call 
“error dynamics” plays an important role in learning precise policies. Error dynamics refers to 
the rate of  change in error reduction, or how fast or slow the sum of  prediction error is being 
reduced relative to the agent’s expectations (Kiverstein at al 2017). Later we will show how this 
embodied sensitivity to error dynamics is what is hijacked in cases of  addiction. First we must 
explain the role error dynamics play in the context-sensitive updating of  precision, and why we 
think this needs to be understood in the larger context of  the agent-environment system.   
6.4  The role of  error dynamics in tuning precision expectations 
We’ve argued that precision expectations can be thought of  as tracking relevance - the 
significance that is given to prediction errors in a given context. When the context changes either 
because of  something on the side of  the agent or something in the world, it is important that the 
agent be ready to adapt what they are doing to this change. This may mean they restructure the 
precision assigned to multiple prediction errors so that possibilities that were being assigned high 
weighting are now down-weighted in favour of  other possibilities.  
We suggest that agents that aim at long-term minimisation in prediction error will benefit from 
being sensitive to error dynamics. This sensitivity takes the form of  positive and negative bodily 
feedback felt by the person as a whole. The organism isn’t only interested in keeping prediction 
error to a minimum in its sensory exchanges with the environment. It doesn’t only aim to get 
itself  into the states it expects given what it cares about. Also important for setting precision is a 
sensitivity to changes in the overall rate at which errors are being reduced or increasing over 
time. Each agent’s performance in reducing error can be plotted as a slope that depicts the speed 
at which errors are being accommodated over time. The steepness of  the slope indicates that 
error is being reduced over a shorter period of  time and so faster than the agent expected: the 
steeper the slope, the faster the rate of  reduction. Rate of  change in error reduction refers to how 
fast or slow the sum of  prediction error is being reduced relative to expectations (Kiverstein at al 
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2017). If  the speed of  error reduction increases, this equates to a decrease in prediction error 
over time (relative to what was expected). If  speed of  error reduction decreases, this equates to 
an increase in prediction error over time.  
These global or summed error comparisons are made available to the system as embodied 
feelings (Kiverstein et al 2017; Van de Cruys 2017; Joffily & Coricelli 2013). Feelings of  positive 
and negative affect emerge as a reflection the the quality of  the organism’s engagement with the 
environment (see also Polani, 2009). These feelings are embodied as part of  valuation process 
that works as a sort of  bodily barometer keeping the organism informed about how it is fairing 
in its practical engagement with the environment and preparing the agent to act so as to improve 
its overall situation (Barrett 2017). Positive feelings are related to positive rates of  change in error 
reduction relative to what is expected. It works in the opposite way for negative feelings - they 
provide bodily feedback to the agent that error has been reduced at a slower than expected rate. 
Agent’s are normally sensitive to the rise and fall in error reduction and will be able to make use 
of  information about how well they are doing overall in reducing error to learn precise policies - 
policies that in the long run are maximally likely to reduce prediction error. This will allow them 
to balance how they distribute precision so that they can on the one hand stay in touch with the 
many possibilities that matter to them. On the other hand they will be able to redistribute how 
precision is assigned when something changes and they find error beginning to increase in ways 
that run contrary to what was expected. Sensitivity to error dynamics thus allows agents to stay 
in touch with and do justice to each of  the many things they care about.  
Consider what happens when the agent is in a high state of  affective tension with the 
environment. You are a smoker and you find yourself  stuck on an airplane. Your cigarettes are 
inviting you to smoke but you are not allowed to smoke. Your body is thus telling you that there 
is relevant source of  error that you have the means to immediately reduce but this is not 
permitted. This situation is felt in the body of  the agent as an unpleasant feeling of  persisting 
error or tension. The agent is doing worse than they expected at reducing error. They expect to 
reduce error fast but their expectation remains frustrated so long as they are flying. This negative 
feeling may lead the agent to explore the environment for other alternative possibilities to 
smoking that reduce tension for the duration of  the flight. Relevant possibilities that might now 
stand out soliciting them to act may possible distractions such as ordering another drink, or 
seeking comfort through complaining to your partner about the unfair smoking policies of  
airlines.  
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Contrast this situation with one in which the agent comes across an unexpected opportunity to 
reduce error. You are in a second-hand book shop and there on the shelf  is a rare book you’ve 
for years been searching for. An opportunity to reduce error has popped up where you were not 
expecting one. You have suddenly done much better than you were expecting and this feels good 
to you. Precision expectations are thus updated by feedback from feelings. This good feeling is 
part of  what sets precision on the policies that will end up leading us back to the same bookshop 
again in the future in the hopes of  acquiring similar rewards. 
Precision weighting then isn't just a brainy event. Precision expectations are updated or tuned to 
the context based on bodily feelings that track and leverage opportunities to improve at reducing 
error in line with our expectations. In the next section we show how it is exactly this sensitivity 
to error dynamics which substances of  addiction tap into and hijack. In PP addiction is 
understood as a consequence of  pathological precision weighting that leads to habits 
overwhelming other of  our goals, and a loss of  contextualisation of  habits by higher-level goals 
and desires. We suggest a different way of  thinking about this loss of  contextualisation by 
reference to the ideas on embodied error dynamics we’ve just introduced.   We will see that 
addictive substances act on the brain in ways that result in a shrinking of  the space of  
possibilities to which the agent attends 
6.5 Addiction as tending towards a sub-optimal grip 
It feels good to the agent when prediction error is reduced more efficiently than expected for the 
activities the agent cares about. For example if  a particular reduction in error is expected, such as 
the error reduced when we scratch an itch, little if  no positive feeling would emerge. The ideal 
situation for the agent is one in which error is being reduced at a faster rate than was expected. 
When this happens the organism can sense that it is doing better than expected. It feels good. 
Now consider what happens in substance addiction as the habit of  using the substance gets a 
grip on the person. The pleasure that the drug elicits in the first stages of  addiction signals that 
using the drug has offered an unexpected opportunity to reduce affective tension with the world. 
Predictive agents are always expecting to reduce tension, but the drug exceeds the agent’s 
expectation of  reducing tension. In addition to alleviating the tensions relating to the drug 
seeking and taking behaviour, addictive substances also reduce tensions relating to wider 
disattunement with the environment. Things overall thus seem to go even better than expected. 
Each time they act on this policy - the seek out and use the drug - the same things happens. 
Instead of  their expectations simply being met, which would normally signal to the brain nothing 
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new to be learned here, the brain responds by producing dopamine that signals that there is still 
something new and surprising being learned.  
As the policy is repeated, so the agent begins to predict cues that are associated with the pursuit 
of  the policy, such as being in a particular neighbourhood where you can score the drug. These 
predictions than give rise to prediction errors that are assigned high precision and so get to drive 
behaviour to actively seek out those cues. The agent will follow the trajectories (action policies) 
that lead to the drug. Eventually the agent finds more and more of  their everyday life being 
taken over by pursuit of  policies associated with drug use.   
Repeated use of  drugs of  addiction can thus be thought of  as training expectations for error 
reduction at a certain rate. Importantly, this is the source of  pleasure that comes with drug use 
(at least in the early days) on our account. Drugs of  addiction act directly on the system that is 
signalling the probability that a policy does a good job of  reducing prediction error. Thus it 
makes it seem there is now something they can do - namely seek out and take the drug - that 
does a much better job than expected at getting them into the rewarding bodily states they 
expect. They make it appear to the agent as if  error in relation to the many things that matter is 
being reduced rapidly at a rate that is faster than anything the agent has anticipated.  
The production of  dopamine caused by the drug makes it seem to the organism as if  the policy 
of  seeking and using the drug is the most reliable way of  getting itself  into the states it expects 
to occupy. Thus the policy of  seeking and using the substances soon comes to be the policy the 
organism has the most confidence in. As soon as the drug wears off  affective tension begins to 
increase again. Nothing was in fact resolved in the world through taking the drug. There was 
only the illusion of  error reduction. In fact the addict often finds themselves in a worse situation 
as is reflected in the negative affect associated with feelings of  guilt and shame in the short term 
and loss of  health in the long term. Cravings in the addict can be thought of  as the affective 
tension that can only be resolved by pursuing the policy of  finding and taking the substance. 
 Thus the cycle of  seeking and using takes hold and exerts a tighter and tighter grip on the agent. 
The addict has now come to expect a certain rate of  error reduction - they have come to expect 
to do better than expected at reducing tension for all of  the things that matter in their lives. So 
long as this fails to happen they feel bad because they are failing to meet their expected slope of  
error reduction (cf. Koob & Moal 2001, 2005).  
What is pathological about this is that it leads to akrasia, which means it leads to pervasive error 
in the rest of  the life of  the addict. What might seem like a fool proof  way to reduce uncertainty 
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is in fact no such thing, The agent increasingly loses touch with all the other possibilities that 
matter to them resulting in more error in the long run. This also has the consequence that the 
possibility to explore and gather new evidence is down-weighted relative to the option of  
continuing to exploit the known consequences of  using the substance. Addicts choose for the 
familiar option, and continue to do so even when the outcomes are negative. They don’t gather 
more evidence that might lead them to change their behaviour.  
Habits can be thought of  as various stable and persisting opportunities for action (or 
“attractors” in the language of  dynamical systems). These fixed point attractors emerge and 
dissolve both due to environmental conditions and changes in our own internal states and 
behaviours. However, agents also tend to actively destroy fixed point attractors therefore 
inducing instabilities and creating peripatetic or itinerant (wandering) dynamics (Friston, 
Breakspear, & Deco 2012).  52
Predictive organisms don't only seek to maximize error reduction, but rather are driven to reduce 
error at a particular rate (Kiverstein at al 2017). They are willing to disrupt their own fixed-point 
attractors (habitual policies) in order to explore just-uncertain-enough environments that are ripe 
for long term prediction error minimisation.  Predictive organisms are thus are the kinds of  53
agents that desire to continuously do better at reducing uncertainty in their engagement with the 
environment. 
We suggest the reason addicts don’t explore and gather new evidence may be that substances of  
addiction make the person feel (at least temporarily) like they are well-attuned even though they 
are not. They create an illusion of  attunement to the environment. Drugs of  addiction ‘cheat’ 
the “affordance competition” (Cisek & Kalaska 2010) - they direct the whole predictive 
organism to track and engage with (i.e. self  organize around) signals that register in the brain as 
highly valuable in terms of  adaptive success, but in fact are precisely the opposite. In the worse 
case scenarios, such as long term opioid addiction, it may be the case that in fact no skills, 
relationships, or resources are gained or improved during the repetitive drug seeking and taking 
behaviours. This further perpetuates the cycle that collapses the field of  relevant affordances - 
 Clark has recently written, “Friston suggests, our ‘neural expectations’ may come to include expectations of  52
‘itinerant trajectories’ mandating change, exploration, and search. We ‘expect’ to sometimes engage in random 
environmental search as a means of  entering into adaptively valuable states. To put it crudely, we randomly sample 
because - qua evolved organisms - we ‘expect’ to discover food, mates, or water at some point during the 
expedition” (2017). 
 Schwartenbeck et al (2013) extend this direction of  thinking by proposing that certain policies may be valuable 53
insofar as they open the way the agent to visit multiple other states. 
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there is more and more error from the many negative effects of  addiction, and less and less 
skillful development and support. 
Sensitivity to error dynamics is one way that good habits are woven into our skillful engagement 
incrementally over time - all directed to what matters to the organism. Drugs of  addiction as we 
have seen hijack this sensitivity leading the system to self-organize in relation to the environment 
in ways that lead agents to neglect the many other things in their lives that also matter to them in 
favour of  the policy of  feeding their addiction. Over time, the pursuit of  this policy is expected 
to a greater and greater degree, while other opportunities for rewarding behaviour are 
increasingly ignored. 
What is pathological we suggest is the crowding out of  the other action options that would 
normally also exert an affective pull on a person because they also matter to the person. But 
once the addiction has taken hold there is just one strongly alluring possibility that comes to be 
expected. We can understand this as the gradual collapse, or shrinking, of  what we call “the field 
of  relevant affordances”. The very same mechanisms that normally produce curiosity and 
exploration (Kiverstein at al 2017) once hijacked by the addictive substance produce precisely the 
opposite effect. Instead of  being moved to pursue the multiple possibilities we care about, the 
hijacked learning system leads the person to engage the world in tighter and tighter circles of  
habitual behaviours.  
Addiction is not a case then of  desire overwhelming a person’s better judgement (see Holton 
2009, ch.7), but instead it is a consequence of  our sensitivity to error dynamics no longer 
functioning to keep us in contact with what we desire. In other words, precision expectations are 
no longer being modulated relative to context in such a way as to allow the agent to maintain 
grip on the field of  affordances as a whole (Kiverstein & Rietveld 2015; Bruineberg et al 2018). 
Drug related affordances in the environment become increasingly powerful, dominating and 
silencing other behavioural policies. Instead of  maintaining grip on the many things that matter 
to them in the environment, the addict find themselves increasingly being gripped by the now 
drug-seeking infused field of  affordances.  
6.6 Why addiction isn’t just a brain disorder, and why it matters 
In section 1 we briefly reviewed the substantial evidence that addictive substances have an 
impact on the brain’s dopaminergic circuitry. However, as Lewis points out all rewarding 
Chapter 6: Gripped by Addiction !130
activities produce changes in dopamine transmission (Lewis 2017). Thus the changes drug use 
induces in the brain are not in themselves evidence for the claim that addiction is a disorder of  
the brain. Addiction isn’t a consequence of  the dysfunction of  the prediction error minimizing 
system in the addict’s brain. It is the result of  processes of  prediction error minimisation that are 
working optimally being led astray by chemically induced changes in precision weighting 
(Schwartenbeck et al 2015). The problems stem from the suboptimal generative model of  the 
environment the agent comes to embody, and where the agent expects to find precise prediction 
error. The “generative model” as we employ this term should be understood as the whole 
organism in relation to its ecological niche (Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al 2018; 
Friston et al 2011; Allen & Friston 2016; Kirchhoff  2017). It is not a model inside of  the brain 
that the organism has but is something the organism develops over time. Friston et al (2012) 
write: 
“We must here understand ‘model’ in the most inclusive sense, as combining interpretive 
dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a highly tuned ‘fit’ 
between the active, embodied organism and the embedded environment” (2012, p. 6). 
It is in this embodied sense of  ‘model’ that Friston claims that an “agent does not have a model 
of  its world – it is a model.” (2013, p. 213; see also Bruineberg et al 2018; Kirchhoff  2016, 2017). 
Every biological agent can be described as a probability distribution – a hierarchically organised 
probabilistic model conditioned on the sensory, physiological and morphological states that are 
highly probable given the life it leads and the eco-niche it inhabits (Friston 2010, 2013).  
Schwartenbeck and colleagues (2015) hypothesise that the generative model in addicts owes its 
suboptimality to the precision that is assigned to the addict’s habitual behaviours. Habitual 
behaviours become more highly expected, while goal-directed behaviours become less highly 
expected. Drugs of  addiction create this imbalance by re-tuning the confidence that some policy 
of  behaviours will result in expected sensory states. We’ve argued that this re-tuning happens 
through a sensitivity to error dynamics. Sensitivity to the rise and fall in error reduction plays a 
crucial role in helping an agent to balance the multiple relevant affordances, staying in touch with 
many of  the possibilities that matters to them when something in the agent’s situation changes. 
Addictive substances progressively drive behaviour to the neglect of  other possibilities that are 
also of  concern to the agent. They do so because they make it seem to the agent as if  an 
improvement has taken place in how well the organism is gripping the field of  affordances as a 
whole. Drugs of  addiction each time they are consumed signal to the organism that something 
better than expected has taken place. Unfortunately, the temporary state of  chemically-
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scaffolded grip wears off  all too quickly, only to be replaced with more error and uncertainty. 
Meanwhile the addict is progressively losing touch with the other things they care about.  
The organism’s brain is not malfunctioning, but is in fact doing what comes naturally, by 
increasingly honing in on the opportunities it expects to lead it to what is important in its 
environment. Through their impact on the dopamine system addictive substances signal to an 
otherwise optimal prediction-error minimising system that it is indeed progressing in reducing 
error, while in fact the exact the opposite is often taking place. We should therefore resist the 
temptation to attribute the many problems common to addiction to any single neurochemical 
alteration. To understand what is pathological in addiction we need to consider how those 
neurochemical changes are taken up into wider patterns of  behaviour, choice and learning. While 
changes in associative-reward circuitry certainly plays a necessary role in the development of  
addiction, we have been arguing that these changes are not sufficient to explain addiction.  
We can thus avoid the dichotomy of  either addiction is a biological disorder or it is a purely 
social phenomenon whose causes lie for instance in poverty or in the urban environment. In the 
place of  this dichotomy we suggest a predictive processing account of  addiction. Such an 
account is better supported by what we know about the brains of  addicts. Our account claims 
that the pathological behaviours of  addicts are the result of  disorganization within the agent-
environment system as a whole. Human agents enter into a circular causal relationship with their 
surroundings. The organism’s perception of  its environment, its actions and its feelings are co-
determining. It is this dynamic relationship between the organisms and the environment that is 
disrupted in addiction. From this perspective addiction is best characterized not as a change in 
particular neural circuitry, but as as a more general loss of  attunement of  the organism and its 
environment. With the addition of  error dynamics, PP can offer a rich explanation of  how 
neural computational processes contribute to the breakdown in this wider organism-
environment system and do justice to its phenomenology in the form of  feelings of  doing better 
or worse. 
Alva Noë has offered an analysis of  addiction that goes in a similar direction to our account. He 
has suggested that addiction should be understood more globally as a break down in the dynamic 
interplay between the addict’s goals and preferences and their wider behaviours. He writes,  
“normally there is a dynamic quality to our actions and preferences, just as there is with those of  
rats. We enjoy exercising, but we soon get tired or bored. But rest, too, soon loses its appeal. We 
eat, and then we are sated. And then we are ready for the treadmill again. And so on. Things 
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have gradually changing and complementary values. In addiction, this dynamic goes rigid. The 
addicts goal assumes a fixed value, and the value of  everything shrinks to zero, and with terrible 
costs” (2011). 
We agree with Noë’s analysis, but extend it further to include the dynamics between the 
organism’s embodied affective states and the field of  affordances. Ordinarily individuals are 
responsive to multiple relevant affordances simultaneously. In addiction the multiple concerns of  
the individual are silenced by the all consuming need that develops with addiction. Drugs of  
addiction impact the systems that help us stay tuned to the many things that matter to us. While 
the brain is registering that the agent improving at reducing error in relation to the many things 
that matter, the opposite is in fact taking place.  
Once we view addiction as a phenomenon of  the whole agent-environment system, we can do 
justice to accounts of  addiction that emphasise its societal causes (e.g Sullivan 2018). Recall how 
affective tension builds up in the body when the bodily states one currently occupies do not 
match the rewarding and valued states one expects to occupy. One expects to be reducing error 
at a particular rate (to reach a particular slope of  error reduction given the context) and when 
one fails to do so this is experienced by the agent as a negative feeling. Consider a person who is 
constantly facing hunger because they don’t have the money to buy food, and is cold because 
they are unable to pay to heat their home. They expect to be well-fed and to stay warm but their 
socio-economic status means that meeting these expectations is a continuous struggle. People 
faced with such a struggle to meet their expected slope of  error reduction might be more 
attracted to the possibility to “self-medicate”, as it is sometimes described. Once they have 
discovered the possibility to reduce affective tension with the world in ways that otherwise prove 
a struggle, one can imagine the temptation to do so repeatedly might be high. Marc Lewis makes 
this point well in relation to the susceptibility of  people struggling with PTSD and depression to 
addiction: 
“Importantly, it’s not just attraction or desire that fuels feedback loops and promotes 
neural habits. Depression and anxiety also develop through feedback. The more we think 
sad or fearful thoughts, the more synapses get strung together to generate scenarios of  
loneliness or danger, and the more likely we are to practice strategies—often unconsciously
—for dealing with those scenarios. Neural patterns forged by desire can complement and 
merge with those born of  depression or anxiety. In fact, that’s a lynchpin in the self-
medication model of  addiction. Gabor Maté persuasively shows how early emotional 
disturbances steer us toward an intense desire for the relief  provided by drugs (2008), and 
Maia Szalavitz vividly portrays her experience as a late adolescent trying to brighten her 
depression with cocaine and ease her anxiety with heroin (2016). So, when we examine the 
correlation between addiction and depression or anxiety, we should recognize that 
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addiction is often a partner or even an extension of  a developmental pattern already set in 
motion, not simply a newcomer who happened to show up one day” (Lewis 2017, p. 10). 
As we have argued above what feels good to agents is to be continuously improving in error 
reduction in relation to the many possibilities that matter to them. So long as the agent is doing 
this, they are managing to maintain grip on the field of  affordances as a whole. Sometimes a 
person’s life however offers only the prospect of  more uncertainty - think of  soldiers that 
become addicted to substances while away in a strange land in a war situation. They can make a 
predictable and somewhat more comforting reality for themselves out of  what is otherwise a 
confusing reality through substance abuse because the substance can be trusted to have certain 
guaranteed and predictable physiological effects on the body. Once the soldiers return home to 
the predictable and familiar reality, drugs no longer present the attraction they once held. There 
are better policies available to the soldiers for improving attunement with the world. This may go 
some way towards explaining why rates of  heroin addiction were high among soldiers stationed 
in Vietnam but upon returning home addiction rates fell back to their normal rates. The 
behavior of  the soldiers stationed in Vietnam was in this respect somewhat similar to that of  the 
rats in the famous Rat Park studies (Alexander, Coambs & Hadaway 1978; Alexander 2010; 
Ahmed et al 2013; Hari 2015; Solinas et al 2008). One group of  rats were placed in simple cages 
all alone, but with plentiful opportunity to consume as much opioids as they wanted.  For such a 
rat addiction was an inevitable outcome. When the same rats, now addicted to the substance, 
were moved to a much larger cage with other rats and a variety of  games and opportunities for 
improving they tended to ignore the available opiates altogether. Given the current proposal, we 
think this could be explainable insofar as the rats were able to now meet their expected slope of  
error reduction, just like the soldiers returning home from Vietnam (Robins 1993; Robins et al 
1975; Granfield & Cloud 1999). In addiction the agent is increasingly gripped by the 
environment until they cease to be open to the other non-drug related possibilities that matter to 
them. The way through addiction then is likely to be in part environmental enrichment. We 
suggest addiction recovery could be facilitated by changing the expected rate (the slope) of  error 
reduction itself  through restructuring (relearning) expectations for where to look in the 
landscape of  affordances for error reduction. A key part of  undoing such habits we suggest will 
be developing new and different skills for reducing error more efficiently, such as techniques of  
emotional regulation and mindfulness (Garland et al. 2014). People may find their way out of  
addiction by learning to contextualise their processes of  habit-selection through emotion 
regulation, so that they restore openness to the many possibilities that matter to them.  
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6.7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that addiction must be investigated from the much wider vantage 
point that includes the whole organism-environment system. The brain of  the addict is in fact 
doing what the brain is meant to do when viewed from the standpoint of  predictive processing. 
It is continually optimizing the fit of  the organism with its environment relative to what matters 
to the organism. However, addictive substances make it seem to the organism as if  error had 
been reduced but sadly for the addict this is just an illusion. The result in the long-run is 
inevitably a greater amount of  uncertainty arising from a loss of  a sensitivity to the wider 
concerns of  life.  
If  all predictive organisms care about is reducing error why isn’t the life addicts lead at least one 
viable strategy for prediction error minimisation? Addicts become extremely skilled at organising 
their lives around the goals of  finding and using the addictive substance. They develop models 
that are optimised to fit an environment in which these are the only things that matter. We’ve 
argued that predictive organism’s don’t only try and reduce error but reduce it at a particular rate. 
It might be thought however that this is exactly what the addict is doing as they get increasingly 
skilled at navigating the environment they come to inhabit.  
What this misses however is the way in which all the drug can deliver is short-term reduction in 
error. The life of  the addict becomes increasingly chaotic in other regards. As soon as the drug’s 
effect wears off, what they return to is a world offering all of  the uncertainty that never really 
went away. So long as the addict is high, it seems to them as if  they are succeeding at maintaining 
grip on what matters to them. Once the drug wears off, they find reality is very different. 
Substance addiction has been likened to a single room with many paths that all in the end lead 
the addict back into the same room again. The room of  addiction is however fraught with 
difficulties and dangers. The progressive loss of  touch with the rest of  what matters leads long 
term addicts to inevitably struggle with loss of  material possessions and personal relationships, 
diminished self  worth, and physical health problems. Addiction thus leads to long term increases 
in error in relation to all the other things that matter to the addict. Humans have come to expect 
over time to maintain relationships that matter to them, and to hold onto their possessions, and 
to remain healthy. In addiction however they act in ways that frustrate these expectations. The 
point at which an addict decides to make a change is sometimes referred to as “rock bottom”. 
This is the point at which what the addict has actually lost finally outweighs what they feel they are 
gaining.  
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The model of  the environment the addict becomes is a model of  an environment that is tailored 
and built around the all consuming activity of  feeding their habit. What counts as an 
improvement with regards to fitting this environment is dictated not by finding a balance among 
the many things that matter to the addict. It is instead dictated to the agent by the increasingly 
wide range of  possibilities that lead them back into the same vicious cycle of  behaviour. What is 
pathological about addiction is thus not to be found inside of  the brains of  addicts but in their 
wider engagement with life, and with the environment they enact.    
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Conclusions 
The predictive processing (PP) framework explored in the chapters of  this thesis has offered a 
number of  revolutionary contributions to the study of  the mind. However, one description of  
these developments threatens to revitalize a classical “internalist” perspective regarding the 
relationship between the brain, body and world. According to one popular characterization of  
the framework, cognition is now the result of  an evolving internal model constituted by a set of  
hierarchically structured neurons. If  cognition is prediction, and prediction is a brainy affair, then 
we know where to find the mind - in the skull, secluded from the body. As Hohwy summarizes, 
“PEM should make us resist conceptions of  this relation on which the mind is in some 
fundamental way open or porous to the world, or on which it is in some strong sense embodied” 
(2016: 259). This depiction of  cognition threatens to set us back into the bad old days of  
disembodied neurocentricism (see Anderson & Chemero 2013). 
However, this approach to PP has not gone without opposition. There is an emerging group of  
researchers who take the very same framework as offering a systems level description of  some 
of  the core tenets of  the embodied cognitive science paradigm. I wholeheartedly agree. 
However, as we have seen throughout this project, many of  these so called “embodied” PP 
approaches turn out to be only “moderately” embodied, meaning they continue to under-
appreciate or ignore completely the role the body plays in cognitive processes.  
The focus of  this project has been to show how a better understanding of  the role of  the living 
body can reveal the intimate relationship between emotion and cognition and help inform the 
construction of  a more fully embodied vision of  the predictive mind. To develop this view, I 
have drawn heavily on recent dynamic network models of  the brain. Such models have captured 
the interest and imagination of  the philosophical community in recent years, due in large part to 
the novel perspective they propose regarding traditional ontological categories of  mind such as 
emotion and cognition (Colombetti 2014; Pessoa 2013; Lewis 2005). Traditional locationist 
models of  the brain characterized emotion and cognition as linearly related, hierarchically 
structured and easily separable processes in the brain. In contrast, these dynamic network models 
suggest that emotion and cognition (our familiar names for functionalities that are not cleanly 
distinguishable at the circuit level) interact in dynamic, co-evolving and deeply interdependent 
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ways. I take this depiction of  emotion and cognition as support for a view of  cognition as 
inevitably affective, and so also deeply embodied. 
Throughout this project I have applied lessons from this research on emotion to the PP 
framework. I have argued that PP and dynamic network models form a powerful synergy. On the 
one hand, dynamic network models can offer neurobiological explanations of  how emotion and 
motivation influence cognitive, perceptual and behavioural processes in just the ways that 
embodied models of  PP have recently suggested (Clark 2016; Pezzulo et al. 2015; Seth & Friston 
2016). As we have seen, interoception is increasingly being given a special role in RPP accounts. 
Information from inside the organism’s body is described as directing the whole error-
minimizing regime in ways that keep the predictive organism in contact with what it cares about. 
To fulfill this role, embodied PP accounts depict interoception as participating in a dynamic and 
non-linear exchange with cognitive and behavioural processes. It is here that I see dynamic 
network models helping to put some much needed neurobiological flesh on an otherwise still 
largely theoretical PP skeleton. On the other hand, PP can provide an elegant systems level 
account of  why these various cognitive-emotional dynamics unfold as they do, as part of  an 
overall drive to continually reduce free-energy during embodied exchanges between the organism 
and the environment. 
While there is indeed an underlying logic in PP that clearly eschews the easy separation of  
processes such as perception, cognition and action, in favour of  a “seamless” dynamical 
integration of  these processes, there remains a perverse and pervasive cognitivism in the field 
when it comes to including the realm of  affectivity into this mix. And so while RPP is happy to 
help itself  to the sorts of  entangled neural architectures I have been describing throughout, 
researchers have not yet fully appreciated the depth of  the embodiment those entanglements 
may entail (good examples of  this are Pezzulo et al. 2015; Seth & Friston 2016) 
As a means of  helping PP to overcome this lingering ‘cognitive-cortical myopia’, I have 
proposed a treatment of  precision weighting as closely related to affective significance. Building 
on recent neuroscientific research, I argue that precision weighting should be understood as 
specifically emphasizing signals that have value for the organism. Precision turns out to be much 
less about reliability in terms of  high fidelity, and much more to do with reliably producing the 
affective and behavioural changes that allow the organism to secure a better more beneficial 
relationship between itself  and the environment. What becomes obvious here is that the 
predictive brain is not, after all, a rational scientist out to construct an objectively accurate model 
of  the world (Hohwy 2013), but rather a crooked scientist whose only aim is to confirm the 
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world it predicts will keep it alive and thriving (Bruineberg et al. 2016). This type of  view echoes 
and extends a motor-centric vision of  the brain (see Churchland et al. 1994). While such a model 
would depart from more traditional Helmholtzian takes on predictive processing, it fits perfectly 
well within more embodied and enactive takes of  PP.  
In the final half  of  this project I push this notion of  precision-based affectivity and affectivity-
reflecting precision to its extreme by linking precision weighting to embodied error dynamics. In the 
picture I develop, precision is set in part based on affective tensions in the body, which arise due 
to changes between the organism and its ecological niche. These affective tensions, which occur 
relative to changes in the rate of  expected error reduction, are interpreted as patterns of  action 
readiness (Frijda). A consequence of  my hypothesis is that instead of  thinking of  precision as a 
form of  top-down constraint operating at the higher-levels of  hierarchy, we can think of  the 
contextualization that precision weighting is believed to offer a little differently. I propose it is 
the larger metastable system of  the whole organism that sets precision. It does so in part on the 
basis of  bodily states of  action readiness, which I define as the organism’s evaluation of  what is 
of  current and future relevance in relation to its surrounding environment. I take this view of  
precision weighting to be supportive of  an ecological and enactive view of  PP (as also seen in 
Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. 2018). 
While this proposal remains in many ways theoretical, there are good reasons for taking such an 
approach seriously. For one, it suggests a vision of  PP that can do justice to the rich relationship 
between emotion and cognition that recent neuroscience has described. Second, it can provide 
insights into a number of  philosophical puzzles. As I have shown, this framework can provide 
elegant naturalistic accounts of  philosophically interesting concepts such as curiosity, desire and 
value, and addiction. And finally, the framework I have developed can provide new and more 
satisfying answers to some the more difficult philosophical and scientific challenges levelled 
against the PP theory of  mind – for example, the worry that it marks a return to an outmoded 
form of  internalism. 
Generative models, error minimizing strategies and precision weighting get us a long way in 
making sense of  what drives the neuroeconomy. But as I have argued throughout this project, a 
complete picture of  human cognition will require us to also include the many ways that the 
predictive brain operates as part of  a wider system which includes a situated body that acts, feels 
and cares. This work thus respects Clark’s injunction to "confront predictions in the 
wild” (2015). By exploring the rich entanglements between the prediction brain and the feeling-
acting-caring body, I have tried to develop a picture that takes us far beyond the merely modest 
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embodiment of  first wave PP. I hope this helps set the stage for a future science that 
foregrounds the living body as the systemic anchor point for the predictive brain. 
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Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. MIT press. 
Noë, A. (2009). Out of  Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain and Other Lessons from the 
Biology of  Consciousness. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Noe, A. (2011, September 9). Addiction is not a disease of  the brain [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2011/09/09/140307282/addiction-is-not-a-disease-of-the-
brain 
Öhman, A., and Mineka, S. (2001). Fear, phobias and preparedness: toward an evolved module 
of  fear and fear learning. Psychol. Rev. 108, 483–522. 
Oosterwijk, S., Lindquist K. A., Anderson, C., Dautoff, R. Moriguchi, Y. Barrett, L. F. (2012). 
States of  mind: Emotions, body feelings, and thoughts share distributed neural networks. 
NeuroImage, 62: 2110–2128. 
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of  vision and visual 
consciousness. Behavioral and brain sciences, 24(5), 939-973. 
O’Regan, J. K., Myin, E., & Noë, A. (2004). Towards an analytic phenomenology: the concepts 
of  “bodiliness” and “grabbiness”. In Seeing, thinking and knowing (pp. 103-114). Springer, 
Dordrecht. 
Oudeyer, P. Y. (2014). Socially guided intrinsic motivation for robot learning of  motor skills. 
Autonomous Robots, 36(3), 273–294. 
Oudeyer, P.-Y., & Kaplan, F. (2006). Discovering communication. Connection Science, 18(2), 189–
206. 
Oudeyer, P.-Y., Kaplan, F., & Hafner, V. V. (2007). Intrinsic motivation systems for autonomous 
mental development. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 11(2), 265–286. 
Oudeyer, P. Y., Baranes, A., & Kaplan, F. (2013). Intrinsically motivated learning of  real-world 
sensorimotor skills with developmental constraints. In Intrinsically motivated learning in natural and 
References !155
artificial systems (pp. 303-365). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Palmer, S., and Kimchi, R. (1986). ‘‘The information-processing approach to cognition,’’ in 
Approaches to Cognition: Contrasts and Controversies, eds T. J. Knapp and L. C. Robertson (Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum), 37–77.  
Pape, L., Controzzi, C. M. O. M., Cipriani, C., Foerster, A., Carrozza, M. C., & Schmidhuber, J. 
(2012). Learning tactile skills through curious exploration. Frontiers in Neurorobotics, 6(6), 11–16 
Papez, J. (1937). A proposed mechanism of  emotion. Archives of  Neurology and Psychiatry, 79, 217–
224.  
Patočka, J. (1998). Body, community, language, world. Open Court Publishing. 
Paulus, M.P., Stein, M.B. (2006). An insular view of  anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 60(4), 383–387. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of  Human and Animal Emotions. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Panksepp, J. (2004). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of  Human and Animal Emotions. 
OUP USA. 
Panksepp, J. (2012). ‘‘In defence of  multiple core affects’’, in Categorial Versus Dimensional 
Models of  Affect: A Seminar on the Theories of  Panksepp and Russell, eds P. Zachar and R. D. 
Ellis (Amsterdam, NL: John Benjamins Publishing Company), 31–78.  
Parvizi, J. (2009). Corticocentric myopia: old bias in new cognitive sciences. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 
354–359. 
Parvizi, J., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Consciousness and the brainstem. Cognition, 79, 135–160. 
Pessoa, L. (2008). On the relationship between emotion and cognition. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 9(2), 148–158. 
Pessoa, L. (2009). How do emotion and motivation direct executive control?. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 13(4), 160-166. 
Pessoa, L. (2013). The cognitive emotional brain: From interactions to integration. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Pessoa, L. (2014). Understanding brain networks and brain organization. Phys. Life Rev. 11, 400–
435. 
Pessoa, L. (2015). Précis on the cognitive-emotional brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, e71. 
Pessoa, L. (2017). A network model of  the emotional brain. Trends in cognitive sciences, 21(5), 
357-371. 
Pessoa, L., & Adolphs, R. (2010). Emotion processing and the amygdala: From a “low road” to 
“many roads” of  evaluating biological significance. Nature Reviews Neurosciences, 11(11), 773–783. 
Petro, L. S., & Muckli, L. (2016). The brain’s predictive prowess revealed in primary visual cortex. 
Proceedings of  the National Academy of  Sciences, 113(5) , 1124–1125. 
References !156
Petro, L. S., Vizioli, L., & Muckli, L. (2014). Contributions of  cortical feedback to sensory 
processing in primary visual cortex. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1223. 
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. (2015). Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and 
adaptive behavioural control. Progress in Neurobiology, 134, 17–35. 
Pfeifer, R., & Bongard, J. (2006). How the body shapes the way we think: a new view of  
intelligence. MIT press. 
Phelps, E. A. (2006). Emotion and cognition: Insights from studies of  the human amygdala. 
Annual Review of  Psychology, 57, 27–53.  
Plato (1992). Republic (Transl. G. Grube & C. Reeve). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. 
Polani, D. (2009). Information: currency of  life?. HFSP journal, 3(5), 307-316. 
Posner, M. I., Petersen, S. E., Fox, P. T., and Raichle, M. E. (1988). Localisation of  cognitive 
operations in the human brain. Science 240, 1627–1631. 
Powell, K. D., & Goldberg, M. E. (2000). Response of  neurons in the lateral intraparietal area to 
a distractor flashed during the delay period of  a memory-guided saccade. Journal of  
Neurophysiology, 84(1), 301–310. 
Ploghaus, A., Tracey, I., Gati, J. S., Clare, S., Menon, R. S., Matthews, P. M., Rawlins, J. N. (1999). 
Dissociating pain from its anticipation in the human brain. Science, 284, 1979–1981. 
  
Prinz, J. (2003). Emotions Embodied. Chapter in R. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling,. New 
York: OUP. 
Raichle, M. (2010). Two views of  brain function. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 180–190. 
Rakic, P. (2009). Evolution of  the neocortex: perspective from developmental biology. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 10, 724–735. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Feelings of  being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the. sense of  reality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of  Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the 
effectiveness of  reinforcement and nonreinforcement. Classical conditioning II: Current research and 
theory, 2, 64-99. 
Rietveld, E. (2008a). Situated normativity: the normative aspect of  embodied cognition in 
unreflective action. Mind 117, 973–1001. 
Rietveld, E. (2008b). The skillful body as a concernful system of  possible actions: Phenomena 
and neuro-dynamics. Theory & Psychology, 18(3), 341–363. 
Rietveld, E., & Brouwers, A. A. (2017). Optimal grip on affordances in architectural design 
practices: an ethnography. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), 545-564. 
Rietveld, E., Denys, D., & Van Westen, M. (2016). Ecological-enactive cognition as engaging with 




Rietveld, E., & Kiverstein, J. (2014). A rich landscape of  affordances. Ecological Psychology, 26(4), 
325–352. 
Rilling, J. K., & Insel, T. R. (1999). The primate neocortex in comparative perspective using 
magnetic resonance imaging. Journal of  Human Evolution, 37, 191–223. 
Risold, P. Y., Thompson, R. H., and Swanson, L. W. (1997). The structural organization of  
connections between hypothalamus and cerebral cortex. Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. 24, 197–254. 
Robins, L. N. (1993). Vietnam veterans' rapid recovery from heroin addiction: A fluke or normal 
expectation?. Addiction, 88(8), 1041-1054. 
Robins, L. N., Helzer, J. E., & Davis, D. H. (1975). Narcotic use in Southeast Asia and afterward. 
Archives of  General Psychiatry, 32(8), 955-961. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (1993). The neural basis of  drug craving: an incentive-
sensitization theory of  addiction. Brain research reviews, 18(3), 247-291. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2000). The psychology and neurobiology of  addiction: an 
incentive–sensitization view. Addiction, 95(8s2), 91-117. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2001). Incentive-sensitization and addiction. Addiction, 96(1), 
103-114. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2008). The incentive sensitization theory of  addiction: some 
current issues. Philosophical Transactions of  the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 363(1507), 
3137-3146. 
Rolls, E. T. (2005). Emotion Explained. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Romo, R., & Schultz, W. (1990). Dopamine neurons of  the monkey midbrain: contingencies of  
responses to active touch during self-initiated arm movements. Journal of  neurophysiology, 63(3), 
592-606. 
Rupert, R. (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of  affect. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 39, 1161–1178. 
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of  emotion. Psychol. Rev. 110, 
145–172. 
Sander, D., Grafman, J., and Zalla, T. (2003). The human amygdala: an evolved system for 
relevance detection. Rev. Neurosci. 14, 303–316. 
Sarinopoulos, I., Grupe, D. W., Mackiewicz, K. L., Herrington, J. D., Lor, M., Steege, E. E., and 
Nitschke, J. B. (2010). Uncertainty during anticipation modulates neural responses to aversion in 
human insula and amygdala. Cereb Cortex, 20, 929–940. 
  
Satel, S., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2014). Addiction and the brain-disease fallacy. Frontiers in psychiatry, 4, 
141. 
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press. 
References !158
Schachter, S., Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of  Emotional 
State. Psychological Review, 69: 379–399. 
  
Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of  emotion: A component process approach. 
Approaches to emotion, 2293, 317. 
  
Scherer, K. R. (1999). Appraisal theory. Handbook of  cognition and emotion, 637-663. 
  
Scherer, K. R. (2001). Appraisal considered as a process of  multilevel sequential checking. 
Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research, 92, 120. 
  
Scherer, K. R. (2004). Feelings integrate the central representation of  appraisal-driven response 
organization in emotion. In Feelings and emotions: the Amsterdam Symp. (eds Manstead  A. S. R., 
Frijda  N. H., Fischer  A. H.), pp. 136–157. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
  
Scherer, K. R. (2009). The dynamic architecture of  emotion: Evidence for the component 
process model. Cognition and emotion, 23(7), 1307-1351. 
Schmidhuber, J. (2010). Formal theory of  creativity, fun, and intrinsic motivation (1990–2010). 
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, 2, 230–247. 
Schouppe, N., Braem, S., Houwer, J. D. A., Verguts, T., & Ridderinkhof, K. R. N. (2014). No 
pain, no gain: Affective valence of  congruency conditions changes following a successful 
response. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioural Neuroscience, 15(1), 251–261. 
Schroeder, T. (2004). Three faces of  desire. Oxford University Press. 
Schueler, G. F. (1995). Desire: Its role in practical reason and the explanation of  action. MIT Press. 
Schultz, W., Dayan, P. & Montague, P. R. (1997). A Neural Substrate of  Prediction and Reward. 
Science, 275(5306), 1593–1599.  
Schultz, W., & Romo, R. (1990). Dopamine neurons of  the monkey midbrain: contingencies of  
responses to stimuli eliciting immediate behavioral reactions. Journal of  neurophysiology, 63(3), 
607-624. 
Schultz, W., Tremblay, L., & Hollerman, J. R. (2000). Reward processing in primate orbitofrontal 
cortex and basal ganglia. Cerebral cortex, 10(3), 272-283. 
Schwartenbeck, P., Fitzgerald, T., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. (2013). Exploration, novelty, 
surprise, and free energy minimization. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 710. 
Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., & Friston, K. (2014). The 
dopaminergic midbrain encodes the expected certainty about desired outcomes. Cerebral 
cortex, 25(10), 3434-3445. 
Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., Wurst, F., Kronbichler, M., &  
Friston, K. (2015). Optimal inference with suboptimal models: addiction and active Bayesian 
inference. Medical hypotheses, 84(2), 109-117. 
References !159
Seeley, W. W., Menon, V., Schatzberg, A. F., Keller, J., Glover, G. H., Kenna, H., et al. (2007). 
Dissociable intrinsic connectivity networks for salience processing and executive control. J. 
Neurosci. 27, 2349–2356. 
Semendeferi, K., Lu, A., Schenker, N., & Damasio, H. (2002). Humans and great apes share a 
large frontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 272–276. 
Sergerie, K., Chochol, C., and Armony, J. L. (2008). The role of  the amygdala in emotional 
processing: a quantitative meta-analysis of  functional neuroimaging studies. Neurosci. Biobehav. 
Rev. 32, 811–830. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007. 12.002 Spinoza, B. (1677/1894). Ethics. 
Translated by W. H. White London: Fisher Unwin.  
Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive Inference, Emotion, and the Embodied Self. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 17(11), 565-573. 
Seth, A. K. (2014). Response to Gu and FitzGerald: Interoceptive inference: from decision-
making to organism integrity. Trends in cognitive sciences, 18(6), 270-271. 
Seth, A. K. (2015). The cybernetic Bayesian brain from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor 
contingen- cies. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.), OpenMIND: 35(T). Frankfurtam Main: 
MIND Group. 
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016). Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain. Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B, 371(1708). 
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012). An interoceptive predictive coding model of  
conscious presence. Frontiers in psychology, 2, 395. 
Shapiro, L. (2007). The embodied cognition research programme. Philosophy compass, 2(2), 
338-346. 
Sherman, S. M. (2007). The thalamus is more than just a relay. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 17, 
417–422. 
Sherman, S. M., & Guillery, R. W. (2011). Distinct functions for direct and transthalamic 
corticocortical connections. Journal of  Neurophysiol, 106, 1068–1077. 
Sherman, S. M., & Guillery, R. W. (2013). Thalamocortical processing: Understanding the messages that 
link the cortex to the world. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Sherwood, C., Bauernfein, A. L., Bianchi, S., Raghanti, M. A., & Hof, P. R. (2012). Human brain 
evolution writ large and small. In M. A. Hofman & D. Falk (Eds.), Evolution of  the primate brain: 
From neuron to behavior (pp. 237–257). Oxford: Elsevier. 
Shipp, S. (2003). The functional logic of  cortico-pulvinar connections. Philosophical Transactions of  
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 358, 1605–1624. 
Singer T, Critchley H. D., Preuschoff  K. (2009). A common role of  insula in feelings, empathy 
and uncertainty. Trends Cogn Sci, 13:334–340. 
  
Sinha, R. (2008). Chronic stress, drug use, and vulnerability to addiction. Annals of  the new York 
Academy of  Sciences, 1141(1), 105-130. 
References !160
Smith, M. (1987). The Humean theory of  motivation. Mind, 96(381), 36-61. 
Smith, L. B., & Thelen, E. (2003). Development as a dynamic system. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
7(8), 343–348. 
Soodak, H., & Iberall, A. (1978). Homeokinetics: A physical science complex systems. Science, 
201, 18.  
Solinas, M., Chauvet, C., Thiriet, N., El Rawas, R., & Jaber, M. (2008). Reversal of  cocaine 
addiction by environmental enrichment. Proceedings of  the National Academy of  Sciences, 105(44), 
17145-17150. 
Sporns, O. (2006). Small-world connectivity, motif  composition, and complexity of  fractal 
neuronal connections. Biosystems, 85(1), 55-64. 
Sporns, O., Chialvo, D. R., Kaiser, M., & Hilgetag, C. C. (2004). Organization, development and 
function of  complex brain networks. Trends in cognitive sciences, 8(9), 418-425. 
Sporns, O., Tononi, G., & Edelman, G. M. (2000). Theoretical neuroanatomy: relating anatomical 
and functional connectivity in graphs and cortical connection matrices. Cerebral cortex, 10(2), 
127-141. 
Sporns, O., & Zwi, J. D. (2004). The small world of  the cerebral cortex. Neuroinformatics, 2(2), 
145-162. 
Sprengelmeyer, R., Young, A. W., Calder, A. J., Karnat, A., Lange, H., Homberg, V.,Perrett, D. I., 
Rowland, D. (1996). Loss of  disgust. Perception of  faces and emotions in Huntington’s disease. 
Brain, 119:1647–65. 
  
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the 
rationality debate? Behavorial and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. 
Stapleton, M. (2013). Steps to a “Properly Embodied” cognitive science. Cognitive Systems Research, 
22–23, 1–11. 
Sullivan, A. (2018, Feb 20). The Poison We Pick. New York Magazine. Retrieved from http://
nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/02/americas-opioid-epidemic.html 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1981). Toward a modern theory of  adaptive networks: expectation 
and prediction. Psychological review, 88(2), 135. 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Suzuki, A., Hoshino, T., Shigemasu, K. & Kawamura, M. (2006). Disgust-specific impairment of  
facial expression recognition in Parkinson’s disease. Brain, 129:707–17. 
Swanson, L. W. (1983). ‘‘The hippocampus and the concept of  the limbic system,’’ in Neurobiology 
of  the Hippocampus, ed W. Seifert (London: Academic Press), 3–19.  
Swanson, L. W. (2000). Cerebral hemisphere regulation of  motivated behavior. Brain Research, 
886, 113– 164. 
References !161
Szalavitz, M. (2016). Unbroken brain: a revolutionary new way of  understanding addiction. St. Martin's 
Press. 
Tetlock, P. E., & Gardner, D. (2016). Superforecasting: The art and science of  prediction. New York: 
Broadway Books. 
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1996). A dynamic systems approach to the development of  cognition and action. 
MIT press. 
Thelen, E., Schöner, G., Scheier, C., & Smith, L. B. (2001). The dynamics of  embodiment: A 
field theory of  infant perseverative reaching. Behavioral and brain sciences, 24(1), 1-34. 
Theyel, B., Llano, D., & Sherman, S. (2010). The corticothalamocortical circuit drives higher-
order cortex in the mouse. Nature Neuroscience, 13, 84–88. 
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of  Mind. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Thompson, E., & Cosmelli, D. (2011). Brain in a vat or body in a world? Brainbound versus 
enactive views of  experience. Philosophical topics, 163-180. 
Thompson, E., & Varela, F. J. (2001). Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and 
consciousness. Trends in cognitive sciences, 5(10), 418-425. 
Tishby, N., & Polani, D. (2011). Information theory of  decisions and actions. In V. Cutsuridis, A. 
Hussain & J. G. Taylor (Eds.), Perception-action cycle (pp. 601–636). New York: Springer. 
Todd, R., & Thompson, E. (2015). Strengthening emotion-cognition integration. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 38. 
  
Van de Cruys, S. (2017). Affective value in the predictive mind. In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese 
(Eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing (Vol. 24). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. 
Van de Cruys, S., & Wagemans, J. (2011). Putting reward in art: A tentative prediction error 
account of  visual art. I-Perception, 2(9), 1035–1062. 
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Sporns, O. (2011). Rich-club organization of  the human connectome. 
Journal of  Neuroscience, 31(15), 775–786. 
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Sporns, O. (2013a). Network hubs in the human brain. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 17, 683–696. 
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Sporns, O. (2013b). An anatomical substrate for integration among 
functional networks in human cortex. Journal of  Neuroscience, 33(14), 489–500. 
Verschure, P. F., Pennartz, C. M., & Pezzulo, G. (2014). The why, what, where, when and how of  
goal-directed choice: neuronal and computational principles. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 369(1655), 
20130483. 
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J. P., Gallese, V., Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of  us 




Wilson, R., Foglia, L. (2011). 'Embodied Cognition'. Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy. 
Available at http://plato.standford.edu/entries/embodiedLcognition. 
  
Wilson-Mendenhall, C. D., Barrett, L. F., Simmons, W. K., and Barsalou, L. W. (2011). Grounding 
emotion in situated conceptualization. Neuropsychologia 49, 1105–1127. 
Winston, P. H. (2012). The next 50 years: A personal view. Biologically Inspired Cognitive 
Architectures, 1, 92–99. 
Withagen, R., De Poel, H. J., Araújo, D., & Pepping, G. J. (2012). Affordances can invite 
behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency. New Ideas in Psychology, 
30(2), 250-258. 
Wolfensteller, U., & Ruge, H. (2012). Frontostriatal mechanisms in instruction-based learning as 
a hallmark of  flexible goal-directed behavior. Frontiers in psychology, 3, 192. 
Wolpert, D. M., & Kawato, M. (1998). Multiple paired forward and inverse models for motor 
control. Neural networks, 11(7-8), 1317-1329. 
Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of  Psychology. Translated by C. H. Judd Oxford: Engelman  
Wurtz, R. H., McAlonan, K., Cavanaugh, J., & Berman, R. A. (2011). Thalamic pathways for 
active vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(4), 177–184.  
Yamamoto, D. J., Woo, C. W., Wager, T. D., Regner, M. F., & Tanabe, J. (2015). Influence of  
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum on risk avoidance in addiction: a mediation 
analysis. Drug & Alcohol Dependence, 149, 10-17. 
Thomas Yeo, B. T., Krienen, F. M., Sepulcre, J., Sabuncu, M. R., Lashkari, D., Hollinshead, M., ... 
& Fischl, B. (2011). The organization of  the human cerebral cortex estimated by intrinsic 
functional connectivity. Journal of  neurophysiology, 106(3), 1125-1165. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1998). Emotions. In Gilbert, Daniel T., Fiske, Susan T., Lindzey, Gardner, (Eds.). 
(1998). The handbook of  social psychology, Vols. 1-2, 4th ed., (pp. 591-632). New York, NY, US: 
McGraw-Hill.
